英語訳
【Right Page】
This is the intention of establishing the thesis "capable-having substance-quality-action separate from substance etc. existence-nature." However, if the words "separate from substance etc." include similarity-difference and conjunction, what remains to serve as the one-sided distinction of "not capable-having substance-quality-action separate from substance etc. existence-nature"? Then, this time the substance should be brought forth and explained.
Above copied and written from the Monastic Director's excerpts.
Apart from what is separated.
The Monastic Director says: One should rely on the present interpretation in the two-volume private record.
Regarding the dharma-distinction "not capable-having substance-quality-action separate from substance etc. existence-nature," what is its substance?
The present interpretation in the two-volume private record says: It should be called the conjunction sentence.
Question: When examining dharma-distinction, similarity-difference and conjunction are included in the "etc." word. How is it that when examining dharma-distinction, the conjunction sentence remains as an implied one-sided distinction?
Answer: To demonstrate the method of violating four, following the teacher's artificial establishment, conjunction is made what is "apart from what is separated," becoming an implied one side. 《The intention of the two-volume private record is like this》
○ The treatise text says "all are shared inference violating shared"《etc.》
Question: Judging the counter-argument methods of the latter two contradictions as shared inferences is unreasonable. First, regarding the counter-argument method for subject-svabhāva: Now Vaiśeṣika establishes "existence-nature is non-substantial." The opponent Five Peaks, using the word "non-substantial," establishes that "the subject existence-nature is separate-from-substance existence-nature," directly negating this existence, immediately establishing "existence-nature is non-existence-nature." Therefore, in the counter-inference, the subject existence-nature should correspond to "separate-from-substance existence-nature." Now
【Lower Section】
taking others' existence to make counter-arguments. How is this not others' inference? Due to this, the commentary says: "They first already established non-substantial existence, now immediately challenging them, breaking others, contradicting others, not establishing various contradictions"《etc.》. Adding to this, the Essential Compilation says: "Now breaking others' existence is immediately one's own subject-basis non-establishment. If it were a shared-self inference, this would be a fault. For breaking others, establishing according to others' doctrine, although there is subject-basis non-establishment, it does not become a fault"《etc.》. According to these texts, it is clearly others' inference. Next, regarding the subject-distinction counter-argument method: Already breaking the thesis "enjoying creating great-existence capable-cognizing nature," immediately establishing "existence-nature is not creating great-existence capable-cognizing nature." Therefore the commentary says: "Not preventing creating capable-cognizing nature but only preventing creating great-existence capable-cognizing nature, therefore establishing implied separate meaning contradiction. Otherwise it contradicts the thesis that existence-nature should create capable-cognizing nature"《etc.》. However, the student Five Peaks, not yet permitting the subject, establish "not creating great-existence capable-cognizing nature." How is this not others' inference?
Answer: Generally, the counter-argument methods of the latter two contradictions are shared inferences. The reason is that the contradicted inferences of the latter two contradictions are when the present proponent, using mutually established subjects and mutually established predicates, initially establishes the desired thesis, also raising mutually permitted reasons and shared similar examples to establish the thesis. However, because the reason lacks the latter two characteristics, it immediately causes contradiction with the established thesis. This is called "shared inference violating shared." Therefore, when opponents see the reason lacking the latter two characteristics, they immediately take the subject to make counter-arguments. Then, if the contradicted is shared inference, the counter-argument is also shared inference. However, when making shared inferences, if there are faults, one also uses others' inferences. There is no impediment in principle. Shared inference contradicting self is a fault. Therefore the commentary says: "If others'
【Left Page】
inference, there is no prevention at all." The intention is here. However, regarding the subject-svabhāva counter-inference: Now establishing "existence-nature is non-existence-nature" actually knows it challenges their "separate-from-substance existence-nature." Still saying "existence-nature" without yet saying "great existence." Generally saying "existence," both sides establish it. Therefore, in implied meaning, challenging great existence, so although not the desired thesis, the verbal expression still says "existence," therefore it is called shared inference. Therefore the commentary says: "They first spoke generally, now also generally challenging. Since they already established separate-from-substance existence, now challenging to make it not this existence. Words are same but meanings different, therefore no various faults"《etc.》. However, regarding the text "breaking others, contradicting others, not establishing various faults," there is no contradiction. The reason is that the general challenging intention: if establishing "existence-nature is non-existence-nature," it immediately commits self-contradictory speech fault. However, the present establishing intention immediately establishes "existence-nature is non-substantial." This is separate-from-substance existence-nature. Now breaking this existence does not commit self-contradictory speech and other faults. The text does not clearly say "others' inference." Therefore there is no contradiction. Next, regarding the Compilation text: this has separate intention. Namely, if looking toward their implied meaning, it is immediately separate-from-substance existence-nature. Therefore, if taking the implied meaning as their verbal expression, there are also faults like subject-basis non-establishment. If regarding verbal expression, not saying "great existence," it is still shared inference. Then, the commentary master focuses on verbal expression, the compilation master focuses on implied meaning. What they look toward differs. There is no contradiction. Next, regarding the subject-distinction counter-argument method: If as challenged, now establishing "not creating great-existence capable-cognizing nature" is indeed others' inference. However, this is one transmission. Its purport is not yet detailed. Therefore, one transmission's intention 《Investigation: the original margin says Eichō's transmission》 also establishes "existence-nature is not creating existence-nature capable-cognizing nature." The present position is precisely this transmission. This still says "existence-nature," also being shared inference. However, reaching the commentary text, this describes
【Lower Section】
the intention of making counter-inferences, not yet reaching the three-part method. When properly establishing inferences, still avoiding faults in verbal expression, one should establish "not creating existence-nature capable-cognizing nature."
Above, copied and written from the Monastic Director's excerpts.
Inquiring: Does "all are shared inference violating shared" mean the contradicted shared inference violates the counter-argument shared inference?
Answer: 《Monastic Director》 No. It means the contradicted inference's thesis violates the contradicted's mutually permitted reason and example. Therefore the commentary's middle volume says: Like using Buddhist doctrine to break Sāṃkhya, saying "your self is impermanent, because it is included in principles, like the permitted great ones etc." This is others' inference. The impermanence thesis takes the twenty-three principles as similar instances. Taking self-nature as dissimilar instances. The reason "included in principles" is pervasively present in both similar and dissimilar instances. Therefore this is others' shared《etc.》. The Myōsen-dō says: "In this others' inference, others' shared indeterminate"《etc.》. 《Investigation: the original back says: the treatise text "all said are shared inference violating shared"》《The matter of calling the text "shared within shared."》 According to this, we know: others' shared in others' inference, self-others' shared in self-inference, self-others' shared in shared inference are all limited to what is contradicted, not extending to counter-arguments. The treatise text "all said are shared inference violating shared, the previous three-four reasons are all self-inference violating self" means shared within shared inference, self within self-inference. Others' inference violating others is also like this.
○ Now observing the latter three are all fourth
The Monastic Director says: There are no specific references.
○ What is explained above《etc.》.
The Monastic Director says: This looks toward example mutual non-establishment. Therefore the Logic Gate treatise says: "In those similar instances