英語訳
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 6
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[Upper Section]
Regarding "Other schools do not accept the dharma included in reality" - the "other school" here refers to the Buddhist school.
"Mutual agreement and establishment, etc." below
Regarding "There is mutual non-agreement, such as when Sāṃkhya masters establish against Buddhism that karma is destroyed" - the "karma" here refers to the karma-category meaning in Vaiśeṣika. Regarding the destruction of karma-category meaning, both Sāṃkhya and Buddhism do not establish it. Therefore it becomes mutual non-agreement.
Regarding "There is agreement with others in one part but not with self" [up to] "establishing that I and mind truly exist" - the Collected Records says: Yi says, "Question: What reality does the previously mentioned 'truly exist' refer to? If it concerns the reality-category, then Sāṃkhya and Sarvāstivāda both lack self and mind, being the same - so why speak of 'one part'? If according to the meaning of the Triumphant school, with form like a mustard seed, then both Sāṃkhya and Sarvāstivāda schools are not truly existent, but Sāṃkhya has self, therefore it agrees with one part. This is not about making the reality-category truly existent," etc. [etc.]. Therefore, this inference establishes that the self and mind included in the reality-category are truly existent. Therefore, when Sarvāstivāda confronts Sāṃkhya, it agrees with the other's one part but not with itself.
Regarding "There is contradiction with perception and also inference" [up to] "tactile objects and various forms are not [grasped by] concentrated mind, etc." - the Collected Records says: Zhou says, "When concentrated mind conditions objects, it is all direct perception. When concentrated mind conditions tactile objects and various forms, now saying these are not obtained contradicts direct perception. In inference, one establishes: tactile objects and various forms are included in one of the five objects that concentrated mind obtains, just like form, smell, etc. This immediately contradicts inference" [etc.].
Various sentences of two-combination, three-combination, etc. of the nine thesis-faults
Having dealt with one inference above, each correctly corresponding to one fault. This means one inference accordingly has one fault.
[Lower Section]
Also describing matters where other faults arise - namely, one inference may have two faults combined, or three faults combined, etc.
Two-combination faults have thirty-six sets of four sentences. [Taking eight as the maximum number, progressively decreasing to one]
With perception-contradiction as the head, the remaining eight faults are combined in sequence. Making four sentences for each one by one, there are eight sets of four sentences. Namely, combining perception with inference to make four sentences. Thus [up to] combining perception with mutual agreement to make four sentences. The middle parts can be known by analogy. The characteristics of four sentences are also as usual: two for partial sentences, one for both sentence, one for both-neither.
With inference-contradiction as head, combining with the remaining seven. [Perception is already paired. Therefore now excluded.] Making four sentences for each one by one, there are immediately seven sets of four sentences. This can be known by analogy with the previous.
With self-teaching contradiction as head, [one] combining with the remaining six. [Excluding perception and inference. Can follow the previous.] There are six sets of four sentences.
With worldly contradiction as head, combining with the remaining five. [Because perception, inference, and teaching are excluded.] There are five sets of four sentences.
With self-statement contradiction as head, combining with the remaining four. [Excluding perception, inference, teaching, and worldly.] There are four sets of four sentences.
With predicate-term not established as head, combining with the remaining three. [Excluding perception, inference, teaching, worldly, and statement.] There are three sets of four sentences.
With subject-term not established as head, combining with the remaining two. [Excluding perception, inference, teaching, worldly, statement, and predicate.] There are two sets of four sentences.
With both not established as head, combining with the remaining one. [Excluding perception, inference, teaching, worldly, statement, predicate, and subject.] There is one set of four sentences.
Thus: eight, seven, six, five, four, three, two, one. Totaling thirty-six sets.
Eight plus two makes ten. Seven plus three makes ten. Six plus four makes ten. Five plus one makes six. Therefore thirty-
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 6
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[Upper Section]
six sets of four sentences. Now all taking four sentences as one unit for counting. Calculating thus.
Above completes two-combination faults.
Three-combination faults have eighty-four sets of four sentences. [Taking seven as the maximum number, progressively decreasing. These seven are the maximum number for making the previous two-combinations.]
With perception as head, there are twenty-eight sets of four sentences. Namely, temporarily setting perception aside, first taking inference as the counterpart, looking toward the seven from self-teaching downward like the previous two-combinations, combining them one by one in sequence. Thus there are immediately seven two-combinations. Next, taking self-teaching as counterpart looking toward the remaining six, there are six two-combinations. Next, taking worldly as counterpart looking toward the remaining five, there are five two-combinations. Next, taking self-statement as counterpart looking toward the remaining four, there are four two-combinations. Next, taking predicate not established as counterpart looking toward the remaining three, there are three two-combinations. Next, taking subject not established as counterpart looking toward the remaining two, there are two two-combinations. Next, taking both not established as counterpart looking toward the remaining one, there is one two-combination. Thus there are immediately twenty-eight two-combinations. To these twenty-eight two-combinations, adding perception as counterpart to each one by one, making four sentences for each one by one. Therefore they become twenty-eight sets of four sentences.
With inference as head, there are twenty-one sets of four sentences. Namely, having discarded perception, discussing those from inference downward. Namely, temporarily setting inference aside, first taking self-teaching as counterpart, looking toward the six from worldly contradiction downward, there are six two-combinations. The rest are all as above: five, four, three, two, one, progressively abbreviated in sequence. Thus there are twenty-one two-combinations. To these twenty-one, adding inference as counterpart to each one by one, making four sentences for each one by one. Therefore they become twenty-one sets of four sentences.
[Lower Section]
With self-teaching as head, there are fifteen sets of four sentences. Having discarded perception and inference, discussing those from self-teaching downward. Namely, temporarily setting self-teaching aside, first taking worldly contradiction as counterpart, looking toward the remaining five, there are five two-combinations. The rest are as above: four, three, two, one, progressively abbreviated in sequence. Thus there are fifteen two-combinations. Opposing each one like self-teaching, making four sentences for each one by one. Therefore they become fifteen sets of four sentences.
With worldly as head, there are ten sets of four sentences. Discarding perception, inference, and teaching, discussing those from worldly downward. Namely, temporarily setting worldly aside, taking self-statement contradiction as counterpart, regarding the four from predicate downward, combining each one by one to have four two-combinations. The rest, taking each one by one as counterpart, three, two, one, progressively decreasing as above. Thus there are ten two-combinations. These, each one by one taking worldly contradiction as counterpart to make four sentences. Therefore they become ten sets of four sentences.
With self-statement as head, there are six sets of four sentences. With predicate as head, there are three sets of four sentences. With subject as head, there is one set of four sentences. These all progressively discard the previous and focus on the latter.
Self-statement takes three as the maximum number, progressively abbreviated. Predicate takes two as maximum number. Subject takes one as maximum number. All can be known by analogy with the above. Thus twenty-eight, twenty-one, fifteen, ten, six, three, one. Totaling eighty-four sets of four sentences.
Above completes three-combination faults.
Four-combination faults have fifty-six sets of four sentences. [Taking six as the maximum number, progressively decreasing. Six is the maximum number for making the previous two-combinations.]