日本の仏典を翻刻

コレクション: 大日本仏教全書第84巻

一 因明大疏私抄三巻 - 翻刻

一 因明大疏私抄三巻 - ページ 37

ページ: 37

翻刻

【右頁】 【枠外右上】 四二〇【但し算用数字】 【枠外右横上】 因明大疏私抄卷第八 【枠外右横下】 七二 【二段構成】 【上段】 【一字下げ】 違 ̄ト_一者。不定 ̄ト相違 ̄ト歟。謂 ̄ク文軌之意。存 ̄ス_下此量 ̄ニハ有_二不 定及有法自相 ̄ノミ_一。無_中 ̄シト隨一不成 ̄ハ_上 爲言。 【七字下げ】 此料簡違_二裏書等_一歟。見合可_二審定_一之。 【字下げ終わり】 此量亦非《割書:乃至》故所引非 ̄ト者。疏主正 ̄ク破_二文軌 ̄ヲ_一也。意 ̄ハ 文軌以_三此量 ̄ニ無_二 ̄キヲ隨一不成_一。爲_二規模例證 ̄ト_一。故誰言_レ 爾。惣擧_二此量 ̄ニ所_レ有隨一不成等諸過_一。此量本如_レ此。何 爲_二例證_一哉 ̄ト嘲也。所謂所別不成《割書:對無空論》隨一不成。所 依不成。共不定。《割書:已上本疏|之分齊。》有法自相相違。《割書:讀疏加_レ|之。》 【一字下げ】 尋云。此量 ̄ノ敵者 ̄ハ本大乘也。軌師之所存。此分齊也。 而何改_二敵者 ̄ヲ_一成_二 ̄シテ無空論師 ̄ニ_一。勘_二所別不成 ̄ヲ_一乎。 答。明燈抄云。初 ̄ニ所別不成過 ̄ト者。虛空常等量 ̄ヲ設 對_二大乘_一立。准_二無空論_一。不_レ許_二實空_一故。有_二所別不成 過_一《割書:等云云》。 尋云。隨一不成不定有法自相 ̄ノ作法如何。 答。明燈抄云。二隨一不成 ̄カ者。大乘不_レ許_下具有_二 ̄ル遮表_一 非作之因 ̄ヲ_上故。有_二他隨一不成 ̄ノ過_一。○四不定過 ̄ト者。 爲如_二 ̄キ擇滅_一具_二遮表_一。體非作故。空是常。爲如_二龜毛_一無_二 【下段】 遮表_一體非作故空非_レ常。彼立空常 ̄ハ具_二遮表_一。龜毛 ̄ハ無_レ 表故。必《割書:考【四角で囲む】必明|燈作五》有法自相相違者。彼立_二離_レ如別體是 空_一故。尋_二 ̄テ意許_一難_二言陳 ̄ヲ_一云。虛空 ̄ハ非_二虛空_一。以_二非作_一 故。如_二擇滅_一旣尋_二意許如外 ̄ノ別空_一。更不 ̄シテ_レ加_レ言。以_レ 難_二言陳_一故。成_二有法自相相違_一。意立_二離_レ如別體_一。是空 彼此共許。擇滅無爲。非_二是虛空_一。空 ̄ハ是所諍故成_二相 違_一《割書:云云》。 又擇滅喩常等者。是一釋也。上 ̄ハ彼以_下非作 故 ̄ノ因。立 ̄ノ前 ̄ニハ有_二遮表_一。敵 ̄ノ前 ̄ニハ但遮 ̄ナリト文軌師存_上。 許難_二其上 ̄ヲ_一也。此釋 ̄ハ不_レ許_二軌師之所存 ̄ヲ_一。此因立敵 共許有_二 ̄リト遮表_一。不_レ可_レ云_二敵前 ̄ニハ但遮 ̄ノミナリトハ_一。旣此因 立敵共許 ̄シテ具_二遮表_一故。彼 ̄ノ量 ̄ニハ無_二隨一不成_一。今 ̄ノ聲常 無礙故如_二虛空_一之量。其喩敵 ̄ノ前 ̄ニハ但遮 ̄ノミナルカ 故。此 ̄ニハ 有_二能立不成_一。所引 ̄ノ例證。其功成_レ徒《割書:爲言》。重意之。初後 ̄ノ 釋。於_二軌師 ̄ノ所存_一。互有_二許不許之二邊_一。初釋 ̄ハ許_二 ̄シテ敵 前 ̄ノ唯遮 ̄ヲハ_一。不_レ許_レ無_二《割書:ト云ヲ》隨一不成_一。後釋 ̄ハ許_レ無_二《割書:ト云ヲハ》 隨一不成_一。不_レ許_二敵者 ̄ノ前 ̄ノ唯遮 ̄ヲ_一也。今此第二釋 ̄ヲハ明 燈抄 ̄ニハ名_二所引無用 ̄ノ過_一。故燈抄云。六所引無用者。又 【左頁】 【枠外左上】 四二一【但し算用数字】 【枠外左横上】 因明大疏私抄卷第八 【枠外左横下】 七三 【二段構成】 【上段】 一釋云。立敵共 ̄ニ許_三 三支之中皆具_二遮表 ̄ヲ_一故。所引量 唐捐其功《割書:等云云》。 尋云。敵者大乘之前具_二遮表_一者。其義如何。大乘之前 ̄ニ 虛空 ̄ニ有_二所表體_一歟如何。 答。私推云。非_下敵者大乘 如_二立者小乘_一許_中 ̄ニハ虛空 ̄ニ有 ̄リト_中【中点重複】所表 ̄ノ體_上歟。今云。有_二 遮表_一者。虛空 ̄ハ無故非 ̄スト_レ作 ̄ニ者。是遮也。其非作 ̄ノ所 表 ̄ハ色法 ̄ノ無 ̄キ處是也 ̄ト者。表也。如_レ此得_レ意歟。 設若 救云《割書:乃至》然有破云等者。淨眼法師破_二軌師 ̄ノ所_レ敍聲 論 ̄ノ救 ̄ヲ_一也。救 ̄ノ意。裏書所引 ̄ノ邑記云。此卽前救《割書:云云》。 前救 ̄ト者。宗初 ̄ニ所 ̄ノ_レ引軌師所_レ敍聲論 ̄ノ救也。 有云 聲宗上遮表等之文是也。其意如_レ 上。疏主爲_レ破_二淨眼 師 ̄ノ能破 ̄ヲ_一。引_二彼能所破 ̄ヲ_一也。淨眼師 ̄ノ能破之意。如_レ 文易_レ知。今此以_二然有破云_一。爲_二淨眼師 ̄ト_一事。《割書:一》【《割書:一》:誤植?】噵及裏 書之文也。裏書云。邑云。此淨眼法師《割書:等云云》。然明燈抄 云。然有破云等者。有人云_三此述_二淨眼師說_一者。未詳也。 撿_二彼師疏_一都無_二此事_一。更亦容_レ撿_二餘 ̄ノ疏等 ̄ヲ_一也《割書:云云》。 續疏云。理門論云。前是遮 ̄ト詮 ̄トナリ。後唯止_レ監。同唯 【下段】 取_レ遮 ̄ノミヲ故違_二於敎_一《割書:云云》。明燈抄云。○謂前同喩 ̄ハ是 遮與 ̄トナリ_レ詮 ̄ト 詮者表也《割書:云云》。又同抄云。問○舊(本疏也)疏本云。 理門論云。若法有_二遮表_一。不_レ得_二唯取_レ遮。而不_一レ取_二於表_一。 理門論 ̄ノ中。都無_二此文_一。彼論唯言_二前是遮詮後唯止監_一。 唯有_二此文_一。舊疏唯取_二此文義意_一。隱文顯義。故非_二虛 引_一。若法有遮表 ̄ト者。前是遮詮也等《割書:云云》。 此難亦非 《割書:乃至》爲定量故 ̄ト者。疏主正 ̄ク破_三 ̄スル淨眼師 ̄ノ破_二 ̄スルヲ聲論 ̄ノ 救 ̄ヲ_一也。外道 ̄ハ不_レ可_下以_二 ̄テ理門 ̄ヲ_一爲_中定量_上《割書:爲言》。今云此 論。《割書:考【四角で囲む】論大|疏作約》《割書:乃至》故是喩過者。疏主非_二諍【諍:淨の誤写?】眼 ̄ノ能破 ̄ヲ_一了 ̄テ。 自難_二聲論 ̄ノ救 ̄ヲ_一。成_二論 ̄ノ無 ̄ノ俱不成 ̄ヲ_一也。續疏云。今者 解云。○《割書:如_二本疏_一。》故是喩過。若唯取 ̄ラハ_レ遮。可_レ違_二理失_一。 宗因喩俱有義故。或可。違_二彼足目所造 ̄ノ本因明論世 共許_一故。可_レ名_二違故 ̄ト_一《割書:云云》。明燈抄云。此卽疏主。更 出_二 二過_一。違_二理及敎_一。○此破意云。聲論 ̄ノ本計_二聲常無 礙_一。具有_二遮表_一。喩唯取_レ遮。此天主 ̄ノ論 ̄ニ若說_レ如_レ空對 無空論無俱不成《割書:ト云テ》。約_二虛空_一辨 ̄コト_レ無 ̄ト_二 二立_一者 ̄ハ。據_二 彼本計_一。若彼 ̄ノ末計 ̄ハ隨_レ言轉故。隨_レ應破_レ之。 若唯取

現代語訳

【右頁】 420 因明大疏私抄巻第八 72 【上段】 【一字下げ】 違」とは、不定と相違とのことか。つまり文軌の意は、この量には不定及び有法自相のみがあり、随一不成はないとするのである【為言】。 【七字下げ】 この料簡は裏書等と違うか。見合わせて審定すべきである。 【字下げ終わり】 「此の量も亦た等しからず【乃至】故に所引は非なり」とは、疏主が正しく文軌を破するのである。意は、文軌がこの量に随一不成がないことを以て、規模例証とする。故に誰がそう言うのか。総じてこの量にある随一不成等の諸過を挙げる。この量は本来このようである。何を例証とするのかと嘲るのである。いわゆる所別不成【無空論に対して】、随一不成、所依不成、共不定【以上本疏の分斉】、有法自相相違【続疏がこれを加える】。 【一字下げ】 尋ね云う。この量の敵者は本来大乗である。軌師の所存はこの分斉である。しかるになぜ敵者を改めて無空論師と成し、所別不成を勘えるのか。 答う。明燈抄に云う。初めに所別不成過とは、虚空常等の量を設けて大乗に対して立てても、無空論に准じて、実空を許さないが故に、所別不成過がある【等云云】。 尋ね云う。随一不成・不定・有法自相の作法はいかん。 答う。明燈抄に云う。二の随一不成とは、大乗が遮表を具有する非作の因を許さないが故に、他随一不成の過がある。○四の不定過とは、択滅の如く遮表を具し、体が非作なるが故に空は常なるか。亀毛の如く遮表がなく、体が非作なるが故に空は常でないか。彼が空常を立てるのは遮表を具えるが、亀毛は 【下段】 表がないが故に。必ず有法自相相違とは、彼が如を離れた別体是空を立てるが故に。意許を尋ねて言陳を難じて云う。虚空は虚空でない。非作を以ての故に。択滅の如し。既に意許の如外の別空を尋ね、更に言を加えずして、言陳を難ずるが故に、有法自相相違と成る。意に如を離れた別体を立てることは空で、彼此共に許す。択滅は無為で、虚空ではない。空は所諍なるが故に相違と成る【云云】。 また「択滅の喩は常」等とは、これは一釈である。上では彼が非作故の因を以て、立者の前には遮表があり、敵の前には但だ遮のみと文軌師が存すると、その上を許して難ずるのである。この釈は軌師の所存を許さない。この因は立敵共に遮表があると許し、敵前には但だ遮のみとは言うべからず。既にこの因は立敵共に許して遮表を具えるが故に、彼の量には随一不成がない。今の声常無礙故虚空の如しの量は、その喩が敵の前には但だ遮のみなるが故に、これには能立不成がある。所引の例証は、その功が徒と成る【為言】。重ねて意味すれば、初後の釈は、軌師の所存において、互いに許不許の二辺がある。初釈は敵前の唯遮を許して、随一不成がないとは許さない。後釈は随一不成がないとは許して、敵者の前の唯遮を許さないのである。今この第二釈を明燈抄では所引無用の過と名づける。故に燈抄に云う。六の所引無用とは、また 【左頁】 421 因明大疏私抄巻第八 73 【上段】 一釈に云う。立敵共に三支の中に皆遮表を具えることを許すが故に、所引の量は唐捐其功である【等云云】。 尋ね云う。敵者大乗の前に遮表を具えるとは、その義はいかん。大乗の前に虚空に所表の体があるのかいかん。答う。私に推するに、敵者大乗が立者小乗の如く虚空に所表の体があると許すのではない。今、遮表があると云うのは、虚空は無なるが故に作らずとは、これが遮である。その非作の所表は色法の無き処これなりとは、表である。このように得意するか。 「設し若し救って云う【乃至】然れども破ありて云う」等とは、浄眼法師が軌師の所叙の声論の救いを破するのである。救いの意は、裏書所引の邑記に云う。これ即ち前救【云云】。前救とは、巻の初めに所引の軌師の所叙の声論の救いである。「有に云う、声宗の上に遮表」等の文これである。その意は上の如し。疏主が浄眼師の能破を破らんと為し、彼の能所破を引くのである。浄眼師の能破の意は、文の如く知り易し。今此れを「然れども破ありて云う」を以て、浄眼師とする事は、道と裏書の文とである。裏書に云う。邑云う。この浄眼法師【等云云】。然れども明燈抄に云う。「然れども破ありて云う」等とは、有る人がこれは浄眼師の説を述べるというが、未だ詳らかでない。彼の師の疏を検するに都てこの事がない。更に亦た余の疏等を検することも容れるべきである【云云】。 続疏に云う。理門論に云う。前は遮と詮となり、後は唯だ監を止む。同じく唯だ 【下段】 遮のみを取るが故に教に違う【云云】。明燈抄に云う。○謂く前の同喩は遮と詮となり、詮とは表なり【云云】。また同抄に云う。問う○旧(本疏なり)疏本に云う。理門論に云う。若し法に遮表あれば、唯だ遮を取って、表を取らざるを得ず。理門論の中には、都てこの文なし。彼の論は唯だ「前は遮詮、後は唯だ監を止む」と言う。唯だこの文のみあり。旧疏は唯だこの文義の意を取り、文を隠して義を顕す。故に虚引に非ず。「若し法に遮表あり」とは、「前は遮詮なり」等【云云】。 「此の難も亦た非なり【乃至】定量と為すが故に」とは、疏主が正しく浄眼師の声論の救いを破するを破するのである。外道は理門を以て定量と為すべからず【為言】。今「此の論」と云う【乃至】「故に是れ喩過」とは、疏主が浄眼の能破を非として了り、自ら声論の救いを難じ、論の俱不成がないことを成すのである。続疏に云う。今者の解に云う。○【本疏の如し】故に是れ喩過なり。若し唯だ遮を取らば、理失に違うべし。宗因喩俱に義があるが故に。或いは可なり。彼の足目所造の本因明論の世共許に違うが故に、違故と名づくべし【云云】。明燈抄に云う。これ即ち疏主が、更に二過を出す。理及び教に違う。○この破の意に云う。声論の本計は声常無礙で、遮表を具有する。喩は唯だ遮を取る。この天主の論に若し空の如く無空論に対して俱不成なしと説いて、虚空について二立がないことを弁ずるとは、彼の本計に據る。若し彼の末計は言に随って転ずるが故に、応に随って之を破すべし。若し唯だ取

英語訳

[Right Page] 420 Private Commentary on the Great Commentary on Hetuvidyā, Volume 8 72 [Upper Section] [One character indent] "contradiction" means uncertainty and contradiction. That is, Wengui's meaning is that this inference has only uncertainty and contradicting the particular characteristics of the subject, and there is no one-sided non-establishment [so to speak]. [Seven character indent] This analysis may differ from the marginal notes etc. They should be compared and determined. [End of indent] "This inference is also not equal [...] therefore what is cited is incorrect" - the commentary master correctly refutes Wengui. The meaning is: Wengui uses this inference having no one-sided non-establishment as a model example. So who says this? Generally raising the various faults of one-sided non-establishment etc. that this inference has. This inference is originally like this. What makes it an example? - this is mockery. Namely: subject non-establishment [against the no-space theory], one-sided non-establishment, basis non-establishment, shared uncertainty [above is the scope of the main commentary], contradicting particular characteristics of the subject [the continued commentary adds this]. [One character indent] Question: The opponent of this inference is originally Mahāyāna. This is the scope of Master Gui's position. But why change the opponent to become a no-space theorist and consider subject non-establishment? Answer: The Ming Deng Commentary says: "First, the subject non-establishment fault means: even if establishing the inference 'empty space is permanent' etc. against Mahāyāna, following the no-space theory, since it does not permit real space, there is the fault of subject non-establishment" [etc.] Question: What are the methods of one-sided non-establishment, uncertainty, and contradicting particular characteristics of the subject? Answer: The Ming Deng Commentary says: "The second one-sided non-establishment means: because Mahāyāna does not permit the unmade-ness reason that possesses negation-affirmation, there is the fault of other one-sided non-establishment. ○ The fourth uncertainty fault means: Is it that like cessation through discrimination, possessing negation-affirmation, the substance being unmade, therefore space is permanent? Or like rabbit horns, lacking negation-affirmation, the substance being unmade, therefore space is not permanent? When they establish space as permanent it possesses negation-affirmation, but rabbit horns lack [Lower Section] affirmation. Necessarily contradicting particular characteristics of the subject means: because they establish a separate substance apart from suchness as space, seeking the implied meaning and challenging the explicit statement, saying: 'Empty space is not empty space, because of being unmade, like cessation through discrimination.' Since they seek the implied separate space apart from suchness and do not add words, challenging the explicit statement, it becomes contradicting particular characteristics of the subject. The meaning of establishing a separate substance apart from suchness is space, which both sides permit. Cessation through discrimination is unconditioned and is not empty space. Space is what is disputed, therefore it becomes contradiction" [etc.] Also, "the example of cessation through discrimination is permanent" etc. is one interpretation. Above, since they use the unmade-ness reason, before the establisher there is negation-affirmation, before the opponent there is only negation - Master Wengui holds this position, and permits challenging this. This interpretation does not permit Master Gui's position. This reason is permitted by both establisher and opponent to have negation-affirmation, and one cannot say that before the opponent there is only negation. Since this reason is already permitted by both establisher and opponent to possess negation-affirmation, that inference has no one-sided non-establishment. The current inference "sound is permanent because of non-obstruction like empty space" - because its example before the opponent has only negation, this has probans non-establishment. What is cited as example-evidence makes its function futile [so to speak]. The repeated meaning is: the first and last interpretations, regarding Master Gui's position, mutually have the two aspects of permission and non-permission. The first interpretation permits only negation before the opponent but does not permit there being no one-sided non-establishment. The last interpretation permits there being no one-sided non-establishment but does not permit only negation before the opponent. Now the Ming Deng Commentary calls this second interpretation the fault of cited uselessness. Therefore the Deng Commentary says: "Sixth, cited uselessness means: also [Left Page] 421 Private Commentary on the Great Commentary on Hetuvidyā, Volume 8 73 [Upper Section] one interpretation says: because establisher and opponent both permit that all three members possess negation-affirmation, the cited inference wastes its effort" [etc.] Question: What does it mean that before the opponent Mahāyāna there is negation-affirmation? Is there an affirmed substance in empty space before Mahāyāna? Answer: I privately consider: it is not that the opponent Mahāyāna permits empty space to have affirmed substance like the establisher Hīnayāna does. Now, saying there is negation-affirmation means: that empty space is non-existent therefore unmade - this is negation. That the affirmation of unmade-ness is the place where material dharmas are absent - this is affirmation. Should it be understood like this? "Suppose if defending by saying [...] however there is refutation saying" etc. - this is Master Jingyan refuting the Sound school defense that Master Gui narrated. The meaning of the defense is stated in the Yi Record cited in marginal notes: "This is precisely the previous defense" [etc.] The previous defense refers to Master Gui's narration of the Sound school defense cited at the beginning of the volume. The text "Some say the Sound school possesses negation-affirmation" etc. is this. Its meaning is as above. The commentary master, wanting to refute Master Jingyan's refutation, cites his refutation and what is refuted. Master Jingyan's refutation meaning is easy to know from the text. Now taking "however there is refutation saying" as Master Jingyan is according to the marginal notes text. The marginal notes say: Yi says: this Master Jingyan [etc.] However, the Ming Deng Commentary says: "'However there is refutation saying' etc. - some people say this narrates Master Jingyan's explanation, but this is not yet clear. Examining that master's commentary, there is no such matter at all. It may also be worth examining other commentaries etc." [etc.] The Continued Commentary says: "The Nyāyamukha says: 'The former is negation and expression, the latter only stops observation.' Taking only negation alike therefore violates the teaching" [etc.] The Ming Deng Commentary says: "○ That is, the former positive example is negation and expression, expression meaning affirmation" [etc.] Also the same commentary says: "Question ○ The old commentary (main commentary) originally says: 'The Nyāyamukha says: If a dharma has negation-affirmation, one cannot only take negation without taking affirmation.' In the Nyāyamukha there is no such text at all. That treatise only says 'the former is negation-expression, the latter only stops observation.' Only this text exists. The old commentary only takes the meaning of this text, hiding the text and manifesting the meaning. Therefore it is not false citation. 'If a dharma has negation-affirmation' means 'the former is negation-expression'" etc. [etc.] [Lower Section] "This challenge is also incorrect [...] because it makes a definitive inference" - the commentary master correctly refutes Master Jingyan's refutation of the Sound school defense. Outsiders should not use the Nyāyamukha as definitive inference [so to speak]. Now saying "this treatise" [...] "therefore this is an example fault" - after the commentary master considers Master Jingyan's refutation incorrect, he himself challenges the Sound school defense and establishes that the treatise has no both non-establishment. The Continued Commentary says: "Now the explanation says: ○ [Like the main commentary] Therefore this is an example fault. If only taking negation, it would violate logical error. Because thesis, reason, and example all have meaning. Or it may violate the original Hetuvidyā treatise composed by Akṣapāda that is commonly accepted in the world, therefore it can be called violating the cause" [etc.] The Ming Deng Commentary says: "This is precisely the commentary master further presenting two faults: violating reason and teaching. ○ This refutation means: the Sound school's original doctrine is that sound is permanent and non-obstructed, possessing negation-affirmation. The example only takes negation. In this treatise of the Heavenly Master, if it says like space against the no-space theory there is no both non-establishment, discussing that empty space lacks both establishments, this is according to their original doctrine. If their derivative doctrine follows verbal changes, it should be refuted accordingly. If only taking