翻刻
【本文二段構成】
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
三三二【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
左府抄中
【枠外右横下】
一四
【上段】
乎見＿二斷文＿一。因明門出＿二 四對＿一之中。第一體義對。卽内明
體義對《割書：云云》。至＿二次下＿一。因明體義對卽局通對《割書：云云》以知。今
局通對。内明體義對￣ナリト《割書：云》￣コトヲ乎。爾何定＿二各別＿一耶。
答。先今三重者。皆於＿二立量門＿一論＿レ之。故云＿二此宗說法＿一。斷
四種￣モ如＿レ此。之皆於＿二立量＿一判也。何說＿下因明自性差別不＿二
立量￣ニハ＿一。汎爾￣ニ定＿上＿レ￣ムト之耶。先德之所判。理恐不＿レ爾。旣斷
文說＿二￣テ今局通體＿一。不￣ムハ＿レ爾喩無￣ラム非＿レ成＿二比量＿一卽名爲＿レ似
《割書：云云》。爰知。第一重￣モ立量門￣ナリト《割書：云》￣ヲ乎。況文旣云＿二所成立
能成立＿一。何非＿二立量＿一耶。但至＿二于局通前後各別￣ナリト《割書：云》￣ニ＿一者＿一【一点衍ヵ】。
其理旣顯然。於＿二 一具比量＿一。立＿二我是思＿一時。我不＿レ通＿二無我＿一。
局＿二-附我自體＿一。名爲＿二自性＿一。思通＿二非我喩＿一。不＿レ限＿二我自體＿一。貫＿二-
通餘法＿一。名爲＿二差別＿一。是局通對也。前陳後說者。前陳我所
分別。無＿三法可＿二分別＿一故。後陳思能分別也。分＿二-別前陳我＿一故。
差別者。分別之異名也。故前陳名＿二自性＿一。後說名＿二差別＿一。故
二義門。其理尤別。不＿レ可＿二異求＿一也。次疏文。至【二点脱ヵ】前後對＿一。出＿二
得名不定之義＿一者。爲＿レ別＿二佛地論所說自共相＿一。非＿レ謂＿下於＿二
第一對＿一無＿中此義＿上矣。但於＿二斷文＿一者。如＿二黄私記＿一者。以＿レ體
【下段】
爲＿二自性＿一義爲＿二差別＿一之片方￣ヲ云￣フト＿レ同￣ト釋歟。但如＿二此義＿一
者。斷第一體義。可＿レ有＿二狹少之過＿一。不＿レ攝＿下以＿レ體爲【二点脱ヵ】差別＿一義
爲＿二自性＿一之片方＿上故。或可。於＿二￣テ《割書：云》少分￣ニ＿一歟。然今案云。斷因
明第一對者。卽局通對《割書：考【四角囲み文字】對下建曆｜本有＿二也字＿一》更無＿二寬狹＿一。名＿二體義＿一者。
雖＿二無常義＿一。附＿二自體無常＿一故。不＿レ爾者。斷四對有＿二不＿レ攝之
法＿一故。但前第一者。於＿レ名判＿レ之。非＿二義卽同＿一。於＿二内《割書：考【四角囲み文字】内建曆本｜作＿二因字＿一。》
明義＿一。得＿二體義名＿一者。局＿二-附己體＿一故。故不＿二相違＿一也。已上因
明内明各別之義。有＿二先德之傳＿一 上。頗以有＿二稟承＿一。《割書：先師慶助｜已講。》
如＿二通途所學＿一者。誠難＿レ避＿二疑惑＿一。甚以深奧。可＿レ祕可＿レ祕。
但少年筆跡。䚹謬最多。老後見＿レ之。難＿レ貽＿二來葉＿一者歟。
僧都云。愚案與＿レ此意也。局通對者。汎爾定＿二因明所成
立惣聚諸法＿一也。未＿レ及＿二 三支作法＿一也。但與＿二内明自性
差別＿一異方。同＿二師說＿一。 問。何故云＿レ未＿レ及＿二 三支作法＿一耶。
答。疏說＿二先陳後說對＿一之處云。二者先後於＿二惣聚中＿一言
先陳者名爲＿二自性＿一言後說者名爲＿二差別＿一《割書：云云》。其惣聚者。
局通對也。謂因明惣聚諸法也。未＿レ爲＿二《割書：考【四角囲み文字】爲建曆本｜作＿二及字＿一》立量時＿一。
問。斷云。三因明二相據＿二通局＿一分以＿三後所說必貫＿二於餘＿一
【左頁】
【枠外左上】
三三三【但し算用数字】
【枠外左横上】
左府抄中
【枠外左横下】
一五
【上段】
不＿レ爾喩無非＿レ成＿二比量＿一卽名爲＿レ似《割書：云云》。是說＿二局通對＿一之
文也。旣云＿二非成比量＿一。如何云＿レ不＿レ及＿二立量時＿一耶。 答。
此文合說＿二局通前後二對＿一之文也。非＿三唯說＿二局通＿一也。
○先陳後說對《割書：自義佛地論｜文成＿レ證》
問。佛地論文。如何成＿二先陳後說對證文＿一耶。 答。先對未＿レ
及＿二立量＿一故。此文不＿レ成＿レ證。此對說＿二 三支作法＿一時故。成＿レ證
也。此文說＿二立量門＿一故也。又此對￣ニモ有＿二局通義＿一故。局附
自性文。非＿二其證＿一《割書：考【四角囲み文字】證建曆｜本作難》也。
問。因明論者。何論何文耶。 答。小論言比量者謂籍聚
相而觀於義之文也。 問。以＿二自相＿一當＿二現量＿一。以＿二共相＿一當＿二
比量＿一歟。 答。自相共相。皆當＿二比量＿一也。
問。貫＿二-通他上＿一。如＿二縷貫＿一＿レ花。不＿レ爲＿二共相＿一者。指＿二何物＿一耶。
答。是指＿レ因也。非＿レ指＿二宗能別＿一也。
問。是說＿二宗先陳後說＿一之文也。如何云＿レ指＿レ因耶。答。論云。
言比量者謂籍聚相而觀於義相有三種如前已說《割書：云云》。彼
因明論。卽此文也。此文說＿二因共相＿一之文也。引＿レ之不＿レ可＿レ
說＿二宗共相＿一。又疏次下云。故依＿二於此＿一聲等局體名爲＿二自性＿一
【下段】
無常貫＿レ他不＿レ爲＿二差別＿一《割書：文》。故知引＿二佛地論文＿一者。是例＿二因
共相＿一。成＿二宗能別之共相之事＿一也。故依於此者。依者准也。
○言陳意許對《割書：僧都云無＿二｜指事＿一》
尋云。今此言陳意許對意者。差別可＿レ許＿レ通＿二言顯自相＿一
耶。若許＿レ爾者。有＿二言許雜亂之過＿一耶。《割書：考【四角囲み文字】建曆本｜無耶字》矣若不＿レ爾
者。何斷云＿下不＿レ障＿三自相亦有＿二意許＿一通＿二言顯＿一故＿上哉。
○擧此三種《割書：僧都云｜無指事》
已上。自＿二 十七日＿一至＿二廿二日＿一習也。廿二日與＿二牛僧都＿一。
寬喜三年三月五日。於＿二 一乘院北面自＿レ西第三蔀間＿一。
書＿二-寫之＿一了。 權僧正《割書：花押》
交了
《割書：考【四角囲み文字】建曆本奥云。此鈔者。宇治左府習＿二學因明＿一之時。對＿二惠曉法印＿一。｜面受口決之間。正記＿二彼口傳＿一。又被＿レ載＿二彼草本＿一。仍爲＿レ知＿二先達雅》
《割書：意＿一。寫＿二｜留之＿一。》
《割書： 建曆二年十二月廿七日。依＿二禪房御命＿一。馳筆了。尊遍》
左府抄中《割書：終》
【八十八行五字目の「奥」は「奧」であるかは判別つかず。「奥」に見える。】
現代語訳
【右頁】
【上段】
況んや断文を見ると、因明門が四対を出す中で、第一の体義対は、即ち内明の体義対である《云云》次下に至って、因明の体義対は即ち局通対である《云云》以て知る。今の局通対は、内明の体義対であると云うのか。それならば何故各別と定めるのか。
答。先ず今の三重は、皆立量門において之を論ずる。故に「此の宗は法を説く」と云う。断の四種もこの如くである。之は皆立量において判ずるのである。何故因明の自性差別は立量には汎爾に定めないと説くのか。先徳の所判は、理恐らく然らず。既に断文は「今の局通体」を説いて、そうでなければ喩が無く、比量を成さず、即ち似と名づけると《云云》ここに知る。第一重も立量門であると云うのか。況んや文は既に「所成立・能成立」と云う。何故立量でないのか。但し「局通前後は各別なり」と云うに至っては、その理は既に顕然である。一具の比量において、「我は思なり」を立てる時、我は無我に通ぜず、我自体に局附して、自性と名づける。思は非我の喩に通じて、我自体に限らず、餘法に貫通して、差別と名づける。これが局通対である。前陳後説とは、前陳の我は所分別で、分別すべき法が無い故に、後陳の思は能分別である。前陳の我を分別する故に。差別とは、分別の異名である。故に前陳を自性と名づけ、後説を差別と名づける。故に二義門は、その理尤も別である。異求すべきではない。次に疏文で、前後対に至って、得名不定の義を出すのは、仏地論所説の自共相を別つためで、第一対において此の義が無いと謂うのではない。但し断文については、黄私記の如くは、体を自性とし義を差別とする片方を同じと釈すのか。但しこの義の如くは、断の第一体義は、狭少の過があるべきである。体を差別とし義を自性とする片方を摂しない故に。或いは少分においてか。然るに今案ずるに云う。断の因明第一対は、即ち局通対で、更に寛狭が無い。体義と名づけるのは、無常の義であっても、自体の無常に附する故に。そうでなければ、断の四対に摂されない法があることになる故に。但し前の第一は、名において之を判ずるので、義が即ち同じではない。内明の義において、体義の名を得るのは、己体に局附する故に。故に相違しない。已上因明・内明各別の義は、先徳の伝があって、頗る稟承がある。《先師慶助已講》通途の所学の如くは、誠に疑惑を避け難い。甚だ深奧である。秘すべし秘すべし。但し少年の筆跡で、謬誤最も多い。老後これを見て、來葉に貽し難いものか。
僧都云く。愚案もこの意と同じである。局通対とは、汎爾に因明の所成立総聚の諸法を定めるのである。未だ三支作法に及ばない。但し内明の自性差別と異なる方は、師説と同じである。問。何故未だ三支作法に及ばずと云うのか。答。疏が先陳後説対を説く処に云う「二者先後は総聚中において言先陳者を自性と名づけ言後説者を差別と名づける」《云云》その総聚とは、局通対である。謂く因明総聚の諸法である。未だ立量の時とならない。問。断に云う「三、因明の二相は通局に拠って分かち、後所説を以て必ず餘に貫通するを以て
【下段】
そうでなければ喩が無く、比量を成さず、即ち似と名づける」《云云》これは局通対を説く文である。既に「比量を成さず」と云う。如何に「立量の時に及ばず」と云うのか。答。この文は局通・前後の二対を合わせて説く文である。唯局通のみを説くのではない。
○先陳後説対《自義では仏地論の文が証と成る》
問。仏地論の文は、如何に先陳後説対の証文と成るのか。答。先対は未だ立量に及ばない故に、この文は証と成らない。この対は三支作法を説く時の故に、証と成る。この文は立量門を説く故である。またこの対にも局通義がある故に、局附自性の文は、その証ではない。
問。因明論とは、何論の何文か。答。小論の「比量とは謂く聚相に籍りて義を観ずる」の文である。問。自相を以て現量に当て、共相を以て比量に当てるのか。答。自相・共相は、皆比量に当たる。
問。「他の上に貫通する」ことを、縷が花を貫くが如くとし、共相としないものは、何物を指すのか。答。これは因を指すのである。宗能別を指すのではない。
問。これは宗の先陳後説を説く文である。如何に因を指すと云うのか。答。論に云う「比量と言うは謂く聚相に籍りて義を観ずる相に三種有り前に已に説くが如し」《云云》彼の因明論は、即ちこの文である。この文は因の共相を説く文である。之を引いて宗の共相を説くべきではない。また疏の次下に云う「故に此に依って声等の局体を自性と名づけ、
【下段】
無常が他に貫いて差別とならず」《文》故に知る。仏地論の文を引くのは、これは因の共相に例えて、宗能別の共相の事を成すのである。故に「此に依る」とは、依とは准のことである。
○言陳意許対《僧都云く指事無し》
尋ねて云う。今この言陳意許対の意は、差別は言顕自相に通ずることを許すべきか。もし爾を許すなら、言許雑乱の過があるのか。もし爾でなければ、何故断に「自相を障えず亦た意許有りて言顕に通ずる故に」と云うのか。
○此の三種を挙ぐ《僧都云く指事無し》
已上。十七日より廿二日に至って習うなり。廿二日牛僧都と。
寛喜三年三月五日。一乗院北面西より第三蔀間において、之を書写し了る。 権僧正《花押》
交了
《建暦本奥に云う。此の鈔は、宇治左府が因明を習学する時、恵暁法印に対して、面受口決の間、正しく彼の口伝を記し、また彼の草本を載せられる。仍って先達の雅意を知るため、之を写留す。建暦二年十二月廿七日。禅房御命に依って、筆を馳せ了る。尊遍》
左府抄中《終》
【左頁】
【上段】
そうでなければ喩が無く、比量を成さず、即ち似と名づける」《云云》これは局通対を説く文である。既に「比量を成さず」と云う。如何に「立量の時に及ばず」と云うのか。答。この文は局通・前後の二対を合わせて説く文である。唯局通のみを説くのではない。
○先陳後説対《自義では仏地論の文が証と成る》
問。仏地論の文は、如何に先陳後説対の証文と成るのか。答。先対は未だ立量に及ばない故に、この文は証と成らない。この対は三支作法を説く時の故に、証と成る。この文は立量門を説く故である。またこの対にも局通義があるので、局附自性の文は、その証ではない。
問。因明論とは、何論の何文か。答。小論の「比量とは謂く聚相に籍りて義を観ずる」の文である。問。自相を以て現量に当て、共相を以て比量に当てるのか。答。自相・共相は、皆比量に当たる。
問。「他の上に貫通する」ことを、縷が花を貫くが如くとし、共相としないものは、何物を指すのか。答。これは因を指すのである。宗能別を指すのではない。
問。これは宗の先陳後説を説く文である。如何に因を指すと云うのか。答。論に云う「比量と言うは謂く聚相に籍りて義を観ずる相に三種有り前に已に説くが如し」《云云》彼の因明論は、即ちこの文である。この文は因の共相を説く文である。之を引いて宗の共相を説くべきではない。また疏の次下に云う「故に此に依って声等の局体を自性と名づけ、
【下段】
無常が他に貫いて差別とならず」《文》故に知る。仏地論の文を引くのは、これは因の共相に例えて、宗能別の共相の事を成すのである。故に「此に依る」とは、依とは准のことである。
○言陈意许对《僧都云く指事無し》
尋ねて云う。今この言陳意許対の意は、差別は言顕自相に通ずることを許すべきか。もし爾を許すなら、言許雑乱の過があるのか。もし爾でなければ、何故断に「自相を障えず亦た意許有りて言顕に通ずる故に」と云うのか。
○此の三種を挙ぐ《僧都云く指事無し》
已上。十七日より廿二日に至って習うなり。廿二日牛僧都と。
寛喜三年三月五日。一乗院北面西より第三蔀間において、之を書写し了る。 権僧正《花押》
交了
《建暦本奥に云う。此の鈔は、宇治左府が因明を習学する時、恵暁法印に対して、面受口決の間、正しく彼の口伝を記し、また彼の草本を載せられる。仍って先達の雅意を知るため、之を写留す。建暦二年十二月廿七日。禅房御命に依って、筆を馳せ了る。尊遍》
左府抄中《終》
英語訳
【Right Page】
【Upper Section】
Moreover, seeing the judgment text, among the four oppositions produced by the logical gate, the first substance-attribute opposition is precisely the inner teaching's substance-attribute opposition《etc.》Reaching the next section below, the logic's substance-attribute opposition is precisely the limited-universal opposition《etc.》Thus we know: is this present limited-universal opposition the inner teaching's substance-attribute opposition? If so, why determine them as separate?
Answer: First, these present three levels all discuss this within the inference-establishment gate. Therefore it says "this thesis expounds dharma." The judgment's four types are also like this. These all judge within inference-establishment. Why would one say that logic's inherent nature-differentia are not established within inference but are generally fixed? The previous masters' judgments are probably not so in principle. Already the judgment text explains "this present limited-universal substance," saying that otherwise there would be no analogy, no completion of inference, immediately named as fallacious《etc.》Here we know: is the first level also the inference-establishment gate? Moreover, the text already says "what is established and what establishes." Why would it not be inference-establishment? However, regarding "limited-universal and before-after are each separate": this principle is already evident. In one complete inference, when establishing "self is thought," self does not penetrate to non-self but is limited-attached to self's own substance, named inherent nature. Thought penetrates to non-self analogies, not limited to self's own substance but penetrating-through other dharmas, named differentia. This is the limited-universal opposition. Before-after refers to: the previous statement "self" is what is differentiated, having no dharma to differentiate; the later statement "thought" is what differentiates, differentiating the previous statement "self." Differentia is another name for differentiation. Therefore the previous statement is named inherent nature, the later statement named differentia. Therefore these two doctrinal gates have especially distinct principles and should not seek otherwise. Next, in the commentary text, reaching the before-after opposition and producing the doctrine of unfixed naming is to distinguish the Buddha-Ground Treatise's explained svarūpa-sāmānya, not saying there is no such doctrine in the first opposition. However, regarding the judgment text, like the Yellow Private Commentary, does it interpret taking substance as inherent nature and meaning as differentia as one side being identical? However, if like this doctrine, the judgment's first substance-meaning would have the fault of narrow limitation, not encompassing the side of taking substance as differentia and meaning as inherent nature. Or perhaps in a small portion? However, now examining and saying: the judgment's logic first opposition is precisely the limited-universal opposition, with no further broad-narrow distinction. Naming it "substance-meaning" is because even though it is impermanence-meaning, it attaches to own-substance's impermanence. Otherwise, there would be dharmas not encompassed by the judgment's four oppositions. However, the previous first judges this in name, not that the meaning is immediately identical. In inner teaching's meaning, obtaining the name substance-meaning is because it is limited-attached to one's own substance. Therefore there is no contradiction. The above doctrine of logic and inner teaching being separate has transmission from previous masters, quite having received inheritance.《Former master Keisuke already lectured》Like what is commonly studied, it is truly difficult to avoid doubt and confusion. Extremely profound. Should be kept secret, should be kept secret. However, youthful handwriting has many errors. Seeing this in old age, would it be difficult to transmit to future generations?
The Monastic Director says: My humble opinion also agrees with this meaning. The limited-universal opposition generally fixes the established total aggregate of various dharmas in logic. It does not yet reach the three-part methodology. However, the way it differs from inner teaching's inherent nature-differentia is the same as the master's teaching. Question: Why say it does not yet reach the three-part methodology? Answer: The commentary explaining the before-after opposition says: "Second, before-after: within the total aggregate, what is called previous statement is named inherent nature, what is called later statement is named differentia"《etc.》That total aggregate is the limited-universal opposition. Namely, logic's total aggregate of various dharmas. It has not yet become the time of inference-establishment. Question: The judgment says: "Third, logic's two aspects are divided according to universal-limited; using what later-taught necessarily penetrates others,
【Lower Section】
otherwise there is no analogy, no completion of inference, immediately named fallacious"《etc.》This is text explaining the limited-universal opposition. Already saying "not completing inference," how can one say "not reaching the time of inference-establishment"? Answer: This text jointly explains the limited-universal and before-after two oppositions. It does not explain only the limited-universal.
○ Before-After Opposition《In our own doctrine, the Buddha-Ground Treatise text serves as proof》
Question: How does the Buddha-Ground Treatise text become proof text for the before-after opposition? Answer: Because the previous opposition does not yet reach inference-establishment, this text does not serve as proof. Because this opposition speaks of the time of three-part methodology, it serves as proof. Because this text explains the inference-establishment gate. Also, because this opposition also has limited-universal meaning, the text about limited-attached inherent nature is not its proof.
Question: What treatise and what text is the logic treatise? Answer: The Small Treatise's text "inference means relying on aggregate characteristics to observe meaning." Question: Does one correspond svarūpa to direct perception and sāmānya to inference? Answer: Both svarūpa and sāmānya correspond to inference.
Question: "Penetrating through others' surface" like thread penetrating flowers - what does this point to when not being sāmānya? Answer: This points to the reason. It does not point to the thesis-predicate.
Question: This is text explaining the thesis's before-after. How can one say it points to the reason? Answer: The treatise says: "Speaking of inference means relying on aggregate characteristics to observe meaning; characteristics have three types as already explained above"《etc.》That logic treatise is precisely this text. This text explains the reason's sāmānya. Citing this, one should not explain the thesis's sāmānya. Also, the commentary's next section below says: "Therefore, relying on this, sound etc.'s limited substance is named inherent nature,
【Lower Section】
impermanence penetrating others does not become differentia"《text》Therefore we know: citing the Buddha-Ground Treatise text uses the reason's sāmānya as analogy to accomplish the matter of the thesis-predicate's sāmānya. Therefore "relying on this" - "relying" means "according to."
○ Explicit Statement-Intended Meaning Opposition《The Monastic Director says there are no specific matters》
Inquiring: In this present explicit statement-intended meaning opposition's intention, should differentia be permitted to penetrate explicit statement svarūpa? If one permits this, is there the fault of explicit-intended confusion? If not, why does the judgment say "not obstructing svarūpa, also having intended meaning penetrating explicit statement"?
○ Raising These Three Types《The Monastic Director says there are no specific matters》
Above: practiced from the 17th to the 22nd day. On the 22nd day with Monastic Director Ushi.
Kanki 3rd year, 3rd month, 5th day. At Ichijō-in's north side, third bay from the west, completed copying this. Provisional Monastic Chief《seal》
Completed revision
《The Kenryaku edition's postscript says: This commentary was when the Uji Minister of the Left was studying logic, facing Dharma Seal Ekyō, during face-to-face received oral decisions, correctly recording those oral transmissions, also having those draft versions recorded. Therefore, to know previous masters' elegant intentions, copied and preserved this. Kenryaku 2nd year, 12th month, 27th day. According to the Zen quarters' honorable command, hastily completed writing. Sonpen》
Minister of the Left Commentary, Middle Volume《End》
【Left Page】
【Upper Section】
otherwise there is no analogy, no completion of inference, immediately named fallacious"《etc.》This is text explaining the limited-universal opposition. Already saying "not completing inference," how can one say "not reaching the time of inference-establishment"? Answer: This text jointly explains the limited-universal and before-after two oppositions. It does not explain only the limited-universal.
○ Before-After Opposition《In our own doctrine, the Buddha-Ground Treatise text serves as proof》
Question: How does the Buddha-Ground Treatise text become proof text for the before-after opposition? Answer: Because the previous opposition does not yet reach inference-establishment, this text does not serve as proof. Because this opposition speaks of the time of three-part methodology, it serves as proof. Because this text explains the inference-establishment gate. Also, because this opposition also has limited-universal meaning, the text about limited-attached inherent nature is not its proof.
Question: What treatise and what text is the logic treatise? Answer: The Small Treatise's text "inference means relying on aggregate characteristics to observe meaning." Question: Does one correspond svarūpa to direct perception and sāmānya to inference? Answer: Both svarūpa and sāmānya correspond to inference.
Question: "Penetrating through others' surface" like thread penetrating flowers - what does this point to when not being sāmānya? Answer: This points to the reason. It does not point to the thesis-predicate.
Question: This is text explaining the thesis's before-after. How can one say it points to the reason? Answer: The treatise says: "Speaking of inference means relying on aggregate characteristics to observe meaning; characteristics have three types as already explained above"《etc.》That logic treatise is precisely this text. This text explains the reason's sāmānya. Citing this, one should not explain the thesis's sāmānya. Also, the commentary's next section below says: "Therefore, relying on this, sound etc.'s limited substance is named inherent nature,
【Lower Section】
impermanence penetrating others does not become differentia"《text》Therefore we know: citing the Buddha-Ground Treatise text uses the reason's sāmānya as analogy to accomplish the matter of the thesis-predicate's sāmānya. Therefore "relying on this" - "relying" means "according to."
○ Explicit Statement-Intended Meaning Opposition《The Monastic Director says there are no specific matters》
Inquiring: In this present explicit statement-intended meaning opposition's intention, should differentia be permitted to penetrate explicit statement svarūpa? If one permits this, is there the fault of explicit-intended confusion? If not, why does the judgment say "not obstructing svarūpa, also having intended meaning penetrating explicit statement"?
○ Raising These Three Types《The Monastic Director says there are no specific matters》
Above: practiced from the 17th to the 22nd day. On the 22nd day with Monastic Director Ushi.
Kanki 3rd year, 3rd month, 5th day. At Ichijō-in's north side, third bay from the west, completed copying this. Provisional Monastic Chief《seal》
Completed revision
《The Kenryaku edition's postscript says: This commentary was when the Uji Minister of the Left was studying logic, facing Dharma Seal Ekyō, during face-to-face received oral decisions, correctly recording those oral transmissions, also having those draft versions recorded. Therefore, to know previous masters' elegant intentions, copied and preserved this. Kenryaku 2nd year, 12th month, 27th day. According to the Zen quarters' honorable command, hastily completed writing. Sonpen》
Minister of the Left Commentary, Middle Volume《End》