翻刻
【本文二段構成】
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
三四二【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
左府抄下
【枠外右横下】
二四
【上段】
談＿二此義＿一。又何大有離＿二實等＿一別有＿二能緣＿一哉。若又令＿レ有＿レ緣
之性。名＿二有緣性＿一者。又不＿レ可＿レ然。違＿二斷文＿一故。謂文云。若
言＿下大有是緣＿二大有＿一心境性＿上《割書：乃至》今爭大有與＿二能緣＿レ有心＿一
作＿二境性＿一《割書：等云云》。以知。作有緣性者。大有別自有＿二能緣＿一也。
加＿レ之。明燈抄云。須＿下更別立＿二大有句義＿一爲＿中意所緣＿上《割書：云云》。又
下文聲有緣性等之例難。豈不＿二乖角＿一耶。彼￣ハ於＿二￣テ《割書：云》￣カ自￣ノ有
緣￣ニ＿一故。抑又作緣性之訓釋如何。
已上書＿二-寫僧都抄出＿一。
問。自義如何。未定。但可＿レ依＿レ斷歟。
○疏云。大有同異有緣性同詮言各別故彼不＿レ取。
永超僧都題也。
○作非有緣性體
實等五句。《割書：纂云。問實等五句得＿レ名＿二不無之有＿一不答雖＿レ言＿二
｜不無＿一然不＿レ名＿レ有云云。此文爲＿レ證歟。不＿レ慥。》
卽義相違。
此二傳之中。學者任＿レ意取捨。
【下段】
○一因違三
尋云。所說有性者。大有性也。勝論自比量故。何此下勘＿二
作非有性有緣性意許＿一乎。
答。《割書：僧都》。所說有性者難＿二其體＿一。離實有性言陳。不＿レ言＿二大
有性＿一故。爲＿レ示＿二重比量作法＿一。汎勘＿レ過也。
問。重比量者。何物乎。 答。違-二違-三違-四。是重比量
也。違一者。單比量也。
○自所餘法皆入同喩無不定過《割書：云云》。
子島意。《割書：依＿二燈｜抄＿一》自所餘法。子孫微也。
同私記問云。因明之法。立＿レ宗之時。可＿レ成＿二同品＿一之物。自
然成＿二同品＿一。可＿レ成＿二異品＿一之物。自然成＿二異品＿一。以＿二異品之物＿一
爲＿二同品＿一。非＿レ可＿レ成＿二同品＿一。以＿二同品之物＿一爲＿二異品＿一。非＿レ可＿レ成＿二
異品＿一。同異二品。自然無＿レ濫。然則子孫等。若可＿レ成＿二異品＿一
者。知＿レ云＿三皆入＿二同喩＿一。豈反成＿二同品＿一耶。若本可＿レ成＿二同品＿一
者。何勞云＿二皆入同喩＿一耶。豈非＿二無用＿一哉。 答。爾也。至＿下
如＿二水火＿一相違之物＿上。不＿レ待＿レ言定自然爲＿二同品＿一爲＿二異品＿一。然
以＿二 四大＿一爲＿レ體故。且有＿下可＿レ成＿二異品＿一之義＿上故。若不＿レ云＿二皆
【左頁】
【枠外左上】
三四三【但し算用数字】
【枠外左横上】
左府抄下
【枠外左横下】
二五
【上段】
入同喩＿一。敵者以＿下 四大爲＿レ體之邊＿上。勘成＿二異品＿一。可＿レ作＿二不定
失＿一故。爲＿レ遮＿二此濫＿一。云＿二皆入同喩＿一也。《割書：唯識比量中。有＿二｜可＿レ例事＿一。可＿レ見。》
僧都云。以＿二 二乘之果量同喩＿一。且可＿レ爲＿レ例也。彼本量云。
二乘之果應＿レ有＿二定性＿一乘所被故如＿二大乘者＿一《割書：云云》。此量
以＿二不定性＿一入＿二同喩＿一。故無＿二不定過＿一也。
尋云。有＿二子孫微不＿一＿レ入＿二 四大種＿一之例乎。
○一因違四
問。先以＿二同異和合二句＿一。竝入＿二所等＿一。如何。凡觀＿二 五頂機
感＿一。雖＿レ授＿二 六句法門＿一。實等三句。一聞便悟。至＿二大有句＿一屢
生＿二心惑＿一。如＿レ云＿二實德業性不無卽是能有＿一也。是以。起＿二諍
論於師資＿一。爭＿二能有於卽難＿一。遂立＿二 三比量＿一。定＿二同異二品＿一之
時。實等三句爲＿二同品＿一。以＿二同異性＿一爲＿二同品＿一了。所以今又。
立＿下離＿二實等＿一外有＿中別自性＿上之時。以＿二德業二句＿一。偏可＿レ入＿二所
等＿一也。何包＿二同異和合＿一。云＿二闕宗同品＿一耶。 然則。許非無故
因。遂犯＿二共不定＿一。於＿二同異二品＿一。竝是遍有故。爾者不＿レ可＿レ
勘＿二-付法自相過＿一也。
答。所難大旨。皆出＿二疏文＿一。不＿レ可＿二劬勞＿一。重成＿二難意＿一者。凡
【下段】
鑒＿二 七德根器＿一。廣說＿二 六句敎門＿一之時。實等五句外。別立＿二大
有性＿一。所以同異和合二句。皆是大有之異品也。然而。師
主授＿二有句＿一。弟子屢不＿レ信者。說＿二同異和合＿一。矯爲＿二能立同
喩＿一。擧＿二異品＿一爲＿二同品＿一。旣是矯立之方便也。由＿レ此。於＿二今此
量＿一。弟子勘＿レ過之時。取＿二同喩＿一爲＿二異品＿一。竝入＿二宗之所等＿一也。
旣闕＿二後二相＿一。犯＿二相違過＿一也。故疏云。然彼五頂《割書：乃至》同遍
非有《割書：云云》。然則。同異和合二句。皆入＿二宗所等＿一之時。許非
無故因。同無異有。更不＿レ轉＿二 二品＿一。故無＿二不定過＿一。疏云。同
異入＿二宗所等之中＿一故無＿二不定＿一。卽此意也。
問。道理彌難＿レ思。疏上文。明＿二師弟諍論＿一云。師主實德業
三句之外別有＿二能有大有性＿一也。弟子實等性不無卽是能
有也《割書：云云》。爰知。本離＿二實等三句＿一。爭＿二能有之卽離＿一。何對＿二同
異和合＿一。論＿二體性之有無＿一乎。何況。若於＿二 五句外＿一。諍＿二無別
自性＿一者。立＿二 三比量＿一。弟子可＿レ貽＿レ疑。更添＿二同異和合＿一。可＿レ
立＿二 五比量＿一也。加＿レ之。付＿二今比量＿一。勘＿二-付法差別相違過＿一之
時。離＿二實等＿一外有＿二別自性＿一法宗之下。有＿二能有實德業離實
等有性。不能有實德業離實等有性之意許差別＿一。立者樂
現代語訳
【右頁】
この義について論じている。また何故大有が実等を離れて別に能縁を有するのか。若しまた縁を有せしむるの性を有縁性と名づけるなら、また然るべからず。断文に違う故である。謂わく文に云く。若し大有はこれ大有を縁ずる心の境性なりと言うなら《乃至》今争うに大有と能縁有心とが境性を作すと《等云云》。以て知る。有縁性を作すとは、大有が別に自ら能縁を有するのである。これに加えて、明灯抄に云く。更に別に大有句義を立てて意所縁と為すを須つ《云云》。また下文の声有縁性等の例難も、どうして乖角でないことがあろうか。彼は自らの有縁において故である。そもそもまた作縁性の訓釈はいかん。
已上僧都の抄出を書写す。
問う。自義はいかん。未定である。ただ断に依るべきか。
○疏に云く。大有同異有縁性同詮言各別故彼不取。
永超僧都の題である。
○作非有縁性体
実等五句。《纂に云く。問う実等五句は不無の有の名を得るや否や答う不無と言うと雖も然れども有と名づけずと云云。この文を証と為すか。確かでない。》
即ち義相違。
この二伝の中、学者は意に任せて取捨せよ。
【下段】
○一因違三
尋ねて云く。所説の有性とは、大有性である。勝論の自比量故に、何故この下で作非有性有縁性の意許を勘ずるのか。
答う。《僧都》所説の有性はその体を難ずる。実を離れた有性の言陳で、大有性と言わない故に、重比量の作法を示すために、汎く過を勘ずるのである。
問う。重比量とは何物か。答う。違二違三違四、これが重比量である。違一は単比量である。
○自所余法皆入同喩無不定過《云云》。
子島の意。《燈抄に依る》自所余法とは、子孫微である。
同じ私記に問うて云く。因明の法では、宗を立てる時、同品と成るべき物は、自然に同品と成る。異品と成るべき物は、自然に異品と成る。異品の物を以て同品と為すは、同品と成すべからず。同品の物を以て異品と為すは、異品と成すべからず。同異二品は、自然に濫れることなし。然れば子孫等が、若し異品と成すべきなら、皆同喩に入ると云うを知る。どうして反って同品と成すのか。若し本より同品と成すべきなら、何の労苦で皆同喩に入ると云うのか。どうして無用でないことがあろうか。答う。その通りである。水火の如く相違の物に至っては、言を待たず定めて自然に同品と為り異品と為る。然れども四大を体と為す故に、且つ異品と成すべきの義があるが故に、若し皆
【左頁】
同喩に入ると云わなければ、敵者は四大を体とする辺を以て、異品と勘成し、不定失を作すべき故に、この濫れを遮するために、皆同喩に入ると云うのである。《唯識比量中に、例とすべき事がある。見るべし。》
僧都云く。二乗の果量の同喩を以て、且つ例と為すべきである。彼の本量に云く。
二乗の果は定性を有すべし乗の所被故大乗者の如し《云云》。この量は不定性を同喩に入れる。故に不定過が無いのである。
尋ねて云く。子孫微が四大種に入らない例があるか。
○一因違四
問う。先ず同異和合二句を以て、並びに所等に入れるは如何。凡そ五頂の機感を観るに、六句法門を授くと雖も、実等三句は、一聞して便ち悟る。大有句に至って屢々心惑を生ず。実德業性不無即ちこれ能有なりと云うが如し。是を以て、師資に諍論を起こし、即難において能有を争う。遂に三比量を立て、同異二品を定むる時、実等三句を同品と為し、同異性を以て同品と為し了んぬ。所以に今また、実等を離れた外に別自性を有することを立てる時、德業二句を以て、偏に所等に入るべきである。何ぞ同異和合を包んで、宗同品を闕くと云うのか。然れば、許非無故の因は、遂に共不定を犯す。同異二品において、並びにこれ遍有する故に。爾れば法自相過を勘付すべからず。
答う。所難の大旨は、皆疏文に出づ。劬労すべからず。重ねて難意を成すとは、凡そ
【下段】
七德の根器を鑑みて、六句教門を広説する時、実等五句の外に、別に大有性を立つ。所以に同異和合二句は、皆これ大有の異品である。然るに、師主が有句を授けるに、弟子屢々信ぜざる者は、同異和合を説いて、矯めて能立の同喩と為し、異品を挙げて同品と為す。既にこれ矯立の方便である。これに由って、今この量において、弟子が過を勘ずる時、同喩を取って異品と為し、並びに宗の所等に入れるのである。既に後二相を闕き、相違過を犯すのである。故に疏に云く。然れば彼の五頂《乃至》同じく遍く非有《云云》。然れば、同異和合二句が、皆宗の所等に入る時、許非無故の因は、同じく無く異なって有り、更に二品に転ぜず。故に不定過が無い。疏に云く。同異が宗所等の中に入る故に不定無しと。即ちこの意である。
問う。道理は弥々思い難し。疏の上文に、師弟の諍論を明かして云く。師主は実德業三句の外に別に能有大有性を有するなりと。弟子は実等性不無即ちこれ能有なりと《云云》。ここに知る。本より実等三句を離れて、能有の即離を争う。何ぞ同異和合に対して、体性の有無を論ずるのか。何況んや、若し五句の外において、別自性無きを諍うなら、三比量を立てて、弟子は疑いを貽すべし。更に同異和合を添えて、五比量を立つべきである。これに加えて、今の比量について、法差別相違過を勘付する時、実等を離れた外に別自性を有する法宗の下に、能有実德業離実等有性と、不能有実德業離実等有性の意許差別がある。立者は楽しむ
英語訳
【Right Page】
Discussing this doctrine. Also, why would great existence separately have capable-cognition apart from substance etc.? If again naming the nature that causes to have cognition as "capable-cognizing nature," this also cannot be so. Because it contradicts the decisive text. Namely, the text says: "If one says great existence is the object-nature of mind that cognizes great existence《etc.》now we dispute that great existence and capable-cognizing mind create object-nature"《etc.》. Thus we know that creating capable-cognizing nature means great existence separately has capable-cognition itself. Adding to this, the Myōtō-shō says: "One must further separately establish great existence sentence-meaning as object of mind"《etc.》. Also, wouldn't the challenge by analogy with sound's capable-cognizing nature etc. in the later text be contradictory? Because that has its own cognition. Moreover, how should the interpretation of "creating cognizing nature" be explained?
Above copied and written from the Monastic Director's excerpts.
Question: What is your own doctrine? Undetermined. But should one rely on the decisive text?
○ The commentary says: "Great existence, similarity-difference have capable-cognizing nature, same indicating words are each separate, therefore that is not taken."
This is Eichō Monastic Director's topic.
○ Creating non-capable-cognizing nature substance
Substance etc., the five sentences. 《The Compilation says: "Question: Do substance etc. five sentences obtain the name 'non-non existence'? Answer: Although saying 'non-non,' they are not named 'existence'"《etc.》. Is this text evidence? Not certain.》
Precisely doctrinal contradiction.
Among these two transmissions, scholars should accept or reject according to their judgment.
【Lower Section】
○ One cause violates three
Inquiring: The explained existence-nature is great existence-nature. Since it is Vaiśeṣika's self-inference, why examine the implied meaning of "creating non-existence-nature capable-cognizing nature" below?
Answer: 《Monastic Director》The explained existence-nature challenges its substance. The verbal expression "existence-nature separate from substance" does not say "great existence-nature." To show the method of compound inferences, examining faults generally.
Question: What is compound inference? Answer: Violating two, violating three, violating four - these are compound inferences. Violating one is simple inference.
○ "All remaining dharmas enter the same example, no indeterminate fault"《etc.》.
Kojima's interpretation. 《Based on the Lamp Commentary》"All remaining dharmas" means child-grandchild atoms.
The same private record asks: In logic's method, when establishing a thesis, things that should become similar instances naturally become similar instances. Things that should become dissimilar instances naturally become dissimilar instances. Taking dissimilar instance things as similar instances cannot establish similar instances. Taking similar instance things as dissimilar instances cannot establish dissimilar instances. The two classes of similar and dissimilar naturally have no confusion. Then if child-grandchild etc. should become dissimilar instances, knowing they are said to "all enter the same example," how could they conversely become similar instances? If originally they should become similar instances, what labor is there in saying "all enter the same example"? How is this not useless? Answer: Exactly so. Reaching contradictory things like water and fire, without waiting for words to determine, they naturally become similar or dissimilar instances. However, since they have the four elements as substance, there is temporarily the meaning that they could become dissimilar instances. Therefore, if one does not say "all
【Left Page】
enter the same example," opponents could take the aspect of having four elements as substance, establish them as dissimilar instances, and create indeterminate faults. To prevent this confusion, one says "all enter the same example." 《In the consciousness-only inference, there are applicable cases. Should be examined.》
The Monastic Director says: Taking the similar example of the two vehicles' fruit inference, this can temporarily serve as an example. That original inference says:
"The two vehicles' fruit should have determined nature, because of being what the vehicle addresses, like the great vehicle practitioners"《etc.》. This inference includes indeterminate nature in the similar example. Therefore there is no indeterminate fault.
Inquiring: Is there an example of child-grandchild atoms not entering the four great elements?
○ One cause violates four
Question: First, including similarity-difference and conjunction, the two sentences, both entered into the thesis-subject, how is this? Generally observing the five peaks' spiritual capacity and response, although teaching the six-sentence dharma gate, for substance etc. three sentences, they understand upon one hearing. Reaching the great existence sentence, they frequently generate mental confusion. Like saying "substance-quality-action nature's non-non is precisely the capable-haver." Therefore, disputes arise between teacher and student, arguing about capable-having in immediate difficulty. Eventually establishing three inferences, when determining the two classes of similar and dissimilar, making substance etc. three sentences similar instances, taking similarity-difference nature as similar instances completed. Therefore now again, when establishing having separate self-nature apart from substance etc., with quality-action two sentences, they should particularly enter the thesis-subject. Why include similarity-difference and conjunction, saying there is "lack of thesis similar instances"? Then the cause "because of permitting non-non" eventually commits shared indeterminate fault. In similarity-difference two instances, both are pervasively present. Then one should not examine dharma-svabhāva faults.
Answer: The general purport of the challenge all appears in the commentary text. No need for strenuous effort. Restating the challenge's meaning: Generally
【Lower Section】
examining the seven virtues' spiritual capacity, when broadly teaching the six-sentence teaching gate, apart from substance etc. five sentences, separately establishing great existence-nature. Therefore similarity-difference and conjunction, the two sentences, are all dissimilar instances of great existence. However, when the teacher transmits the existence-sentence but students frequently do not believe, explaining similarity-difference and conjunction, artificially making them capable-establishing similar examples, raising dissimilar instances as similar instances. This is already the expedient of artificial establishment. Due to this, in this present inference, when students examine faults, they take similar examples as dissimilar instances, both entering the thesis-subject. Already lacking the latter two characteristics, committing contradiction faults. Therefore the commentary says: "However, those five peaks《etc.》same and pervasive non-existence"《etc.》. Then when similarity-difference and conjunction two sentences all enter the thesis-subject, the cause "because of permitting non-non" has same without, different with, no longer turning to the two instances. Therefore there is no indeterminate fault. The commentary says: "Because similarity-difference enter within the thesis-subject, there is no indeterminate" - precisely this meaning.
Question: The reasoning is increasingly difficult to understand. The commentary's above text, clarifying teacher-student disputes, says: The teacher holds that apart from substance-quality-action three sentences there is separately the capable-having great existence-nature. The student holds that substance etc. nature's non-non is precisely the capable-having《etc.》. Here we know that originally, apart from substance etc. three sentences, they dispute the immediate-separate of capable-having. Why discuss the existence or non-existence of essential nature regarding similarity-difference and conjunction? Moreover, if disputing no separate self-nature apart from the five sentences, establishing three inferences, students should harbor doubts. Further adding similarity-difference and conjunction, five inferences should be established. Adding to this, regarding the present inference, when examining dharma-viśeṣa contradiction faults, under the dharma-thesis "having separate self-nature apart from substance etc.," there are the implied distinctions of "capable-having substance-quality-action separate from substance etc. existence-nature" and "not capable-having substance-quality-action separate from substance etc. existence-nature." The proponent enjoys