一　左府抄三巻 - 翻刻

翻刻

【本文二段構成】
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
三二六【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
左府抄中
【枠外右横下】
八

【上段】
如＿レ此言陳立＿レ量時。爲＿二法自相＿一故。次下文云。若加言已
卽名爲法《割書：云云》。　問。若爾與＿二璧法師義＿一。有＿二何差別＿一哉。　答
璧法師￣ハ。有法自性￣ヲ離實有性￣ニ成￣テ。望＿レ此勘＿二同異品＿一。斷
主￣ハ。非實￣ノ法宗￣ヨリ諍￣ハ起￣レドモ。其非實言￣ヨリ求出￣タル離實
有性￣ハ。在＿二有法處＿一言也。是豈非＿レ有＿二差別＿一耶。斷上文云。故
知還以非實等爲法卽是所諍《割書：云云》。亦此心也。
問。離實有性在＿二有法處＿一事。以＿二何文＿一爲＿レ證哉。
答。疏云。有性旣爲＿二有法自相＿一《割書：等云云》。又云。難＿二意許離實
等有＿一而非＿二有性＿一《割書：等云云》此等證文也。
　○有法差別《割書：寫＿二僧都記錄＿一載＿レ之》
問。有法差別相違作法何。　答云。有法差別相違作法。
先德有＿二 二傳＿一。一者以＿二前有法自相作法＿一。爲＿二今有法差別
相違作法＿一。所＿レ謂師主勝論對＿二弟子五頂＿一立＿レ量云。有性非＿レ
實非＿レ德非＿レ業有＿二 一實＿一故有＿二德業＿一故如＿二同異性＿一。是其作法
也。或於＿二前有性非實等三量＿一。改＿二能別法宗＿一。立＿二有性作有
緣性＿一。爲＿二￣ト《割書：云》此作法＿一。先德￣ノ意￣モ可＿レ有＿レ之也。
問云。有法差別相違作法。先德旣有＿二 二傳＿一。爾者立者存＿二-

【下段】
申何義＿一耶。　答。有法差別相違作法者。是上古未決也。
所以近代先德云。四種相違之中都無＿二如＿レ此之難儀＿一。《割書：云云》
先哲旣貽＿レ疑。末學何決＿レ之。然而七大諸寺之名德。古往
當今之學徒。多依＿二本作法之傳＿一。故且可＿レ存＿二-申此義＿一也。
問。於＿二 二傳中＿一。存＿二-申本作法義【一点無し】。道理不＿レ然。凡差別相違
量。言陳自相立敵共許。於＿二意許宗＿一具＿二 二等義＿一也。而前
有法自相作法者。所違立＿二有性非實＿一。有法有性限＿二於大
有＿一。能違難＿二有性非有性＿一。亡＿二言陳自相＿一了。何具＿二 二等義＿一。
爲＿二差別相違作法＿一耶。是以立＿二有性作有緣性別量＿一。所別
能別共許之時。勘＿二 二意許＿一。可＿レ爲＿二此作法＿一也。何況。見＿二論
文＿一云。如卽此因卽於前宗有法差別作有緣性《割書：云云》。所＿レ言
作有緣性者。能別法宗也。由＿レ此次明＿二能違作法＿一云。亦
能成立與此相違作非有緣性《割書：云云》。若不＿レ成＿二作有緣性言
陳＿一者。對＿レ何而云＿二亦能成立與此相違等＿一耶。然則疏釋＿二
論文＿一云。此言有者有無之有非作境因有能緣性故非大
有也若作大有緣性能別不成《割書：云云》。以知。立＿二有性作有緣
性別量＿一。可＿レ爲＿二今作法＿一耶。爾者何背＿二文理＿一。存＿二-申本作法

【左頁】
【枠外左上】
三二七【但し算用数字】
【枠外左横上】
左府抄中
【枠外左横下】
九

【上段】
傳＿一耶。　答。先有法差別相違作法者。凡師主勝論。對＿二
弟子五頂＿一。鑒＿二 七德根機＿一。授＿二 六句奧旨＿一之時。師資諍論。
是離實等大有也。然而函杖室内。不＿レ立＿二兩重比量＿一。寫瓶
窓前。只示＿二 一具作法＿一。所謂有性非實等三比量也。今此
有性言陳之下。帶＿二 二意許加言量＿一。一立＿二有性離實等有＿一
成＿二有性體＿一。二立＿二有性作有緣性＿一諍＿二有性義＿一。是則師主本
意所＿二立來＿一也。是以言陳云＿二有性＿一時。必帶＿二離實等意許＿一。
爲＿二樂爲宗＿一。而同喩同異性。旣不＿二離實大有＿一。望＿二意許宗＿一。還
成＿二異品＿一。由＿レ此意許大有被＿レ非。言陳有性亦亡。表裏悉
壊。是云＿二有性自相相違＿一也。次又勘＿二師主意許＿一者。如＿下同
異性有＿二 一實等＿一作有緣性￣トシテ體非＿中實等＿上。有性有＿二 一實＿一。亦
作有緣性￣タリ。故知體非＿二實等＿一。由＿レ此有性言陳下。亦挾作
有緣性別義＿一【一点衍ヵ】。以爲＿二樂爲宗＿一。故疏云。彼鳩鶹仙以＿二 五頂不＿一＿レ
信＿下離＿二實德業＿一別有＿上＿レ有故卽以＿二前因＿一成＿二-立前宗＿一言陳有
性有法自相意許差別爲有緣性《割書：云云》。而同喩同異性。是爲＿二
同異￣ノ有緣性＿一。不＿二大有￣ノ有緣性＿一。望＿二意許宗＿一。亦分＿二異品＿一。由＿レ
此。有性言陳不＿レ亡。意許別義相違。故云＿二有法差別相違＿一

【下段】
也。所以此量。卽一因違二作法也。所＿レ謂以＿二非實言＿一。見＿二
有法有性是離實大有＿一。就＿レ之而難＿二有性非有性＿一。卽有法自
相作法也。又汎爾言＿レ有￣ト。不＿レ云＿二大有￣ト＿一。許＿レ之而勘＿二 二意
許＿一。今有法差別也。縱奪勘＿レ過。單重加＿レ難。所以竝付＿二後
二相過＿一。更無＿二相違＿一也。但至＿二論疏文＿一者。先論云＿二有法差
別作有緣性＿一者。有性言陳之下意許差別也。若從＿二師主意＿一。
卽作大有緣性也。更不＿二言陳￣ノ作有緣性￣ニ＿一。次亦能成立作
非有緣性者。論次下文。釋＿二所由＿一云。如遮實等俱決定故
《割書：云云》。此意今以＿二有一實等因＿一。成＿二有性非實等宗＿一。然後亦
成＿二意許作有緣性＿一。而敵者勘＿二能違＿一之時。亦以＿二此因＿一。成＿三
立非＿二作有緣性＿一也。對＿二彼非實等言＿一。云＿二亦能成立＿一。更不＿下
對＿二作有緣性言陳＿一置＿中亦言＿上也。故斷云。論云如遮實等俱
決定故不云成作有緣性亦得決定《割書：云云》。次疏云。此言有
者有無之有等者。准＿レ前可＿レ知。論云＿二作有緣＿一【一点は「性」の下ヵ】性者。是意
許量能別也。可＿レ立＿二有性作有緣性＿一故。且略＿二大言＿一意＿二-許
作有緣性＿一。所＿二-以然＿一者。若顯＿二樂爲＿一。必言顯可＿レ立＿レ之。由＿レ此
兼避＿二能別不成等過＿一。意＿二-許作有緣性＿一云也。　問。所＿二答

現代語訳

【右頁】

【上段】
このように言陳で量を立てる時は、法自相のためである。故に次の下文に「もし加言すれば即ち法と名づける」と云う。問。もしそうなら璧法師の義と、どのような差別があるか。答。璧法師は、有法自性を離実有性に成して、これに望んで同異品を勘考する。断主は、非実の法宗から諍いは起こるが、その非実の言から求め出した離実有性は、有法処に在ると言う。これに豈差別が無いだろうか。断の上文に「故に知る、還って非実等を以て法とするは即ちこれ所諍である」と云う。また此の心である。

問。離実有性が有法処に在ることを、何の文を以て証とするか。
答。疏に「有性は既に有法自相となる」等と云う。また「意許の離実等有を難ずるも有性に非ず」等と云う。これ等が証文である。

○有法差別（僧都記録を写してこれを載せる）
問。有法差別相違の作法は何か。答えて云う。有法差別相違の作法について、先徳には二伝がある。一つは前の有法自相作法を以て、今の有法差別相違作法とする。所謂師主勝論が弟子五頂に対して量を立てて云う。「有性は実に非ず、徳に非ず、業に非ず。一実有る故、徳業有る故、同異性の如し」。これがその作法である。或いは前の有性非実等の三量において、能別法宗を改めて、有性作有縁性を立てる。これを此の作法とする。先徳の意もこれがあるべきである。

問うて云う。有法差別相違の作法について、先徳に既に二伝がある。それでは立者はどのような義を存申するか。答。有法差別相違の作法は、これ上古未決である。

【下段】
所以に近代の先徳が云う。「四種相違の中で、都てこのような難儀は無い」と。先哲が既に疑いを遺している。末学が何でこれを決するか。然るに七大諸寺の名徳、古往当今の学徒は、多く本作法の伝に依る。故にしばらく此の義を存申すべきである。

問。二伝の中で、本作法の義を存申するのは、道理が然らない。凡そ差別相違の量は、言陳自相は立敵共に許し、意許の宗において二等義を具えるのである。而るに前の有法自相作法は、所違が「有性非実」を立て、有法有性を大有に限る。能違が「有性非有性」を難じて、言陳自相を亡ぼし終わる。何で二等義を具えて、差別相違の作法とするか。これを以て「有性作有縁性」の別量を立て、所別能別が共に許される時、二意許を勘考すべきが、この作法である。何況や、論文を見ると「この因の如く即ち前宗において有法差別作有縁性」と云う。所言の作有縁性とは、能別法宗である。これによって次に能違作法を明かして「また能く此と相違する作非有縁性を成立する」と云う。もし作有縁性の言陳を成さないなら、何に対して「また能く此と相違する等を成立する」と云うか。然らば疏が論文を釈して「この有と言うは有無の有で、境因を作す有でなく、能縁性有る故に大有に非ず。もし大有縁性を作せば能別不成」と云う。これによって知る。「有性作有縁性」の別量を立てることが、今の作法となるべきか。それなら何故文理に背いて、本作法の

【左頁】

【上段】
伝を存申するか。答。先ず有法差別相違の作法は、凡そ師主勝論が弟子五頂に対して、七徳の根機を鑑み、六句の奥旨を授ける時、師資で諍論する。これは離実等の大有である。然るに函杖室内で、両重比量を立てず、瓶窓の前で、ただ一具の作法を示す。所謂有性非実等の三比量である。今此の有性の言陳の下に、二意許加言量を帯びる。一つは「有性離実等有」を立てて有性の体を成し、二つは「有性作有縁性」を立てて有性の義を諍う。これは則ち師主の本意の所立である。これを以て言陳で「有性」と云う時、必ず離実等の意許を帯びて、楽為宗とする。而るに同喩の同異性は、既に離実の大有でない。意許宗に望んで、還って異品となる。これによって意許の大有が非とされ、言陳の有性も亡ぶ。表裏悉く壊れる。これを「有性自相相違」と云う。次にまた師主の意許を勘考すると、同異性が一実等を有して作有縁性として体が実等に非ざるが如く、有性も一実を有し、また作有縁性である。故に知る、体が実等に非ず。これによって有性の言陳の下に、また作有縁性の別義を挟んで、楽為宗とする。故に疏に「彼鳩摩羅仙は五頂が実徳業を離れて別に有が有ることを信じないのを以て、即ち前因を以て前宗の言陳有性有法自相意許差別を有縁性となることを成立する」と云う。而るに同喩の同異性は、これ同異の有縁性となり、大有の有縁性でない。意許宗に望んで、また異品に分かれる。これによって、有性の言陳は亡びず、意許別義が相違する。故に「有法差別相違」と云う

【下段】
のである。所以にこの量は、即ち一因で二作法に違うのである。所謂非実の言を以て、有法有性がこれ離実の大有であることを見て、これに就いて「有性非有性」を難ずる。即ち有法自相作法である。また汎爾に「有」と言って、「大有」と云わず、これを許して二意許を勘考する。今の有法差別である。縦奪して過を勘考し、単重して難を加える。所以に並びて後二相の過に付いて、更に相違が無い。但し論疏の文に至っては、先ず論が「有法差別作有縁性」と云うのは、有性言陳の下の意許差別である。もし師主の意に従えば、即ち大有縁性を作すのである。更に言陳の作有縁性ではない。次に「また能く作非有縁性を成立する」とは、論の次の下文で所由を釈して「実等を遮するが如く俱に決定する故」と云う。この意は、今「一実等有る」の因を以て、「有性非実等」の宗を成し、然る後にまた意許の作有縁性を成す。而るに敵者が能違を勘考する時、またこの因を以て、作有縁性に非ずを成立するのである。彼の非実等の言に対して、「また能く成立する」と云う。更に作有縁性の言陳に対して「また」の言を置くのではない。故に断に「論に実等を遮するが如く俱に決定する故と云い、作有縁性を成すもまた決定を得ると云わない」と云う。次に疏が「この有と言うは有無の有等」と云うのは、前に准じて知るべきである。論が「作有縁性」と云うのは、これ意許量の能別である。「有性作有縁性」を立てるべき故に、しばらく大の言を略して意許作有縁性とする。所以に然るは、もし楽為を顕せば、必ず言顕でこれを立てるべきである。これによって兼ねて能別不成等の過を避けて、意許作有縁性と云うのである。問。答える所の

英語訳

【Right Page】

【Upper Section】
When establishing an inference through explicit statement in this way, it is for the sake of dharma-svarūpa. Therefore, the following text states: "If additional words are added, it is immediately called dharma." Question: If so, what difference is there from Master Pi's doctrine? Answer: Master Pi establishes the subject-svabhāva as existence apart from substance, and examines positive and negative analogies in relation to this. The master of the Duan says that although dispute arises from the dharma-thesis of non-substantiality, the existence apart from substance derived from that non-substantial statement exists in the subject position. How could there be no difference? The above text of the Duan states: "Therefore we know that taking non-substantiality, etc. as dharma is precisely what is disputed." This is also the same intention.

Question: What text serves as proof that existence apart from substance exists in the subject position?
Answer: The commentary states: "Existence already becomes subject-svarūpa," etc. It also states: "Although challenging intended meaning existence apart from substance, etc., it is not existence," etc. These are the proof texts.

○ Subject-differentia (Copying and recording the Master's notes)
Question: What is the method for subject-differentia contradiction? Answer: Regarding the method for subject-differentia contradiction, there are two traditions among previous masters. One takes the previous subject-svarūpa method as the present subject-differentia contradiction method. Namely, Master Vaiśeṣika establishes an inference against his disciple Pañcaśikha: "Existence is non-substantial, non-qualitative, non-active, because it has one substance, because it has qualities and actions, like identity-difference nature." This is that method. Alternatively, in the previous three inferences of "existence is non-substantial," etc., one changes the predicate dharma-thesis and establishes "existence as having object-perceiving nature." Making this the method - the intention of previous masters may also have this.

Question: Regarding the method for subject-differentia contradiction, since previous masters already have two traditions, what doctrine does the establisher maintain? Answer: The method for subject-differentia contradiction has been undecided since ancient times.

【Lower Section】
Therefore recent previous masters said: "Among the four types of contradictions, there is no such difficulty anywhere." Since predecessors have already left doubts, how can later students decide it? However, the eminent virtue of the seven great temples and students from ancient times to the present mostly rely on the tradition of the original method. Therefore, one should temporarily maintain this doctrine.

Question: Among the two traditions, maintaining the original method doctrine is unreasonable. Generally, in differentia contradiction inferences, explicit statement svarūpa is mutually accepted by both establisher and opponent, and the intended meaning thesis includes two equal doctrines. However, the previous subject-svarūpa method has the contradicted establishing "existence is non-substantial," limiting the subject existence to universal existence. The contradicting challenges "existence is non-existence," destroying the explicit statement svarūpa. How does this include two equal doctrines to become a differentia contradiction method? Therefore, establishing the separate inference "existence has object-perceiving nature," when both subject and predicate are mutually accepted, examining the two intended meanings should be this method. Moreover, seeing the treatise text: "Like this very reason, in the previous thesis, subject-differentia has object-perceiving nature." The so-called "having object-perceiving nature" is the predicate dharma-thesis. Based on this, the next explanation of contradicting method states: "It can also establish the contradictory 'having non-object-perceiving nature.'" If the explicit statement of "having object-perceiving nature" is not established, in relation to what would one say "also can establish the contradictory," etc.? Then the commentary explains the treatise text: "This word 'existence' is the existence of existence-nonexistence, not the existence that creates objects and causes, having perceiving nature therefore not universal existence. If creating universal existence perceiving nature, the predicate would not be established." By this we know that establishing the separate inference "existence has object-perceiving nature" should be the present method. Then why go against textual principle and maintain the original method

【Left Page】

【Upper Section】
tradition? Answer: First, the method for subject-differentia contradiction is generally when Master Vaiśeṣika faces his disciple Pañcaśikha, examining the seven qualities' capacities and transmitting the profound meaning of six categories, the master and student dispute. This concerns universal existence apart from substance, etc. However, within the study room, one does not establish double inferences; before the window, one simply shows one complete method. Namely, the three inferences of "existence is non-substantial," etc. Now under the explicit statement of this "existence," it carries two intended meaning additional-word inferences. First, establishing "existence apart from substance, etc." accomplishes the substance of existence. Second, establishing "existence has object-perceiving nature" disputes the meaning of existence. This is precisely what the master originally intended to establish. Therefore, when saying "existence" in explicit statement, it necessarily carries the intended meaning of apart-from-substance, etc., as the desired thesis. However, the positive analogy identity-difference nature is already not apart-from-substance universal existence. In relation to the intended meaning thesis, it conversely becomes a negative analogy. By this, the intended meaning universal existence is negated, and the explicit statement existence also perishes. Both surface and depth are completely destroyed. This is called "existence svarūpa contradiction." Next, examining the master's intended meaning: just as identity-difference nature, having one substance, etc., has object-perceiving nature while its substance is not substance, etc., existence also has one substance and also has object-perceiving nature. Therefore we know its substance is not substance, etc. By this, under the explicit statement of existence, it also includes the separate meaning of having object-perceiving nature as the desired thesis. Therefore the commentary states: "That Kapila sage, because Pañcaśikha does not believe in existence separate from substance, quality, and action, immediately uses the previous reason to establish the previous thesis - explicit statement existence subject-svarūpa intended meaning differentia as having perceiving nature." However, the positive analogy identity-difference nature becomes identity-difference's object-perceiving nature, not universal existence's object-perceiving nature. In relation to the intended meaning thesis, it also divides into negative analogy. By this, the explicit statement of existence does not perish, but the intended meaning separate doctrine contradicts. Therefore it is called "subject-differentia contradiction"

【Lower Section】
Thus this inference immediately violates two methods with one reason. Namely, using the statement of non-substantiality, one sees that subject existence is apart-from-substance universal existence, and based on this challenges "existence is non-existence." This is the subject-svarūpa method. Also, saying "existence" generally without saying "universal existence," accepting this and examining two intended meanings is the present subject-differentia. Through concession and examination of faults, adding single and double challenges. Therefore, both attach to the latter two phase-faults, with no further contradictions. However, regarding treatise and commentary texts: first, when the treatise says "subject-differentia having object-perceiving nature," it is intended meaning differentia under existence explicit statement. If following the master's intention, it immediately creates universal existence perceiving nature. It is not explicit statement's having object-perceiving nature. Next, "also can establish having non-object-perceiving nature" - the treatise's following text explains the reason: "Like blocking substance, etc., both are equally determined." This means: now using the reason "having one substance, etc." to establish the thesis "existence is non-substantial, etc.," and afterward also establishing the intended meaning having object-perceiving nature. When the opponent examines contradictions, also using this reason to establish non-having object-perceiving nature. In relation to those non-substantial, etc. statements, it says "also can establish." It does not place the word "also" in relation to the explicit statement of having object-perceiving nature. Therefore the Duan states: "The treatise says 'like blocking substance, etc., both are equally determined,' not saying 'establishing having object-perceiving nature also gains determinacy.'" Next, the commentary saying "this word 'existence' is existence of existence-nonexistence, etc." should be understood according to the previous. The treatise saying "having object-perceiving nature" is the predicate of intended meaning inference. Since "existence has object-perceiving nature" should be established, it temporarily abbreviates the word "universal" to mean intended meaning having object-perceiving nature. The reason for this is that if revealing the desired position, it must be established through explicit statement. By this it simultaneously avoids faults like predicate non-establishment, etc., saying intended meaning having object-perceiving nature. Question: What is answered