一　左府抄三巻 - 翻刻

翻刻

【本文二段構成】
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
三三六【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
左府抄下
【枠外右横下】
一八

【上段】
不＿レ然。汎因明法。能立過失。惣有＿二 七種＿一。所＿レ謂闕減過性。
立宗過性。不成因性。不定因性。相違因性。同喩過性。異
喩過性。而初闕減過性者。通＿二有體無體＿一。有體者謂陳＿レ言。
此卽支上過。無體者不＿レ陳＿レ言。此卽支闕￣タル過也。夫三十
三過者。皆是支上過也。是以。於＿二有體闕＿一。餘過相竝。於＿二
無體闕＿一。不＿レ攝＿二 三十三過＿一。而於＿二此闕過＿一。陳那菩薩。但立＿二
六句＿一。不＿レ立＿二第七三相俱闕＿一。五印學者。不＿レ肯＿レ受＿レ之。但那
蘭陀寺有＿二 一大論師＿一。名曰＿二賢愛＿一。妙悟＿二因明＿一。深達＿二異論＿一。
因明一論。時無＿二敵者＿一。是則勝軍論師因明之師也。亦同＿二
陳那＿一不＿レ立＿二第七＿一。自餘諸師。不＿二敢信＿一＿レ之。然則闕無同喩
者。卽闕＿二同喩支＿一過￣ナリ。是六句中之隨一￣ナリ。但名＿二闕減過
性＿一。不＿レ攝＿二 三十三過＿一。由＿レ之論云。復次若正顯＿二-示能立過
失＿一說名＿二能破＿一謂初能立闕減過性立宗過性不成因性
不定因性相違因性及喩過性《割書：云云》。旣三支過外。別立＿二
闕減過性＿一。何卅三過外。別無＿二其體＿一。由＿レ此。疏釋＿二此文＿一。
竝擧＿二有體無體二類＿一。而無體闕者。專不＿レ攝＿二 三十三過＿一。故
疏云。但名＿二闕過＿一非＿二餘過攝＿一《割書：云云》。但陳那已後。於＿二因三

【下段】
相＿一。立＿二闕減過性＿一者。夫因一喩二者。此則因三相。以＿二因三
相＿一。攝＿二同異喩＿一。作＿二如＿レ此說＿一。非＿二但限＿一＿レ因。《割書：考【四角囲み文字】本導云。愚後勘＿二｜疏中＿一云。陳那已後》
《割書：卽說因三相卽攝二喩｜二喩卽因俱顯宗故。》　若但限＿レ因。不＿二同異喩＿一。亦唯有體。不＿レ
通＿二無體＿一者。何疏上文。賢愛論師陳那菩薩等以無體爲
闕故唯六句《割書：云云》。以知。陳那賢愛等心。猶許＿二無體闕＿一。但
不＿レ許＿二第七句＿一。但至＿二亦如論說等文＿一者。若於＿二立因＿一。是則
有體闕。闕＿二所作因＿一故。若於＿二同喩＿一。是則支闕過。但名＿二無
體闕￣ノ闕＿一減過性＿一。然則於＿二因一喩二＿一。立＿二此過＿一故。非＿二但立
因＿一。若於＿二同喩＿一。且立＿二無體＿一故。卽云＿二闕無同喩＿一。故疏上文云。
陳那菩薩以能別不成卽是因中不共不定等過亦是喩中
所立不成闕無同喩等《割書：云云》。旣云＿二亦是喩中＿一。故知非＿二但
立因＿一。故無＿二其失＿一也
　　已上書＿二-寫僧都抄出＿一
　○積聚性因違＿二法自相＿一《割書：云云》
數論師對＿二佛弟子＿一。立＿レ量云＿下眼等必爲＿レ我用積聚性故如＿中
臥具等＿上之時。已有＿二他能別不成＿一故。見＿二他宗＿一臥具非＿二神我
受用之物＿一。故成＿二異喩＿一。故闕＿二後二相＿一。令＿レ違＿二必爲他￣ノ用法自
相＿一也。如＿レ云＿二亦如論說《割書：考【四角囲み文字】原本裏書云以＿二亦｜如論說等文＿一被例事》聲常之宗法自

【本文二段構成】
【左頁】
【枠外左上】
三三七【但し算用数字】
【枠外左横上】
左府抄下
【枠外左横下】
一九

【上段】
相因對無空論闕無同喩＿一。
○必爲他用量犯＿二相符宗＿一
　　此量差別量也。立者意以爲＿レ立＿二神我＿一。故不＿レ犯＿二相符＿一
　　也。
○因喩之法不＿レ應＿二分別＿一故惣建立
問。先因明法。惣不＿レ分＿二-別因喩之法＿一道理不＿レ然。廣百論
中。更分＿二-別之＿一。所＿レ謂數論所立。覺惠非思量。分＿二-別因義＿一。而
勘＿レ過云。就＿二生滅義＿一自宗不＿レ許。隱顯義釋他宗不＿レ成《割書：文》
今護法論主。更致＿二此分別＿一。豈不＿二因明之規模＿一耶。加＿レ之。
唯識樞要中。勘＿二淸辯比量過＿一。亦分＿二-別如幻喩＿一。以付＿二能
立所立二種不成＿一。然則。護法廣破＿二數論＿一。中宗更斥＿二邊主＿一。
皆分＿二-別因喩法＿一。以勘＿二比量過失＿一。以知。因明門心。猶可＿レ
分＿二-別之＿一。
答。凡因明門意。但依＿二惣相極成＿一。無＿レ顧＿二假設分別＿一。若望＿二
立敵＿一。强求＿二別義＿一。以＿レ何立＿二眞宗＿一。以＿レ何破＿二邪義＿一。但至＿二廣
百論說＿一者。先德有＿二 二傳＿一。或爲＿レ研＿二-尋學者惠解＿一。假分＿二-別
之＿一。非＿二理盡說＿一。或陳那已前古師。依＿二別義＿一而勘＿レ過。域

【下段】
龍天主已降。就＿二惣相＿一則立＿レ量。所以廣百論說。且順＿二古
師＿一。如＿三理門論中說＿レ宗爲＿二能立＿一。彼以＿レ宗爲＿二能立＿一。且爲＿レ順＿二
古師＿一。今於＿レ因致＿二分別＿一。豈是護法本意。以＿二理實＿一而言＿レ之。
亦不＿レ可＿二分別＿一也。故纂云。若爾數論對＿二佛弟子＿一。成＿二-立覺
惠非思＿一。以＿二無常故因＿一。亦不＿二分別＿一。答亦不＿レ應＿二分別＿一。但爭＿二
覺惠是思非思＿一《割書：文》。次於＿二淸辯比量如幻喩＿一者。此亦二傳。
若依＿二有古德心＿一者。亦是假設分別。更非＿二實過＿一。若依＿二平
備師心＿一者。是非＿レ分＿二-別同喩＿一。只顯＿二條然過失＿一。所＿レ謂。凡
因喩之法不應分別者。於＿下有＿二喩體＿一之量＿上談＿レ之。而若似
事幻者。望＿二空宗＿一無＿二喩體＿一。若實事幻者。望＿二緣生＿一無＿二喩
體＿一。能立所立互闕。宗同因同不＿レ備。此過條然。更不＿二分
別＿一。故以＿二此等比量＿一。更勿＿レ爲＿レ難。
　　已上書＿二-寫僧都抄出＿一
　問。大德傳與＿二平備傳＿一。可＿レ用＿レ何乎。　答。僧都云。可＿レ用＿二
　平備義＿一也。
　○豈於眼等無能受用事《割書：可＿レ存＿二明燈抄意＿一也。》
問。凡見＿二疏文勢＿一。上述＿二西域師轉救＿一。旣案＿二數論本計＿一。云＿下

現代語訳

【右頁】

そうではない。一般に因明法では、能立の過失には総じて七種類がある。所謂、闕減過性、立宗過性、不成因性、不定因性、相違因性、同喩過性、異喩過性である。而してはじめの闕減過性とは、有体と無体に通ずる。有体とは言葉を陳べることをいう。これは即ち支の上の過である。無体とは言葉を陳べないことである。これは即ち支が欠けた過である。そもそも三十三過とは、皆これ支の上の過である。これ以て、有体の欠に於いては、余の過相並びに、無体の欠に於いては、三十三過に摂されない。而してこの欠過に於いて、陳那菩薩は、ただ六句を立て、第七の三相俱欠を立てない。五印の学者は、これを受け入れることを肯んじない。ただしナーランダ寺に一人の大論師がいて、賢愛と名づく。因明を妙悟し、異論に深く達している。因明一論において、時に敵者無し。これは則ち勝軍論師の因明の師である。亦た陳那と同じく第七を立てない。自余の諸師は、これを敢えて信じない。然れば闕無同喩とは、即ち同喩支を欠く過である。これは六句中の随一である。ただ闕減過性と名づけ、三十三過に摂されない。これに由って論に云く。「復次にもし正しく能立の過失を顕示するなら能破と説名する。謂く初めの能立の闕減過性、立宗過性、不成因性、不定因性、相違因性、及び喩過性」《云云》。既に三支の過の外に、別に闕減過性を立てる。何ぞ三十三過の外に、別にその体が無いことがあろうか。これに由って、疏はこの文を釈して、並びに有体無体二類を挙げる。而して無体の欠とは、専ら三十三過に摂されない。故に疏に云く。「ただ欠過と名づけ、余過の摂に非ず」《云云》。ただし陈那已後、因の三相に於いて、闕減過性を立てるとは、そもそも因一喩二とは、これ則ち因の三相である。因の三相を以て、同異喩を摂め、このような説を作す。ただ因に限るのではない。《考 本導に云く。愚後に疏中を勘して云く。陳那已後即ち因三相を説き即ち二喩を摂す。二喩即ち因俱に宗を顕す故。》もしただ因に限り、同異喩でなく、亦た唯だ有体で、無体に通じないなら、何故疏の上文に。「賢愛論師、陳那菩薩等は無体を以て欠と為す故に唯だ六句」《云云》。以て知る。陳那、賢愛等の心は、猶お無体の欠を許す。ただ第七句を許さない。ただし「亦た論説の如き等の文」に至っては、もし因を立てることに於いては、これ則ち有体の欠である。所作因を欠く故。もし同喩に於いては、これ則ち支欠の過である。ただ無体欠の闕減過性と名づける。然れば因一喩二に於いて、この過を立てる故に、ただ因を立てるのではない。もし同喩に於いては、且つ無体を立てる故に、即ち闕無同喩と云う。故に疏の上文に云く。「陳那菩薩は能別不成を以て即ちこれ因中の不共不定等の過、亦たこれ喩中の所立不成、闕無同喩等」《云云》。既に「亦たこれ喩中」と云う。故に知る、ただ因を立てるのではない。故に其の失は無いのである。

　已上僧都の抄出を書写す

○積聚性因が法自相に違う《云云》
数論師が仏弟子に対して、量を立てて云く「眼等は必ず我が用為り、積聚性の故に、臥具等の如し」の時、已に他の能別不成があるので、他宗を見るに臥具は神我の受用の物ではない。故に異喩と成る。故に後二相を欠き、必ず他の用為りの法自相に違わしめるのである。「亦た論説の如く」と云うが如く《考 原本裏書に云く。亦た論説等の文を以て例えられる事》「声常の宗法自相因、無空論に対して同喩を闕無す」。

【左頁】

○必ず他の用為りの量は相符宗を犯す
　このの量は差別量である。立者の意は以て神我を立てると為す。故に相符を犯さないのである。

○因喩の法は分別すべからざる故に総じて建立する
問。先ず因明法では、総じて因喩の法を分別しない道理は然るべきではない。広百論の中で、更にこれを分別する。所謂数論の所立、覚慧は思量に非ず、因義を分別する。而して過を勘して云く。「生滅義に就いて自宗許さず、隠顕義の釈で他宗成らず」《文》今護法論主は、更にこの分別を致す。どうして因明の規模でないことがあろうか。加えて、唯識枢要の中で、清弁の比量の過を勘し、亦た如幻喩を分別する。以て能立所立二種不成を付ける。然れば、護法は広く数論を破し、中宗は更に辺主を斥け、皆因喩法を分別して、以て比量の過失を勘する。以て知る。因明門の心は、猶おこれを分別すべきである。

答。凡そ因明門の意は、ただ総相極成に依り、仮設分別を顧みることが無い。もし立敵に望んで、強いて別義を求めるなら、何を以て真宗を立てるのか。何を以て邪義を破るのか。ただ広百論説に至っては、先德に二つの伝がある。或いは学者の慧解を研尋するために、仮にこれを分別する。理尽の説ではない。或いは陳那已前の古師は、別義に依って過を勘する。域龍天主已降は、総相に就いて則ち量を立てる。所以に広百論説は、且つ古師に順ずる。理門論中に宗を能立と説くが如く、彼は宗を以て能立と為す。且つ古師に順ずるためである。今因に於いて分別を致すのは、どうして護法の本意であろうか。理実を以て之を言えば、亦た分別すべからざるである。故に纂に云く。「若し爾らば数論が仏弟子に対して、覚慧非思を成立するに、無常故の因を以て、亦た分別せず。答えて亦た分別すべからず。ただ覚慧是思非思を争う」《文》。次に清弁比量の如幻喩については、これ亦た二伝である。もしある古徳の心に依るなら、亦たこれは仮設分別である。更に実過ではない。もし平備師の心に依るなら、これは同喩を分別するのではない。只だ条然たる過失を顕すのである。所謂、凡そ因喩の法は分別すべからずとは、喩体がある量の上について之を談ずる。而してもし似事の幻なら、空宗に望んで喩体が無い。もし実事の幻なら、縁生に望んで喩体が無い。能立所立互いに欠け、宗同因同備わらず。この過は条然として、更に分別しない。故にこれ等の比量を以て、更に難と為すことなかれ。

　已上僧都の抄出を書写す

問。大徳の伝と平備の伝と、何れを用いるべきか。答。僧都云く。平備の義を用いるべきである。

○どうして眼等に能く受用する事が無いことがあろうか《明燈抄の意を存すべきである。》
問。凡そ疏文の勢いを見るに、上に西域師の転救を述べる。既に数論の本計を案ずるに、云く

英語訳

【Right Page】

That is not so. Generally in Buddhist logic dharma, the faults of ability-to-establish have seven types in total. Namely: lacking-diminishing fault-nature, thesis-establishing fault-nature, non-accomplishing cause-nature, indeterminate cause-nature, contradictory cause-nature, similar-analogy fault-nature, and dissimilar-analogy fault-nature. The first lacking-diminishing fault-nature encompasses both substantial and insubstantial. Substantial means stating words. This is precisely faults on the component. Insubstantial means not stating words. This is precisely faults where components are lacking. Now the thirty-three faults are all faults on components. Therefore, regarding substantial lacking, along with other fault-characteristics, regarding insubstantial lacking, they are not included in the thirty-three faults. Regarding these lacking faults, Dignāga Bodhisattva only established six sentences, not establishing the seventh "all three characteristics lacking together." The scholars of the five regions are unwilling to accept this. However, at Nālandā monastery there was one great treatise master named Bhadanta. He had wonderful enlightenment regarding Buddhist logic and deep mastery of different theories. In Buddhist logic treatises, at times there were no opponents. This was precisely the teacher of Buddhist logic for Treatise Master Śūramati. He also, like Dignāga, did not establish the seventh. The other various masters dare not believe this. Therefore lacking similar analogies means precisely the fault of lacking the similar-analogy component. This is one among the six sentences. It is only named lacking-diminishing fault-nature and is not included in the thirty-three faults. Due to this, the treatise says: "Furthermore, if correctly manifesting the faults of ability-to-establish is called ability-to-refute, namely the initial ability-to-establish's lacking-diminishing fault-nature, thesis-establishing fault-nature, non-accomplishing cause-nature, indeterminate cause-nature, contradictory cause-nature, and analogy fault-nature"《etc.》. Already establishing lacking-diminishing fault-nature separately outside the three-component faults. Why would there be no separate substance outside the thirty-three faults? Due to this, the commentary explains this text, raising both substantial and insubstantial two types together. The insubstantial lacking is exclusively not included in the thirty-three faults. Therefore the commentary says: "Only named lacking fault, not included in other faults"《etc.》. However, after Dignāga, establishing lacking-diminishing fault-nature in the three characteristics of causes means: now "one cause, two analogies" - this is precisely the three characteristics of causes. Using the three characteristics of causes to encompass similar and dissimilar analogies, making such explanations. This is not limited only to causes.《Note: The original guide says: After my humble examination of the commentary: After Dignāga, immediately explaining the three characteristics of causes immediately encompasses the two analogies. The two analogies and causes together manifest the thesis.》If only limited to causes, not similar-dissimilar analogies, and also only substantial, not encompassing insubstantial, then why in the commentary's text above: "Treatise Master Bhadanta, Bodhisattva Dignāga and others take insubstantial as lacking, therefore only six sentences"《etc.》. Thus we know: The minds of Dignāga, Bhadanta and others still permit insubstantial lacking. They only do not permit the seventh sentence. However, regarding "also like the treatise explains etc. text": if in establishing causes, this is then substantial lacking. Because lacking the made-cause. If in similar analogies, this is then component-lacking fault. Only named insubstantial lacking's lacking-diminishing fault-nature. Therefore, establishing this fault in "one cause, two analogies," so not only establishing causes. If in similar analogies, temporarily establishing insubstantial, therefore immediately called "lacking similar analogies." Therefore the commentary's text above says: "Bodhisattva Dignāga takes predicate non-establishment as precisely faults of uncommon indeterminacy etc. in causes, also these are thesis non-establishment in analogies, lacking similar analogies etc."《etc.》. Already saying "also these are in analogies." Therefore we know it is not only establishing causes. Therefore there is no such fault.

　Above copied and written from the Monastic Director's excerpts

○ The aggregate-nature cause violates dharma-svarūpa《etc.》
When the Sāṅkhya master, opposing Buddhist disciples, establishes the inference saying "Eyes etc. must serve my use, because of aggregate-nature, like bedding etc.," already having other's predicate non-establishment, seeing other schools, bedding is not an object of spirit-self's reception and use. Therefore it becomes a dissimilar analogy. Therefore lacking the latter two characteristics, causing violation of the dharma-svarūpa of "must serve other's use." As saying "also like the treatise explains"《Note: The original back-writing says: The matter of being exemplified by "also like the treatise explains etc. text"》"The sound-permanence thesis dharma-svarūpa cause, opposing the void-school, lacks similar analogies."

【Left Page】

○ The "must serve other's use" inference commits the fault of accordant thesis
　This inference is a differential inference. The proponent's intention considers it establishing spirit-self. Therefore it does not commit accordance.

○ Because the dharma of causes and analogies should not be differentiated, therefore establishing them comprehensively
Question: First, in Buddhist logic dharma, the principle of generally not differentiating the dharma of causes and analogies is not reasonable. In the Śataśāstra, they further differentiate these. Namely, what Sāṅkhya establishes: consciousness-wisdom is not deliberation, differentiating causal meanings. Then examining faults saying: "Regarding birth-destruction meaning, one's own school does not permit; regarding hidden-manifest meaning explanation, other schools do not accomplish"《text》. Now Treatise Master Dharmapāla further applies this differentiation. How could this not be the standard of Buddhist logic? Additionally, in the Vijñānavāda Essentials, examining the faults of Bhāviveka's inference, also differentiating the like-illusion analogy. Thereby attributing ability-to-establish and what-is-to-be-established two types of non-establishment. Therefore, Dharmapāla extensively refutes Sāṅkhya, the Madhyamaka school further criticizes the extremist master, all differentiating cause-analogy dharmas to examine inference faults. Thus we know: The mind of the Buddhist logic school should still differentiate these.

Answer: Generally the intention of the Buddhist logic school only relies on general-characteristic extreme establishment, having no regard for hypothetical differentiation. If looking toward proponent and opponent, forcibly seeking separate meanings, with what would one establish true doctrine? With what would one refute erroneous doctrines? However, regarding the Śataśāstra explanation, the predecessor virtuous ones have two transmissions. Either for investigating and seeking students' wise understanding, hypothetically differentiating these. This is not exhaustive explanation of principle. Or the ancient masters before Dignāga relied on separate meanings to examine faults. From Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva onwards, regarding general characteristics, they then establish inferences. Therefore the Śataśāstra explanation temporarily accords with ancient masters. Like the Nyāyamukha explaining thesis as ability-to-establish, they take thesis as ability-to-establish, temporarily to accord with ancient masters. Now applying differentiation to causes - how could this be Dharmapāla's original intention? Speaking from true principle, also should not differentiate. Therefore the compilation says: "If so, when Sāṅkhya, opposing Buddhist disciples, establishes consciousness-wisdom as non-thought, using the cause 'because of impermanence,' also not differentiating. Answer: also should not differentiate. Only disputing whether consciousness-wisdom is thought or non-thought"《text》. Next, regarding Bhāviveka's inference like-illusion analogy, this also has two transmissions. If following some ancient virtuous one's mind, this is also hypothetical differentiation. Furthermore not real fault. If following Master Pingbei's mind, this is not differentiating similar analogies. Only manifesting obvious faults. Namely: generally that the dharma of causes and analogies should not be differentiated is discussed regarding inferences that have analogy-substance. However, if apparent-phenomenon illusion, looking toward the Void school there is no analogy-substance. If real-phenomenon illusion, looking toward dependent-origination there is no analogy-substance. Ability-to-establish and what-is-to-be-established mutually lack, thesis-similarity and cause-similarity not complete. This fault is obvious. Furthermore not differentiated. Therefore with these and other inferences, further do not make difficulties.

　Above copied and written from the Monastic Director's excerpts

Question: Between the great virtue's transmission and Pingbei's transmission, which should be used? Answer: The Monastic Director says: Pingbei's doctrine should be used.

○ How could there be no matter of capable reception and use regarding eyes etc.《The intention of the Bright Lamp Commentary should be preserved.》
Question: Generally seeing the tendency of the commentary text, above it describes the Western Region master's counter-rescue. Already examining Sāṅkhya's fundamental calculation, saying