一　左府抄三巻 - 翻刻

翻刻

【本文二段構成】
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
三三四【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
左府抄下
【枠外右横下】
一六

【上段】
左府抄《割書：下》　《割書：　｜考【四角囲み文字】原本表紙裏云。「外題云自抄問惠曉下」》

　久壽二年二月三十日以後。惠曉僧都敎＿二因明＿一。《割書：餘自＿二廿｜八日＿一。住＿二》
　《割書：宇治＿一。僧都自＿二廿九｜日夕＿一。來＿二-住宇治＿一。》
　○相違有四
　　僧都云無＿二指事＿一
　○勤勇發因有＿二 一分能立不成＿一事
有九句私記云。有傳云。同品￣イヽ寬立＿二￣ルニハ無常宗＿一。諸無常
者皆成＿二同品＿一。雖＿三電非＿二勤發＿一。無常之義等故。同喩擧＿二電
瓶＿一。若置＿二諸皆之言＿一合時。能被＿レ合。故無＿二此過＿一。何者。諸勤
勇無間所發性者皆見＿二￣ヨト《割書：云》無常＿一時。電以＿レ非＿二勤勇＿一。因不＿レ
關也《割書：云云》。
　僧都云。此義甚妙。可＿レ用＿レ之。世人不＿二輙知＿一之義也。
　○聲生論師立＿二勤勇發因＿一乎
僧都云。聲生一切聲常￣ト立故。不＿レ立＿二勤發因＿一。《割書：外聲非｜勤發故》若於＿二
内聲＿一論時。聲生立＿二勤勇因＿一。可＿レ無＿二其妨＿一也。
　　聲生立＿二勤發因＿一證文

【下段】
　理門論過類文中。見＿三勤勇發因通＿二生顯二師＿一。依＿レ之上
　卷出＿二兩俱有體一分不成＿一云。勝論對＿二聲生＿一。立＿二 一切聲
　皆是無常＿一時。二宗唯許＿下内聲有＿二勤勇發＿一外聲非＿上＿レ有《割書：云云》。
　以知。聲生論師立＿二勤勇因＿一乎。加＿レ之。中卷文見＿三聲生
　立＿二勤勇因＿一《割書：云云》。
　○生顯二師￣ヲ共＿二-許内外聲常＿一耶
僧都云。見＿二處處釋＿一。聲顯論師。計＿二-【注】内外聲皆常＿一歟。但勤
發因。唯限＿二内聲＿一也。
　○欲令學者知因決定非喩過故《割書：云云》。
僧都云。非喩過故￣トイハ。四相違￣ハ因過也。非＿二喩過￣ト《割書：云》￣ナリ＿一不＿レ
遮＿二他過在＿一＿レ喩也。
　此義同＿二日來愚案＿一。
　○諸無似立此過相故《割書：云云》。
僧都云。永超僧都云。諸￣ノ無似￣ノ立￣ニ此￣ノ過￣ノ相￣アリナムカ故。
難云。此義違＿二 下故於似立不見其過之文＿一。
　　難問僧都自義不＿レ被＿レ答
　○若言眼等必爲我用能別不成闕無同喩積聚性因違

【注　左記】
「計＿二-」は「共＿二-許」の誤ヵ

【左頁】
【枠外左上】
三三五【但し算用数字】
【枠外左横上】
左府抄下
【枠外左横下】
一七

【上段】
　　法自相《割書：文》。
　　我他相例事
先立＿二必爲我用＿一之時。有＿二能別不成＿一者。汎數論立＿二此量＿一
之時。本意爲＿レ顯＿下廿五諦中神我諦受＿二-用眼等＿一之義＿上也。於＿二
假我受用之義＿一。立敵共許。何始諍＿二其受用＿一。是以。今立＿二必
爲我用＿一之時。必然可＿二神我＿一。若是神我者。豈不＿レ犯＿二他能別
不成過＿一哉。但至＿下我言通＿二假我＿一故。不＿上＿レ可＿レ犯＿二能別不成過＿一
者。汎僧佉本意。謂＿レ避＿二相符＿一。故疏云。若成眼等爲假他
用相符極成《割書：云云》。是以僧佉本意。若寄＿二言於假我＿一者。卽
恐＿三敵者付＿二相符過＿一。所謂假我受用。佛法亦許。而言不＿二簡
別＿一。豈不＿レ招＿二相符過＿一。但於＿二他言＿一者。其例不＿レ齊。今立＿二必
爲他用＿一者。卽顯＿下於＿二眼等上＿一有＿中能用他＿上。汎勘＿二劫比羅
宗＿一。以＿二 五種因＿一。卽成【二点脱ヵ】神我實有之義＿一。今此必爲他用量者。
卽第一聚爲他故因也。所＿レ謂聚集積聚之法。必爲＿レ他用。
譬如＿二臥具等＿一。眼等五知根。旣是積聚性故。必可＿レ有＿二
用＿レ此能用之他＿一。其能用他者。卽是神我。由＿二此理＿一故。
知＿二我實有＿一。故金七十論云。他者卽是我故知我實有《割書：云云》。

【下段】
是以。立者本意。是顯＿三眼等上更有＿二能用他＿一。若成＿二能用他＿一。
必然謂＿レ應＿二神我＿一。是則望＿二眼等自＿一。神我名＿レ他。汎爾言＿レ他。
是共許言￣ナリ。卽自他￣ノ名言￣ナルカ之故也。非＿下是寄＿二言於假
他＿一矯立＿中眞他＿上。旣爾亦同＿二假我＿一。豈不＿二相符＿一乎。所以於＿二立
者意＿一。我他二言。全不＿二相例＿一。
　　已上書＿二寫僧都抄出＿一
　○能別不成闕無同喩《割書：闕無同喩者。闕減過性之中。｜無體闕也。不＿二 三十三過所攝＿一。》
疑云。闕無同喩者。卽是闕減過性。不＿レ可＿レ攝＿二 三十三過＿一。其
理不＿レ可＿レ然。夫因明法。能立過失。更不＿レ出＿二 三十三過＿一。今闕
減過性。亦應＿二此攝＿一。何云＿二別過＿一耶。況陳那已後。於＿二因三
相＿一。卽立＿二闕減過性＿一。是以隨＿レ宜。須＿レ攝＿二 三十三過＿一。何云＿二別
過＿一耶。由＿レ此疏下文云。亦如論說聲常之宗法自相因對
無空論闕無同喩《割書：云云》。爰知。雖＿レ闕＿二同喩支＿一。猶於＿レ因談＿レ過。
隨＿レ義應＿レ攝＿二法自相等＿一。何云＿二別過＿一耶。加＿レ之疏云。若陳＿二因
言＿一必是有體。以知。陳那等心。更不＿レ許＿二無體闕＿一。是於＿二因
三相＿一。立＿二此過＿一故。爾者。此義末【「未」ヵ】＿レ詳。何可＿二答申＿一哉。
答。闕無同喩者。先能立過失。不＿レ可＿レ出＿二 三十三過＿一。其理

現代語訳

【右頁】

左府抄《下》

久寿二年二月三十日以後。恵暁僧都が因明を教える。《余は二十八日から宇治に住む。僧都は二十九日夕から宇治に来住する。》

○相違には四つがある
　僧都云く「指事無し」

○勤勇発因に一分能立不成の事がある
九句私記に云う。ある伝に云う。同品を寛く立てて無常宗とするには、諸々の無常のものは皆同品となる。電は勤発でないといえども、無常の義が等しい故に。同喩に電と瓶を挙げる。もし「諸皆」の言葉を置いて合する時は、能く合されるので、故にこの過は無い。どういうことかというと、「諸々の勤勇無間所発性のものは皆無常と見る」時、電は勤勇でないので、因が関わらないのである《云云》。

僧都云く。この義は甚だ妙である。これを用いるべきである。世人が軽々に知らない義である。

○声生論師は勤勇発因を立てるのか
僧都云く。声生は一切声常と立てる故に、勤発因を立てない。《外声は勤発でない故》もし内声について論ずる時は、声生が勤勇因を立てても、その妨げは無いであろう。

　声生が勤発因を立てる証文

【下段】
理門論の過類文の中に、勤勇発因が生顕二師に通ずることを見る。これに依って上巻に両俱有体一分不成を出して云く。勝論が声生に対して、「一切声は皆無常である」と立てる時、二宗は唯だ内声に勤勇発があり、外声には有らないことを許す《云云》。以て知る。声生論師は勤勇因を立てるのかと。加えて、中巻の文に声生が勤勇因を立てることを見る《云云》。

○生顕二師を共に内外声常を許すのか
僧都云く。処々の釈を見ると、声顕論師は、内外声皆常と計るのか。但し勤発因は、唯だ内声に限るのである。

○「学者をして因決定にして喩の過に非ざることを知らしめんと欲する故」《云云》。
僧都云く。「喩の過に非ざる故」とは、四相違は因の過である。喩の過ではないということで、他の過が喩にあることを遮るものではない。

この義は日来の愚案と同じである。

○「諸々の無似の立にこの過の相ある故」《云云》。
僧都云く。永超僧都云く。諸々の無似の立にこの過の相があるが故に。
難じて云う。この義は下の「故に似立において其の過を見ない」の文に違う。

　難問に僧都の自義は答えられない

○「もし眼等は必ず我が用為りと言うなら能別不成、同喩を闕無し、積聚性因は違法自相である」《文》。

　我他相例の事
先ず「必ず我が用為り」と立てる時、能別不成があるとは、汎く数論がこの量を立てる時、本意は二十五諦中の神我諦が眼等を受用する義を顕すためである。仮我の受用の義については、立敵共に許す。何ぞ始めてその受用を諍うのか。これ以て、今「必ず我が用為り」と立てる時、必然に神我であるべきである。もしこれが神我なら、どうして他の能別不成過を犯さないだろうか。但し「我」の言葉が仮我に通ずる故に、能別不成過を犯すべきではないというに至っては、汎く僧佉の本意は、相符を避けると謂う。故に疏に云う。「もし眼等が仮他の用為りと成すなら相符極成である」《云云》。これ以て僧佉の本意は、もし仮我に言葉を寄せるなら、即ち敵者が相符過を付けることを恐れる。所謂仮我の受用は、仏法も亦た許す。而して言葉が簡別しないなら、どうして相符過を招かないだろうか。但し「他」の言葉については、その例は斉しくない。今「必ず他の用為り」と立てるのは、即ち眼等の上に能用の他があることを顕す。汎く劫比羅宗を勘するに、五種の因を以て、即ち神我実有の義を成す。今のこの「必ず他の用為り」の量は、即ち第一の聚他の為の故の因である。所謂聚集積聚の法は、必ず他の為に用いられる。譬えば臥具等の如く。眼等五知根は、既にこれ積聚性の故に、必ずこれを用いる能用の他があるべきである。その能用の他とは、即ちこれ神我である。この理に由る故に、我の実有を知る。故に金七十論に云く「他とは即ちこれ我なり、故に我の実有を知る」《云云》。

【下段】
これ以て、立者の本意は、これ眼等の上に更に能用の他があることを顕す。もし能用の他を成すなら、必然に神我と謂うべきである。これ則ち眼等自らに望んで、神我を他と名づける。汎爾に他と言うのは、これ共許の言葉である。即ち自他の名言であるが故である。これ仮他に言葉を寄せて真他を矯立するのではない。既に爾れば亦た仮我と同じである。どうして相符でないだろうか。所以に立者の意においては、我他二言は、全く相例しない。

　已上僧都の抄出を書写す

○能別不成、同喩を闕無す《闕無同喩とは、闕減過性の中の、無体闕である。三十三過所摂ではない。》
疑って云う。闕無同喩とは、即ちこれ闕減過性で、三十三過に摂すべきではない。その理は然るべきではない。そもそも因明法では、能立の過失は、更に三十三過を出でない。今闕減過性も、亦たこれに摂すべきである。何ぞ別過と云うのか。況んや陳那已後、因の三相において、即ち闕減過性を立てる。これ以て随宜に、須く三十三過に摂すべきである。何ぞ別過と云うのか。これに由って疏の下文に云く。「亦た論説の如く声常の宗法自相因、無空論に対して同喩を闕無す」《云云》。ここに知る。同喩支を闕くといえども、猶お因において過を談ずる。義に随って法自相等に摂すべきである。何ぞ別過と云うのか。加えて疏に云く。「もし因言を陳ずるなら必ずこれ有体である」。以て知る。陳那等の心は、更に無体闕を許さない。これは因の三相において、この過を立てる故である。爾らば、この義は未だ詳らかでない。何ぞ答申すべきか。

答。闕無同喩とは、先ず能立の過失で、三十三過を出でるべきではない。その理は

【左頁】
【上段】
我他相例の事
先ず「必ず我が用為り」と立てる時、能別不成があるとは、汎く数論がこの量を立てる時、本意は二十五諦中の神我諦が眼等を受用する義を顕すためである。仮我の受用の義については、立敵共に許す。何ぞ始めてその受用を諍うのか。これ以て、今「必ず我が用為り」と立てる時、必然に神我であるべきである。もしこれが神我なら、どうして他の能別不成過を犯さないだろうか。但し「我」の言葉が仮我に通ずる故に、能別不成過を犯すべきではないというに至っては、汎く僧佉の本意は、相符を避けると謂う。故に疏に云う。「もし眼等が仮他の用為りと成すなら相符極成である」《云云》。これ以て僧佉の本意は、もし仮我に言葉を寄せるなら、即ち敵者が相符過を付けることを恐れる。所謂仮我の受用は、仏法も亦た許す。而して言葉が簡別しないなら、どうして相符過を招かないだろうか。但し「他」の言葉については、その例は斉しくない。今「必ず他の用為り」と立てるなら、即ち眼等の上に能用の他があることを顕す。汎く劫比羅宗を勘するに、五種の因を以て、即ち神我実有の義を成す。今のこの「必ず他の用為り」の量は、即ち第一の聚他の為の故の因である。所謂聚集積聚の法は、必ず他の為に用いられる。譬えば臥具等の如く。眼等五知根は、既にこれ積聚性の故に、必ずこれを用いる能用の他があるべきである。その能用の他とは、即ちこれ神我である。この理に由る故に、我の実有を知る。故に金七十論に云く「他とは即ちこれ我なり、故に我の実有を知る」《云云》。

【下段】
これ以て、立者の本意は、これ眼等の上に更に能用の他があることを顕す。もし能用の他を成すなら、必然に神我と謂うべきである。これ則ち眼等自らに望んで、神我を他と名づける。汎爾に他と言うのは、これ共許の言葉である。即ち自他の名言であるが故である。これ仮他に言葉を寄せて真他を矯立するのではない。既に爾れば亦た仮我と同じである。どうして相符でないだろうか。所以に立者の意においては、我他二言は、全く相例しない。

　已上僧都の抄出を書写す

○能別不成、同喩を闕無す《闕無同喩とは、闕減過性の中の、無体闕である。三十三過所摂ではない。》
疑って云う。闕無同喩とは、即ちこれ闕減過性で、三十三過に摂すべきではない。その理は然るべきではない。そもそも因明法では、能立の過失は、更に三十三過を出でない。今闕減過性も、亦たこれに摂すべきである。何ぞ別過と云うのか。況んや陳那已後、因の三相において、即ち闕減過性を立てる。これ以て随宜に、須く三十三過に摂すべきである。何ぞ別過と云うのか。これに由って疏の下文に云く。「亦た論説の如く声常の宗法自相因、無空論に対して同喩を闕無す」《云云》。ここに知る。同喩支を闕くといえども、猶お因において過を談ずる。義に随って法自相等に摂すべきである。何ぞ別過と云うのか。加えて疏に云く。「もし因言を陳ずるなら必ずこれ有体である」。以て知る。陈那等の心は、更に無体闕を許さない。これは因の三相において、この過を立てる故である。爾らば、この義は未だ詳らかでない。何ぞ答申すべきか。

答。闕無同喩とは、先ず能立の過失で、三十三過を出でるべきではない。その理は

英語訳

【Right Page】

Minister of the Left Commentary《Lower Volume》

From the 30th day of the 2nd month of Kyūju 2nd year onwards. Monastic Director Ekyō teaches Buddhist logic. 《I myself have resided in Uji since the 28th day. The Monastic Director has come to reside in Uji since the evening of the 29th day.》

○ There are four types of contradictions
　The Monastic Director says "There are no specific matters"

○ The matter of the diligence-arising cause having partial inability to establish
The Nine Sentence Private Commentary says: There is a transmission that says: When broadly establishing the impermanence thesis through similar instances, all impermanent things become similar instances. Although lightning is not diligence-arising, because the meaning of impermanence is equal, lightning and jars are raised as similar analogies. If one places the words "all universally" when making the combination, it can be combined, therefore there is no such fault. What does this mean? When [saying] "all things of diligent intervalless arising nature are seen to be impermanent," since lightning is not diligent, the cause is not related《etc.》.

The Monastic Director says: This doctrine is extremely subtle. It should be used. This is a doctrine that ordinary people do not easily understand.

○ Do the sound-production theorists establish the diligence-arising cause?
The Monastic Director says: Since sound-production [theorists] establish that all sounds are eternal, they do not establish the diligence-arising cause. 《Because external sounds are not diligence-arising》If discussing internal sounds, there should be no hindrance for sound-production [theorists] to establish the diligence cause.

　Textual evidence that sound-production [theorists] establish the diligence-arising cause

【Lower Section】
In the Nyāyamukha's section on fallacious types, we see that the diligence-arising cause applies to both production and manifestation schools. Based on this, the upper volume presents "bilateral substantial partial non-establishment" saying: When Vaiśeṣika, opposing sound-production [school], establishes "all sounds are impermanent," both schools only permit that internal sounds have diligence-arising, while external sounds do not《etc.》. Thus we know: Do sound-production theorists establish the diligence cause? Additionally, in the middle volume text we see sound-production [theorists] establishing the diligence cause《etc.》.

○ Do the production-manifestation two schools jointly permit internal and external sounds to be eternal?
The Monastic Director says: Looking at various commentaries, sound-manifestation theorists calculate that both internal and external sounds are eternal. However, the diligence-arising cause is limited only to internal sounds.

○ "Wishing to make students know that causes are definitive and not faults of analogies"《etc.》.
The Monastic Director says: "Not being faults of analogies" means that the four contradictions are faults of causes. They are not faults of analogies, not preventing other faults from being in analogies.

This doctrine agrees with my humble opinion of recent days.

○ "Because various non-fallacious establishments have the characteristics of these faults"《etc.》.
The Monastic Director says: Monastic Director Eichō says: Because various non-fallacious establishments have the characteristics of these faults.
Objection: This doctrine contradicts the text below "therefore in fallacious establishments one does not see their faults."

　The Monastic Director's own doctrine receives no answer to the difficult question

○ "If one says eyes etc. must serve my use, there is predicate non-establishment, lacking similar analogies, the aggregate-nature cause violates dharma-svarūpa"《text》.

　The matter of self-other mutual analogy
First, when establishing "must serve my use," having predicate non-establishment means: generally when Sāṅkhya establishes this inference, the original intention is to manifest the doctrine that among the twenty-five principles, the spirit-self principle receives and uses eyes etc. Regarding the doctrine of provisional self's reception and use, both proponent and opponent permit it. Why would they begin disputing that reception and use? Therefore, when now establishing "must serve my use," it must necessarily be spirit-self. If this is spirit-self, how could it not commit the fault of other's predicate non-establishment? However, regarding the fact that the word "self" penetrates to provisional self, therefore one should not commit the predicate non-establishment fault: generally Sāṅkhya's original intention is said to avoid mutual agreement. Therefore the commentary says: "If establishing that eyes etc. serve provisional other's use would be mutual agreement and extreme establishment"《etc.》. Therefore Sāṅkhya's original intention: if relying on words regarding provisional self, immediately fears the opponent would attach the fault of mutual agreement. So-called provisional self's reception and use is also permitted by Buddhist dharma. If words do not distinguish, how would this not invite the fault of mutual agreement? However, regarding the word "other," that analogy is not equal. Now establishing "must serve other's use" immediately manifests that there is a capable-using other above eyes etc. Generally examining the Kapila school, using five types of causes, immediately accomplishes the doctrine of spirit-self's real existence. This present "must serve other's use" inference is precisely the first "aggregate for other's sake" cause. So-called aggregate collection laws must serve others' use. Like bedding etc. Eyes and other five cognitive faculties, being already aggregate-nature, must necessarily have a capable-using other that uses these. That capable-using other is precisely spirit-self. Due to this principle, one knows self's real existence. Therefore the Sāṅkhya-kārikā says "Other is precisely self, therefore knowing self's real existence"《etc.》.

【Lower Section】
Therefore, the proponent's original intention manifests that above eyes etc. there is additionally a capable-using other. If accomplishing the capable-using other, it must necessarily be called spirit-self. This then, looking toward eyes etc. themselves, names spirit-self as "other." Generally speaking "other" is permitted language. Precisely because it is the nomenclature of self-other. This is not relying on words regarding provisional other to falsely establish true other. Already being so, it is also the same as provisional self. How would it not be mutual agreement? Therefore in the proponent's intention, the two words self-other completely do not mutually correspond.

　Above copied and written from the Monastic Director's excerpts

○ Predicate non-establishment, lacking similar analogies《Lacking similar analogies means: among the lacking-diminishing fault-natures, it is substantial lacking. Not included in the thirty-three faults.》
Doubtfully saying: Lacking similar analogies is precisely lacking-diminishing fault-nature and should not be included in the thirty-three faults. This principle should not be so. Generally in Buddhist logic dharma, faults of ability-to-establish do not exceed the thirty-three faults. This present lacking-diminishing fault-nature should also be included in these. Why call it a separate fault? Moreover, after Dignāga, regarding the three characteristics of causes, precisely establishing lacking-diminishing fault-nature. Therefore according to appropriateness, it must be included in the thirty-three faults. Why call it a separate fault? Due to this, the commentary's text below says: "Also like the treatise explains: the sound-permanence thesis's dharma-svarūpa cause, opposing the void-school, lacks similar analogies"《etc.》. Here we know: although lacking the similar analogy component, still discussing faults regarding causes. According to doctrine it should be included in dharma-svarūpa etc. Why call it a separate fault? Additionally the commentary says: "If stating causal words, they must be substantial." Thus knowing: Dignāga and others' minds do not further permit substantial lacking. This is because they establish this fault in the three characteristics of causes. If so, this doctrine is not yet detailed. How can one respond?

Answer: Lacking similar analogies: first, faults of ability-to-establish should not exceed the thirty-three faults. This principle is

【Left Page】
【Upper Section】
The matter of self-other mutual analogy
First, when establishing "must serve my use," having predicate non-establishment means: generally when Sāṅkhya establishes this inference, the original intention is to manifest the doctrine that among the twenty-five principles, the spirit-self principle receives and uses eyes etc. Regarding the doctrine of provisional self's reception and use, both proponent and opponent permit it. Why would they begin disputing that reception and use? Therefore, when now establishing "must serve my use," it must necessarily be spirit-self. If this is spirit-self, how could it not commit the fault of other's predicate non-establishment? However, regarding the fact that the word "self" penetrates to provisional self, therefore one should not commit the predicate non-establishment fault: generally Sāṅkhya's original intention is said to avoid mutual agreement. Therefore the commentary says: "If establishing that eyes etc. serve provisional other's use would be mutual agreement and extreme establishment"《etc.》. Therefore Sāṅkhya's original intention: if relying on words regarding provisional self, immediately fears the opponent would attach the fault of mutual agreement. So-called provisional self's reception and use is also permitted by Buddhist dharma. If words do not distinguish, how would this not invite the fault of mutual agreement? However, regarding the word "other," that analogy is not equal. Now establishing "must serve other's use" immediately manifests that there is a capable-using other above eyes etc. Generally examining the Kapila school, using five types of causes, immediately accomplishes the doctrine of spirit-self's real existence. This present "must serve other's use" inference is precisely the first "aggregate for other's sake" cause. So-called aggregate collection laws must serve others' use. Like bedding etc. Eyes and other five cognitive faculties, being already aggregate-nature, must necessarily have a capable-using other that uses these. That capable-using other is precisely spirit-self. Due to this principle, one knows self's real existence. Therefore the Sāṅkhya-kārikā says "Other is precisely self, therefore knowing self's real existence"《etc.》.

【Lower Section】
Therefore, the proponent's original intention manifests that above eyes etc. there is additionally a capable-using other. If accomplishing the capable-using other, it must necessarily be called spirit-self. This then, looking toward eyes etc. themselves, names spirit-self as "other." Generally speaking "other" is permitted language. Precisely because it is the nomenclature of self-other. This is not relying on words regarding provisional other to falsely establish true other. Already being so, it is also the same as provisional self. How would it not be mutual agreement? Therefore in the proponent's intention, the two words self-other completely do not mutually correspond.

　Above copied and written from the Monastic Director's excerpts

○ Predicate non-establishment, lacking similar analogies《Lacking similar analogies means: among the lacking-diminishing fault-natures, it is substantial lacking. Not included in the thirty-three faults.》
Doubtfully saying: Lacking similar analogies is precisely lacking-diminishing fault-nature and should not be included in the thirty-three faults. This principle should not be so. Generally in Buddhist logic dharma, faults of ability-to-establish do not exceed the thirty-three faults. This present lacking-diminishing fault-nature should also be included in these. Why call it a separate fault? Moreover, after Dignāga, regarding the three characteristics of causes, precisely establishing lacking-diminishing fault-nature. Therefore according to appropriateness, it must be included in the thirty-three faults. Why call it a separate fault? Due to this, the commentary's text below says: "Also like the treatise explains: the sound-permanence thesis's dharma-svarūpa cause, opposing the void-school, lacks similar analogies"《etc.》. Here we know: although lacking the similar analogy component, still discussing faults regarding causes. According to doctrine it should be included in dharma-svarūpa etc. Why call it a separate fault? Additionally the commentary says: "If stating causal words, they must be substantial." Thus knowing: Dignāga and others' minds do not further permit substantial lacking. This is because they establish this fault in the three characteristics of causes. If so, this doctrine is not yet detailed. How can one respond?

Answer: Lacking similar analogies: first, faults of ability-to-establish should not exceed the thirty-three faults. This principle is