翻刻
【本文二段構成】
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
三三〇【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
左府抄中
【枠外右横下】
一二
【上段】
性意許也。論￣ノ作有緣性￣ヲ意許也￣ト言也。
松室噵云。今作有緣性○是其差別《割書：已上破＿レ｜璧了。》今據意許
○故非言顯。《割書：斷主出＿二｜正義＿一也。》 問答據意許立云有作緣等
《割書：斷主自｜問也。》
○相違因《割書：自義之因》
私《割書：考【四角囲み文字】私建曆｜本作＿レ祕》亦如因明四相違因文。爲＿二之因之證＿一。疏云。今
陳其宗猶未有過《割書：等文。》若爾縱立＿二相違卽因之義＿一。何有＿二宗
因相例難＿一耶。
答。今陳其宗等文者。聲常宗一切皆是無常故。《割書：因》此因
惡立有＿二多過＿一。宗無＿レ過故。云今陳其宗猶未有過擧因方
過《割書：等云云》。非＿二【三点ヵ。対応する一二点無し】宗因相形唯因過《割書：考【四角囲み文字】過建曆本｜無案恐違字》宗故爲＿レ過故。不＿五
可＿四例＿三所作因違＿二常宗＿一也。
僧都云。樞要之中。幷十因章。有＿二淸淨之相違因果無漏
之事＿一。以＿レ之可＿レ爲＿二之因難＿一也。《割書：此事無＿二知人＿一。》
有因返宗問。依＿二之因之義＿一問也。《割書：可＿レ讀＿二文點＿一。》
有＿二￣ヲモテ因■【「只」ヵ】返＿一＿レ￣シムルコト宗￣ヲ不＿レ順＿二因義￣ニ＿一因￣ヲ名＿二￣ケバ相
【下段】
違￣ト＿一宗￣モ亦返＿レ￣シムルヲ《割書：以》因￣ヲ不＿レ順＿二宗義＿一應＿レ名＿二相違＿一。
疏文體。宗違＿レ因￣ヲハ云＿レ違。兩宗乖返￣ヲハ云＿レ返。故不
可＿レ讀＿二因返＿一＿レ￣ズト宗￣ニ。
又因名＿二法自相相違＿一者。所作因令＿レ返＿二常宗＿一。爲＿二無常宗＿一
爲＿レ因。名＿二法自相相違＿一言也。
宗名＿二比量相違＿一者。常宗違＿二無常宗之因＿一。名＿二比量相違＿一
言也。《割書：前宗與＿二後因＿一相對。宗名＿二比量相違＿一。｜因名＿二法自相相違＿一。其理可＿レ然。》
論云。亦能成立與此相違作非有緣性《割書：云云》。此文可＿レ爲＿二
之因之證＿一。
問。存＿二之因之義＿一之人。可＿レ棄＿二邑記＿一乎。 答。可＿レ棄。
○如無違法《割書：自義本量未＿レ蒙＿二他違＿一也。｜是邑記意也。》
理門論若無所違害文。爲＿二此義證＿一。
○比量相違相違決定相違因相幷耶。《割書：自義｜相竝》
所違者。三過相竝。《割書：比量相違相違因￣ハ不＿レ改＿レ因相竝。一【「一」衍ヵ】｜相違決定改＿レ因相竝。》
能違者。相違因比量相違￣ハ相竝。相違決定￣ハ不＿レ竝。
問。疏云。諸相違決定皆比量相違《割書：云云》。論所說相違決定。
何帶＿二比量相違＿一乎。比量相違違＿二正比量道理＿一故。
【左頁】
【枠外左上】
三三一【但し算用数字】
【枠外左横上】
左府抄中
【枠外左横下】
一三
【上段】
答。所聞性因具＿二 三相＿一故。且云＿二正量因＿一。故云＿二諸相違決
定皆比量相違＿一《割書：云云》。《割書：明詮噵云[考【四角囲み文字】建曆本無云字。【]脱ヵ】相違決定處云。二｜比量相違。亦通＿二相違決定＿一如＿二第六相違決定＿一。》
《割書：謂前無常宗。違＿二後所｜聞性＿一。此云＿二比量相違＿一。》
○局通對《割書：寫＿二僧都記｜錄＿一載＿レ之》
私云。竊見＿二疏斷文勢＿一。今此局通對者。與＿二内明所說體義
對＿一。其義可＿二各別＿一。道詮仁覺等所案。深窮＿二幽致＿一。所＿二-以然＿一
者。内明所說體義對者。五蘊自體云＿二自性＿一。體之上我無
常等名＿二差別＿一。其理必然。自＿レ本無＿二相濫＿一。然見＿二疏文相＿一。云＿二
所成立自性＿一。旣出＿二我法二種＿一。若是内明體義對者。是以＿レ
我爲＿二自性＿一哉。況乎見＿二斷文＿一。於＿三佛地經《割書：考【四角囲み文字】經下建曆本｜有＿二所說二字＿一》自相
《割書：考【四角囲み文字】建曆本｜消＿レ之》共相。與＿二因明論自共相＿一。出＿二 三種差別＿一之中。第三
差別。以＿二今局通對＿一別＿レ之。故。文云三因明二相據＿二通局＿一
分以＿三後所說必貫＿二於餘＿一《割書：等云云》。故今對意者。五蘊自性￣ニマレ
無常等差別￣ニマレ。以＿レ局＿二-附自性＿一云＿二自性＿一。貫＿二-通他上＿一云＿二
差別＿一。非＿レ如＿二内明體義對。自性差別凝然各定＿一。今此不定
故。若不＿レ爾者。立＿二我是思＿一時。是以＿二有法＿一。我＿一【一点衍ヵ】爲＿二差＿一。【一点「。」衍ヵ】別＿一。以＿二
法宗思＿一爲＿二自性＿一耶。若許＿レ爾者。返違＿二謂我自性之文＿一。其
【下段】
義必然故。又義斷￣ニ違＿下￣セリ於局通對￣ハ後所說通＿二￣スルヲ《割書：以》他￣ノ
上￣ニ＿一爲＿二差別＿一之文＿上。以後＿二說思＿一判＿二自性＿一故。依＿レ之斷云。然
體不定經汎通辨雖＿二遍不遍＿一 二相卽定故有＿二差別＿一《割書：云云》。以
知。今局通對其義不定。然體不定之意。蓋以在＿レ之。通途
學者。執＿二其體同＿一。未＿レ詳＿二義理之致＿一也。於＿二判＿レ同之先德義＿一。
未＿レ知＿二其意＿一。況乎。明燈抄一第獻記等。證據明白。不＿レ可＿二
狐疑＿一也。
重難云。判＿二内明體義對￣ト各別￣ナリト＿一。義理専不＿レ然。案＿二 三
重自性差別＿一。第一對者。汎爾判＿二所成立法自性差別＿一。第
二重者。正立量門也。於＿二今此對＿一。不＿レ論＿二諸法體義＿一。先陳
爲＿二自性＿一。後說爲＿二差別＿一也。故見＿二疏文＿一。至＿二第二先陳後說
對＿一。出＿二得名不定義＿一。専不＿レ見＿下於＿二初對＿一其義不定＿上。若爾者。
第二第一對。有＿二何差別＿一耶。不＿レ論＿二體義＿一。得＿レ名不定故。但
至＿二于數論所立我是思之量＿一者。自＿レ本今第一重者。不＿レ約＿二
立量門＿一。汎爾出＿二自性差別＿一也。如＿二 四卷私記＿一。又子島云。問
此上三對次第何故爾答第一重凡約＿二因明門所成立之
法＿一第二重明＿二立量門＿一《割書：云云》。故於＿二立量＿一勿＿レ致＿二疑難＿一也。況
現代語訳
【右頁】
【上段】
性の意許である。論の「作有縁性」を意許であると言うのである。
松室道云く。今の作有縁性○これがその差別である《すでに上で璧を破り了る》今意許に拠る○故に言顕ではない《断主が正義を出すのである》問答では意許に拠って立てて「有作縁等」と云う《断主が自ら問うのである》
○相違因《自義の因》
私《秘》もまた因明四相違因の文の如く、之因の証とする。疏に云う「今其の宗を陳ぶるにまだ過有らず」《等の文》もしそうなら、縦い相違即因の義を立てても、何の宗因相例難があるのか。
答。「今其の宗を陳ぶる」等の文は、声常宗は一切皆これ無常なる故に《因》この因は悪しく立てて多くの過がある。宗には過が無い故に、「今其の宗を陳ぶるにまだ過有らず、因を挙ぐれば方に過あり」等と云う。宗因相形して唯因のみ過ある宗故に過となる故ではない。所作因が常宗に違うのを例とすべきではない。
僧都云く。枢要の中、並びに十因章に、清浄の相違因果無漏の事がある。これを以て之因の難とすべきである。《この事を知る人が無い》
因返宗の問がある。之因の義に依って問うのである。《文点を読むべし》
因を以て宗を返さしめることあるを因義に順じざる因を相違と名づければ、宗もまた因を返さしめるを因を宗義に順じずして相違と名づくべきである。
疏文の体では、宗が因を違するを違と云い、両宗の乖返を返と云う。故に「因返」を「宗に返さず」と読むべきではない。
また因を法自相相違と名づけるとは、所作因が常宗を返らしめて、無常宗の為に因となるを法自相相違と名づけると言うのである。
宗を比量相違と名づけるとは、常宗が無常宗の因に違するを比量相違と名づけると言うのである。《前宗と後因とが相対して、宗を比量相違と名づけ、因を法自相相違と名づける。その理は然るべきである》
論に云う「亦た能く成立す此れと相違する作非有縁性を」《云云》この文を之因の証とすべきである。
問。之因の義を存じる人は、邑記を棄てるべきか。答。棄てるべきである。
○違法無きが如く《自義では本量がまだ他違を蒙らないのである。これは邑記の意である》
理門論の「若し所違害無くば」の文を、この義の証とする。
○比量相違・相違決定・相違因は相並ぶか《自義では相並ぶ》
所違は、三過が相並ぶ。《比量相違・相違因は因を改めずに相並ぶ。相違決定は因を改めて相並ぶ》
能違は、相違因・比量相違は相並ぶ。相違決定は並ばない。
問。疏に云う「諸の相違決定は皆比量相違なり」《云云》論の所説の相違決定は、何故比量相違を帯びるのか。比量相違は正比量の道理に違する故に。
【左頁】
【上段】
答。所聞性の因は三相を具えている故に、且つ正量因と云う。故に「諸の相違決定は皆比量相違なり」と云う《云云》《明詮道云く、相違決定の処に云う。二比量相違、また相違決定に通ず、第六相違決定の如し》《謂く前の無常宗は、後の所聞性に違する。これを比量相違と云う》
○局通対《僧都記録を写して之を載せる》
私に云く。ひそかに疏・断の文勢を見るに、今この局通対は、内明所説の体義対と、その義は各別であるべきである。道詮・仁覚等の所案は、深く幽致を窮める。所以に然るは、内明所説の体義対とは、五蕴の自体を自性と云い、体の上の我・無常等を差別と名づける。その理は必然で、本より相濫が無い。然るに疏文の相を見ると、「所成立の自性」と云って、既に我・法の二種を出している。もしこれが内明の体義対なら、これは我を自性とするのか。況んや断文を見ると、仏地経の自相・共相と、因明論の自共相とにおいて、三種の差別を出す中の第三差別に、今の局通対を以てこれを別つ。故に文に云う「三、因明の二相は通局に拠って分かつ、後所説を以て必ず余に貫通するを以て」《等云云》故に今の対の意は、五蕴の自性にまれ、無常等の差別にまれ、自性に局附するを以て自性と云い、他の上に貫通するを差別と云う。内明の体義対の如く、自性・差別が凝然として各々定まっているのとは異なる。今これは不定である故に。もしそうでなければ、「我は思なり」を立てる時、これは有法の我を差別とし、法宗の思を自性とするのか。もしそれを許すなら、「我を自性と謂う」の文に返って違する。その
【下段】
義は必然の故である。また義断に違する、局通対においては「後所説が他の上に通ずるを差別とする」の文に。後説の思を以て自性と判ずる故である。これに依って断に云う「然れども体は不定なり、経は汎通にして弁ずれども遍不遍の二相は即ち定まる故に差別有り」《云云》以て知る。今の局通対はその義が不定である。「然れども体は不定なり」の意は、蓋しこれに在る。通途の学者は、その体が同じと執して、未だ義理の致を詳らかにしていない。体が同じと判ずる先徳の義において、未だその意を知らない。況んや明燈抄・一第・献記等は、証拠明白で、狐疑すべきではない。
重ねて難じて云く。内明の体義対と各別なりと判ずるは、義理が専ら然らず。三重の自性差別を案ずるに、第一対は、汎爾に所成立法の自性差別を判ず。第二重は、正しく立量門である。今この対において、諸法の体義を論ぜず、先陳を自性とし、後説を差別とするのである。故に疏文を見ると、第二の先陳後説対に至って、得名不定の義を出している。専ら初対においてその義が不定であるのを見ない。もしそうなら、第二と第一対に、何の差別があるのか。体義を論ぜず、得名が不定である故に。但し数論所立の「我は思なり」の量に至っては、本より今の第一重は、立量門に約せず、汎爾に自性差別を出すのである。四巻私記の如く、また子島云く「問う、この上の三対の次第は何故にそうなのか。答う、第一重は凡そ因明門の所成立の法に約し、第二重は立量門を明かす」《云云》故に立量において疑難を致すことなかれ。況んや
【下段続き】
英語訳
【Right Page】
【Upper Section】
It is the intended meaning of "nature." It says that the treatise's "creating object-perceiving nature" is intended meaning.
Master Matsumuro says: "Now this creating object-perceiving nature ○ this is that differentia" 《Above, Master Pi has already been refuted》 "Now based on intended meaning ○ therefore not explicit statement" 《The master of Duan presents the correct doctrine》 In question and answer, based on intended meaning, establish and say "existence creates perceiving, etc." 《The master of Duan questions himself》
○ Contradictory Reason 《Reason of one's own doctrine》
I (Secret) also, like the text on the four contradictory reasons in logic, make this proof for the "reason as such." The commentary says "Now stating this thesis, there is not yet any fault" 《etc.》 If so, even if one establishes the doctrine that contradiction is identical with reason, what thesis-reason mutual comparison difficulty would there be?
Answer: The text "Now stating this thesis, etc." means that because the thesis "sound is permanent" is entirely impermanent 《reason》, this reason is badly established and has many faults. Because the thesis has no fault, it says "Now stating this thesis, there is not yet any fault; only when raising the reason is there fault" etc. It is not because the thesis becomes faulty due to thesis and reason being mutually comparative with only the reason having faults. One should not use as example the made-reason violating the permanence thesis.
The Monastic Director says: In the Pivotal Essentials and the Ten Reasons Chapter, there are matters of pure contradictory reason-effect and uncontaminated affairs. This should be used as a difficulty for the "reason as such." 《There is no one who knows this matter》
There is a question about "reason reversing thesis." This asks based on the doctrine of "reason as such." 《One should read the punctuation marks》
When there is using reason to make the thesis reverse, if a reason not conforming to reason-nature is called contradictory, then when the thesis also makes the reason reverse, the reason not conforming to thesis-nature should be called contradictory.
In the commentary's style, when the thesis violates the reason it is called "violation," when both theses are discordant and reversed it is called "reversal." Therefore one should not read "reason reversal" as "not reversing to the thesis."
Also, naming a reason "dharma-svarūpa contradiction" means that the made-reason makes the permanence thesis reverse, becoming a reason for the impermanence thesis, which is named dharma-svarūpa contradiction.
Naming the thesis "inference contradiction" means that the permanence thesis violating the reason of the impermanence thesis is named inference contradiction. 《The previous thesis and later reason are mutually opposed; the thesis is named inference contradiction, the reason is named dharma-svarūpa contradiction. This reasoning is appropriate》
The treatise states: "Also can establish what contradicts this - creating non-object-perceiving nature" 《etc.》 This text should serve as proof for the "reason as such."
Question: Should those who maintain the doctrine of "reason as such" abandon the Yi Commentary? Answer: They should abandon it.
○ Like Having No Violating Dharma 《In one's own doctrine, the original inference has not yet suffered other-violation. This is the Yi Commentary's intention》
The Treatise on Logic's text "If there is no violated harm" serves as proof for this doctrine.
○ Do Inference Contradiction, Contradictory Determination, and Contradictory Reason Coexist? 《In one's own doctrine, they coexist》
For what is contradicted: three faults coexist. 《Inference contradiction and contradictory reason coexist without changing the reason. Contradictory determination coexists by changing the reason》
For what contradicts: contradictory reason and inference contradiction coexist. Contradictory determination does not coexist.
Question: The commentary says "All contradictory determinations are inference contradictions" 《etc.》 Why does the treatise's contradictory determination carry inference contradiction? Because inference contradiction violates the principle of correct inference.
【Left Page】
【Upper Section】
Answer: Because the audible-nature reason possesses the three characteristics, it is tentatively called a correct inference reason. Therefore it says "All contradictory determinations are inference contradictions" 《etc.》 《Master Myōsen says: At the place of contradictory determination: "Two inference contradictions also penetrate contradictory determination, like the sixth contradictory determination"》 《Namely, the previous impermanence thesis violates the later audible-nature. This is called inference contradiction》
○ Limited-Universal Opposition 《Copying and recording the Monastic Director's record》
I say privately: Secretly observing the textual momentum of the commentary and judgment, this present limited-universal opposition should be doctrinally separate from the substance-attribute opposition taught in inner enlightenment teachings. The proposals of Masters Dōsen, Ninkaku, etc. deeply probe the subtle principle. The reason is that the substance-attribute opposition taught in inner teachings calls the five aggregates' own substance "inherent nature" and names the self, impermanence, etc. upon that substance "differentia." This principle is necessary, having no confusion from the beginning. However, seeing the commentary text's aspect, it says "established inherent nature" and already produces two types: self and dharma. If this were inner teaching's substance-attribute opposition, would this take self as inherent nature? Moreover, seeing the judgment text, in the Buddha-Ground Sutra's svarūpa-sāmānya and the logical treatise's svarūpa-sāmānya, among the three types of differentia produced, the third differentia distinguishes using this present limited-universal opposition. Therefore the text says "Third, logic's two aspects are divided according to universal-limited; using later teachings necessarily penetrating others" 《etc.》 Therefore this opposition's intention: whether five aggregates' inherent nature or impermanence etc. differentia, what is limited-attached to inherent nature is called inherent nature; what penetrates-through others is called differentia. It is not like inner teaching's substance-attribute opposition where inherent nature and differentia are solidly fixed each to each. This present one is unfixed. If not so, when establishing "self is thought," would this take the subject "self" as differentia and the predicate-thesis "thought" as inherent nature? If one permits this, it contradicts the text "calling self inherent nature." That
【Lower Section】
doctrine is necessary. Also it violates the judgment that in limited-universal opposition "what later-taught penetrates others' surface is differentia." Because it judges later-taught thought as inherent nature. Based on this, the judgment says: "However, substance is unfixed; though sutras universally penetrate and discriminate, because the two aspects of pervading/non-pervading are immediately fixed, there are differentia" 《etc.》 Thus we know that this present limited-universal opposition has unfixed doctrine. The meaning "however, substance is unfixed" presumably lies in this. Common scholars cling to their substances being identical, not yet being detailed about doctrinal principle. Regarding previous masters' doctrines judging them identical, they do not yet know their intention. Moreover, the Bright Lamp Commentary, First Volume,献 Commentary, etc. have clear evidence and should not be doubted.
Repeatedly challenging: Judging the inner teaching's substance-attribute opposition as separate is entirely unreasonable in principle. Examining the three levels of inherent nature-differentia: the first opposition generally judges established dharma's inherent nature-differentia. The second level is properly the inference-establishment gate. In this present opposition, not discussing various dharmas' substance-attribute, the prior statement becomes inherent nature, the later statement becomes differentia. Therefore, seeing the commentary text, reaching the second prior-statement later-statement opposition, it produces the doctrine of unfixed naming. One does not specifically see that doctrine being unfixed in the initial opposition. If so, what differentia would there be between the second and first oppositions? Not discussing substance-attribute, naming being unfixed. However, regarding the Sāṅkhya-established inference "self is thought," originally this present first level does not relate to the inference-establishment gate but generally produces inherent nature-differentia. Like the Four-Volume Private Commentary, also Kojima says: "Question: Why is the sequence of these three oppositions so? Answer: The first level generally relates to dharmas established by the logical gate; the second level clarifies the inference-establishment gate" 《etc.》 Therefore, regarding inference-establishment, one should not raise doubts. Moreover