翻刻
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
四三二【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
因明大疏私抄卷第九
【枠外右横下】
八四
【二段構成】
【上段】
問身根實智等者。裏書云。此問答是約＿二外道＿一言也《割書：云云》。
問￣ノ意。外道以爲言得＿二火自相＿一。緣＿二此言＿一實智亦能得＿二火自
相＿一。如＿二身根觸＿一レ火也。所以此問來也。同￣ク得＿二自相＿一事。其
分齊旣等。何燒＿レ身不＿レ燒＿レ智哉《割書：爲言》。答意。裏書云。若以＿レ火
對＿レ心時。其用最劣。若對＿レ根時。其用强盛。故有＿二根燒心
不燒＿一也。此外道答也《割書：云云》。仍此爲＿レ示＿二外道之所存分齊＿一。
有＿二此問答＿一也。
答此之共相《割書：乃至》所依共相者。續疏云。答現量心緣所得
自相。可分有體。亦緣＿二有體法＿一。害＿二自體＿一故。若比量緣＿二有
法及法自共二種＿一。緣＿二因三相＿一。此之共相○《割書：已下如＿二本｜疏＿一。云云》
設定心緣因彼名言等者。噵云。定心尋＿レ名緣＿レ火。依＿二唯識＿一
是共相收。此可言故。若依＿二因明＿一。是自相收。各謝＿二己體＿一
緣故《割書：云云》。裏書云。備云。依＿二此文＿一明知。定心尋＿レ名緣＿レ火。
旣是共相。亦是自相《割書：云云》。
然不許名○故云得自相者。噵云。因明￣ノ自相《割書：云云》。此之
共相者。噵云。因明￣ノ共相《割書：云云》。
同名句詮所依共相者。裏書云。因明共相。同＿二於唯識共
【下段】
相＿一也。所依者。能詮之所依故《割書：云云》。
明燈抄云。依＿二佛地論＿一。因明二相。與＿レ經不＿レ同。因明意者。
諸法實義￣ヲ皆名＿二自相＿一。亦散心智分別假立名爲＿二共相＿一。經
說￣ケル共相因明論中自相所攝。所＿二-以爾＿一者。於＿二諸法上＿一。自
相共相。各附＿二己體＿一。不＿レ共＿レ他故。非＿二假立＿一故。名爲＿二實義＿一。
不＿レ待＿二假智￣ノ分別安立＿一。任＿二法性理＿一。任＿二自性＿一故。名爲＿二自
相＿一。卽現量心之境界也。苦無常等。體性非＿レ無。該＿二-通諸
法＿一。諸法共有故。佛地論名爲＿二共相＿一。若因明中所說共相。
唯於＿二自相＿一增益假立。名同義別。故與＿二經旨＿一。義不＿二相違＿一。
○何故今云＿二此之共相全無其體＿一。解云。夫共相者。但是名
言增益假立。非＿下離＿二自相＿一有＿中共相體＿上。謂假智詮不￣トモ＿レ得＿二自
相＿一。然離＿二自相＿一施設無＿レ方故。對＿二名言及分別智＿一。於＿二法自
相＿一增益建立。無＿二別自體＿一。稱＿レ之爲＿レ假。遮得自相。說＿二自相＿一。
說＿二共相名＿一。故雖＿四說云＿三名字所得￣ハ非＿二是實法＿一。唯識復
云＿下由＿レ此但依＿二似＿レ事而轉＿一。似謂增益。非＿中實有相＿上。佛地亦
云＿下如＿二因明論所說共相＿一要是散心分別假立＿上。依＿二此等
文＿一。共相無體。故云＿二此之共相全無其體＿一。 文設定心緣
【左頁】
【枠外左上】
四三三【但し算用数字】
【枠外左横上】
因明大疏私抄卷第九
【枠外左横下】
八五
【二段構成】
【上段】
至＿二故亦無失＿一者○此卽因＿レ名作＿二行解＿一故。緣《割書：考【四角で囲む】緣字不｜明復歟》是
假智而名＿レ得＿二自相＿一。亦名＿二現量＿一者。不＿レ同＿下比量分別假立￣シテ
計＿二名之與＿一レ義定相屬著＿上故○同名句詮所依共相者。假
智及詮之取＿二增益＿一。名爲＿二所依＿一。此義云何。依＿二無始￣ヨリ習￣セル
内心￣ノ計度＿一。於＿二離言法＿一。分別增益。方發＿二名言＿一。依＿二此名言＿一。
更發＿二假智＿一。其所增語。貫＿二-在彼此＿一。故名＿二共相＿一。此之共相。
名句轉起之所依處￣ナリ。所依卽共故。名＿二所依共相＿一等《割書：云云》。
【一字下げ】
仍准＿二此等釋＿一。案＿二 二明￣ノ二相有體無體＿一。因明共相￣ハ無
體假￣ナリ。因明自相。卽内明共相。是有體假￣ナリ。内明自
相。方是眞有體。卽法性故。是卽眞現量境界。如＿レ此歟。
【字下げ終わり】
若（又云）佛心緣比量共相等者。明燈抄云。佛緣＿二共相＿一。卽有＿二 二
說＿一。一云因位現量劣。唯能緣＿二自相＿一。若緣＿二共相＿一者。卽是比
量收。果位旣遍知。亦能緣＿二共相＿一。然由＿二無分別＿一。仍是現量
攝。能緣＿二共相＿一名＿二比量＿一者。唯約＿二因位。散心＿一說。一云佛
地論難＿二《割書：傍【四角で囲む】不量》因明論中所說共相＿一。要是散心分別假立。
如來旣無＿二比量散心＿一。如何諸佛緣＿二共相＿一乎○今此疏主。
卽依＿二初說＿一《割書：云云》。
【下段】
裏書云。邑云。此說＿三佛心緣＿二於比量境之共相＿一。非＿レ謂＿三佛
心有＿二比量＿一也《割書：文》。
又云。備云。佛緣＿二凡夫比量心所緣共相＿一。亦無體也《割書：云云》。
【二字下げ】
離名種等所有分別下
【字下げ終わり】
故理門云《割書：乃至》方爲現量者。解＿二論文＿一《割書：今論＿二有等言＿一｜故。全同＿二理門＿一。》大有＿二
二意＿一《割書：見タリ》。
【三字下げ】
初釋
【一字下げ】
遠離一切種類￣ト。《割書：勝論￣ノ大有。同異。｜數論￣ノ三德等分別。》名言假立￣ト。《割書：目＿レ短爲＿レ｜長等。皆》
《割書：不＿レ稱＿レ實。｜名言分別。》無異￣ト。《割書：依＿二共相＿一｜轉￣スル分別》諸門￣ト。《割書：六句中常無｜常等分別》分別。
【三字下げ】
此釋通簡＿二比量非量分別＿一《割書：爲言》。
後釋
【一字下げ】
遠離一切種類￣ノ《割書：名言非一故｜名＿二種類＿一。》名言假立￣セル無異￣ノ《割書：依＿二此名｜言＿一。假＿二-立》
《割書：一法＿一。貫＿二-通諸法＿一。｜名爲＿二無異＿一。》諸門￣ノ《割書：通宗。定有。異遍｜無等￣ヲ名爲＿二諸門＿一。》分別。
【三字下げ】
此釋但簡＿二比量分別＿一《割書：爲言》。或可諸門卽諸外道等
者。此釋中解＿二諸門言＿一 一義《割書：ナリト見タリ》
此卽簡非盡者。此釋不＿レ簡＿二非量分別＿一。故簡＿二不盡＿一
《割書：爲言》。
現代語訳
【右頁】
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【上段】
「問う。身根の実智等」とは、裏書に云う。この問答は外道について言うのである【云云】。
問いの意は、外道は言が火の自相を得ると以為し、この言に縁ずる実智も亦能く火の自相を得ると考える。身根が火に触れるが如くである。所以にこの問が来るのである。同じく自相を得ることについて、その分際が既に等しい。何故身を焼いて智を焼かないのか【為言】。答えの意について、裏書に云う。もし火を心に対する時、その用は最も劣る。もし根に対する時、その用は強盛である。故に根は焼かれて心は焼かれないということがある。これは外道の答えである【云云】。よってこれは外道の所存の分際を示すために、この問答があるのである。
「答う。この共相【乃至】所依の共相」とは、続疏に云う。答う。現量心が縁じて得る所の自相は、分かって体有りと言うべきである。亦体有る法に縁ずる。自体を害するが故に。もし比量が有法及び法の自共二種に縁じ、因の三相に縁ずるなら、この共相○【已下本疏の如し。云云】
「設い定心が彼の名言に因って縁ずる等」とは、道に云う。定心が名を尋ねて火に縁ずるのは、唯識に依れば是れ共相の収である。この言うべきが故に。もし因明に依れば、是れ自相の収である。各々己体を謝して縁ずるが故に【云云】。裏書に云う。備に云う。この文に依って明らかに知る。定心が名を尋ねて火に縁ずるのは、既にこれ共相であり、亦これ自相である【云云】。
「然し名を許さず○故に自相を得ると云う」とは、道に云う。因明の自相【云云】。「この共相」とは、道に云う。因明の共相【云云】。
「同じく名句が詮する所依の共相」とは、裏書に云う。因明の共相は、唯識の共
【下段】
相と同じである。所依とは、能詮の所依だからである【云云】。
明燈抄に云う。仏地論に依れば、因明の二相は、経と同じではない。因明の意は、諸法の実義を皆自相と名づける。亦散心智の分別仮立を名づけて共相と為す。経が説く所の共相は因明論中では自相の所摂である。所以にそうである理由は、諸法の上において、自相・共相は、各々己体に附いて、他と共しないが故に。仮立ではないが故に。実義と名づける。仮智の分別安立を待たず、法性の理に任せ、自性に任ずるが故に。自相と名づける。即ち現量心の境界である。苦・無常等は、体性が無ではなく、諸法に該通し、諸法が共に有するが故に、仏地論では共相と名づける。もし因明中の所説の共相は、唯自相の上で増益仮立する。名は同じだが義は別である。故に経の旨と、義は相違しない。
○何故今「この共相は全くその体が無い」と云うのか。解いて云う。そもそも共相とは、但だこれ名言の増益仮立である。自相を離れて共相の体が有るのではない。謂わば仮智は詮じても自相を得ない。然し自相を離れて施設する方がないが故に、名言及び分別智に対して、法の自相の上で増益建立する。別の自体が無い。これを称して仮と為す。自相を得ることを遮って、自相を説き、共相の名を説く。故に「名字の所得は実法ではない」と説くといえども、唯識にまた「これによって但だ事に似たものに依って転ずる」と云う。似とは増益を謂う。実に有る相ではない。仏地にも「因明論の所説の共相の如きは、要するにこれ散心の分別仮立である」と云う。これ等の文に依って、共相は無体である。故に「この共相は全くその体が無い」と云う。文「設い定心が縁ずる
【左頁】
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【上段】
故に亦失無きに至る」○これ即ち名に因って行解を作すが故に、縁ずる【考察：縁字不明復歟】これ仮智であって自相を得ると名づける。亦現量と名づけるのは、比量が分別仮立して名と義とが定めて相属著することを計るのと同じではないからである○「同じく名句が詮する所依の共相」とは、仮智及び詮のとる増益を、所依と名づける。この義はどうか。無始より習った内心の計度に依って、離言の法において、分別増益し、方に名言を発す。この名言に依って、更に仮智を発す。その所増の語は、彼此に貫在するが故に、共相と名づける。この共相は、名句転起の所依処である。所依が即ち共であるが故に、所依共相と名づける等【云云】。
【一字下げ】
よってこれ等の釈に准じて、二明の二相の有体・無体を案ずるに、因明の共相は無体の仮である。因明の自相は、即ち内明の共相で、これは有体の仮である。内明の自相こそが、方に真の有体である。即ち法性であるが故に。これ即ち真の現量の境界である。この如くか。
【字下げ終わり】
「もし（又云う）仏心が比量の共相に縁ずる等」とは、明燈抄に云う。仏が共相に縁ずることについて、即ち二説がある。一に云う。因位の現量は劣であり、唯能く自相に縁ずる。もし共相に縁ずれば、即ちこれ比量の収である。果位は既に遍知であり、亦能く共相に縁ずる。然し無分別によって、仍お是れ現量の摂である。能く共相に縁ずることを比量と名づけるのは、唯因位・散心について説くのである。一に云う。仏地論は「因明論中の所説の共相は、要するにこれ散心の分別仮立である」と難ずる。如来は既に比量の散心が無い。如何にして諸仏は共相に縁ずるのか○今この疏主は、即ち初説に依る【云云】。
【下段】
裏書に云う。邑に云う。これは仏心が比量の境たる共相に縁ずることを説く。仏心に比量が有ると謂うのではない【文】。
又云う。備に云う。仏が凡夫の比量心の所縁の共相に縁ずるのも、亦無体である【云云】。
【二字下げ】
名種等の所有の分別を離るるより下
【字下げ終わり】
「故に理門に云う【乃至】方に現量と為す」とは、論文を解くのである【今論に有等の言があるが故に、全く理門と同じ】大いに二意がある【見たり】。
【三字下げ】
初釈
【一字下げ】
一切の種類を遠離し【勝論の大有・同異、数論の三徳等の分別】、名言仮立を【短を目して長と為す等、皆実に称わず、名言分別】、無異を【共相に依って転ずる分別】、諸門を【六句中の常・無常等の分別】分別する。
【三字下げ】
この釈は通じて比量・非量の分別を簡ぶ【為言】。
後釈
【一字下げ】
一切の種類の【名言が一でないが故に種類と名づける】名言仮立せる無異の【この名言に依って、一法を仮立し、諸法に貫通するを、無異と名づける】諸門の【通宗・定有・異遍・無等を名づけて諸門と為す】分別を遠離する。
【三字下げ】
この釈は但だ比量の分別を簡ぶ【為言】。或いは可し。「諸門即ち諸外道等」とは、この釈中で諸門の言を解く一義である【なりと見たり】。
「これ即ち簡が尽きず」とは、この釈は非量の分別を簡ばない。故に簡が尽きない【為言】。
英語訳
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[Upper Section]
"Question: Real cognition of body-faculty etc." - the marginal commentary says: This question and answer speaks about non-theists [etc.].
The question's intention is: non-theists consider that words obtain fire's self-characteristics, and real cognition relating to these words can also obtain fire's self-characteristics. Like body-faculty touching fire. Therefore this question arises. Regarding equally obtaining self-characteristics, since their extent is already equal, why does it burn the body but not burn cognition [meaning]? Regarding the answer's intention, the marginal commentary says: If fire opposes mind, its function is most weak. If opposing faculties, its function is strong. Therefore there is burning of faculties but not burning of mind. This is the non-theists' answer [etc.]. Therefore, to show the extent of non-theists' understanding, there is this question and answer.
"Answer: These universal characteristics [...] universal characteristics as foundation" - the Continued Commentary says: Answer: The self-characteristics that direct perception obtains through relating can be distinguished as having substance. It also relates to dharmas having substance. Because it harms the self-substance. If inference relates to both particular and universal types of subject and predicate, relating to the three characteristics of reasons, these universal characteristics ○ [below as in the main commentary, etc.]
"Even if concentrated mind relates through those conventional expressions etc." - Dō says: Concentrated mind seeking names and relating to fire, according to Consciousness-Only, is included in universal characteristics. Because this can be spoken. If according to Hetuvidyā, it is included in self-characteristics. Because each relates by thanking its own substance [etc.]. The marginal commentary says: Bei says: Based on this text, it is clearly known. Concentrated mind seeking names and relating to fire is already universal characteristics and also self-characteristics [etc.].
"However, not permitting names ○ therefore saying obtaining self-characteristics" - Dō says: Hetuvidyā's self-characteristics [etc.]. "These universal characteristics" - Dō says: Hetuvidyā's universal characteristics [etc.].
"Same as conventional expressions indicating foundational universal characteristics" - the marginal commentary says: Hetuvidyā's universal characteristics are the same as Consciousness-Only's universal
[Lower Section]
characteristics. Foundation means because it is the foundation of what indicates [etc.].
The Mingdeng Commentary says: According to the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra, Hetuvidyā's two characteristics are not the same as the sūtras. Hetuvidyā's intention is: all dharmas' real meaning is called self-characteristics. Also, scattered mind's discrimination and provisional establishment is called universal characteristics. What the sūtras explain as universal characteristics is included in self-characteristics within Hetuvidyā treatises. The reason for this is: regarding dharmas, self-characteristics and universal characteristics each attach to their own substance, not shared with others. Because they are not provisional establishments, they are called real meaning. Not waiting for provisional cognition's discriminative establishment, following dharma-nature's principle, following self-nature, therefore called self-characteristics. That is, the realm of direct perception mind. Suffering, impermanence etc. - their substance-nature is not non-existent, pervading all dharmas, commonly possessed by all dharmas, therefore the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra calls them universal characteristics. If the universal characteristics explained in Hetuvidyā are only superimposed provisional establishments on self-characteristics. Same names but different meanings. Therefore with the sūtra's intention, the meaning does not contradict.
○ Why now say "these universal characteristics completely lack substance"? Explaining: Universal characteristics are merely conventional expressions' superimposed provisional establishments. It is not that universal characteristics' substance exists apart from self-characteristics. That is, though provisional cognition indicates, it does not obtain self-characteristics. However, because there is no way to establish apart from self-characteristics, in response to conventional expressions and discriminative cognition, they superimpose and establish on dharmas' self-characteristics. Having no separate self-substance, this is called provisional. Blocking obtaining self-characteristics, explaining self-characteristics, explaining universal characteristics' names. Therefore, though explaining "what names obtain are not real dharmas," Consciousness-Only also says "because of this, they only operate depending on seeming things." Seeming means superimposition - not actually existing characteristics. Buddhabhūmi also says "like the universal characteristics explained in Hetuvidyā treatises are necessarily scattered mind's discriminative provisional establishments." Based on these texts, universal characteristics lack substance. Therefore saying "these universal characteristics completely lack substance." The text "Even if concentrated mind relates
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[Upper Section]
therefore also reaching no error" ○ This is because it creates understanding based on names, therefore relating [investigation: the character for "relating" is unclear, possibly repeated] - this is provisional cognition called obtaining self-characteristics. Also called direct perception because it is not the same as inference's discriminative provisional establishment calculating that names and meanings are definitely mutually attached ○ "Same as conventional expressions indicating foundational universal characteristics" - the superimpositions taken by provisional cognition and indication are called foundations. What is this meaning? Depending on beginningless internal mental calculation, on ineffable dharmas, discriminatively superimposing, then producing conventional expressions. Depending on these conventional expressions, further producing provisional cognition. Their superimposed language pervades here and there, therefore called universal characteristics. These universal characteristics are the foundational places where names and sentences arise. Because foundation is immediately universal, called foundational universal characteristics etc. [etc.].
[Indented one character]
Therefore, following these explanations, considering the two teachings' two characteristics having or lacking substance: Hetuvidyā's universal characteristics are substanceless provisional ones. Hetuvidyā's self-characteristics are immediately esoteric teaching's universal characteristics - these are substantial provisional ones. Esoteric teaching's self-characteristics are truly substantial. Because they are immediately dharma-nature. These are immediately true direct perception's realm. Is it like this?
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"If (also saying) Buddha-mind relates to inference's universal characteristics etc." - the Mingdeng Commentary says: Regarding Buddha relating to universal characteristics, there are immediately two explanations. One says: Causal stage direct perception is inferior, only able to relate to self-characteristics. If relating to universal characteristics, this is included in inference. Fruition stage is already omniscient, also able to relate to universal characteristics. However, through non-discrimination, it is still included in direct perception. Calling the ability to relate to universal characteristics "inference" only speaks about causal stage scattered mind. One says: Buddhabhūmi-śāstra objects to "universal characteristics explained in Hetuvidyā treatises are necessarily scattered mind's discriminative provisional establishments." Since Tathāgatas already lack inference's scattered mind, how do Buddhas relate to universal characteristics? ○ Now this commentary master follows the first explanation [etc.].
[Lower Section]
The marginal commentary says: Yup says: This explains Buddha-mind relating to universal characteristics that are inference's objects. It does not mean Buddha-mind has inference [text].
Also says: Bei says: Buddha relating to ordinary beings' inferential mind's object universal characteristics is also substanceless [etc.].
[Indented two characters]
From leaving all discriminations of name-types etc. below
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"Therefore Nyāyamukha says [...] then becomes direct perception" - this explains the treatise text [because the present treatise has words like "having etc.", completely same as Nyāyamukha] greatly having two meanings [seen].
[Indented three characters]
First Explanation
[Indented one character]
Far from all types [Vaiśeṣika's great existence, sameness-difference, Sāṃkhya's three qualities etc.'s discriminations], conventional provisional establishments [calling short "long" etc., all not according to reality, conventional discriminations], non-difference [discriminations operating based on universal characteristics], various approaches [discriminations of permanence, impermanence etc. among the six categories] discriminations.
[Indented three characters]
This explanation generally eliminates inferential and invalid cognition discriminations [meaning].
Second Explanation
[Indented one character]
Far from all types of [because conventional expressions are not one, called types] conventionally established non-difference [depending on these conventional expressions, provisionally establishing one dharma, pervading all dharmas, called non-difference] various approaches [calling interpenetrating schools, definitely existent, different-pervading, non-existent etc. "various approaches"] discriminations.
[Indented three characters]
This explanation only eliminates inferential discriminations [meaning]. Or possibly "various approaches being various non-theists etc." - this is one meaning explaining the words "various approaches" in this explanation [seen as such].
"This immediately does not eliminate completely" - this explanation does not eliminate invalid cognition discriminations. Therefore elimination is incomplete [meaning].