翻刻
【本文二段構成】
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
三四〇【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
左府抄下
【枠外右横下】
二二
【上段】
量准＿レ之可＿レ知。然立＿二有性非實＿一時。用＿二有無實故之因＿一者。
可＿レ有＿二 三過失＿一。一者。無實之言。被＿レ擧＿二和合無實＿一。而實上
不無之有不＿レ有＿レ之。故有＿二兩俱不成＿一。二者。同喩同異性。
不＿レ有＿二和合無實＿一。故有＿二能立不成＿一。三者。因亦不遍謂無
實之言。含＿二德業無實＿一。然於＿二非實＿一【一点衍ヵ】一量＿一。有法有性。唯是
實上不無之有也。實上不無之有。不＿レ有＿二德業無實＿一故。不＿レ
遍＿二有法＿一。乍唯似＿レ有＿二實句之無實＿一故《割書：爲言》。待＿二喩能立不成＿一
置＿二因言＿一。見＿二 上因和合句無實＿一置＿二亦言＿一。如＿レ文可＿レ悉＿レ之。於＿二
有一實因＿一。無＿二不遍之過＿一。故取＿レ之捨＿レ彼也。 問。爾者。其
不遍者。三十三過之中何乎。 答。可＿二兩俱不成＿一。謂德業
之無實不＿レ遍＿二有法＿一。故惣言＿レ之。三量因￣ヲ取-差￣フル兩俱不
成也。可＿レ思。此義意云。前後二過。俱寬因狹宗兩俱不
成耳。
已上書＿二-寫僧都抄出＿一。僧都語云。故大僧正《割書：覺信》對＿二良撰＿一。
傳＿二因明深義＿一。記置也。緣而不＿レ露。大僧正隱後。僧正
《割書：玄覺》幷惠曉。相俱開＿レ封見＿レ之。其旨不＿レ過＿レ斯耳。
僧都云。湛秀云。可＿レ用＿二 二卷私記義＿一。 問。若爾。【句点衍ヵ】淸水難
【下段】
如何可＿レ言。 答。有一實因者。限＿二實句＿一不＿レ應＿二德業＿一。故
與＿二法宗＿一相合。無＿レ不＿レ遍＿レ異。於＿二有無實因＿一者。雖＿レ兼＿二德業
無實＿一。爲＿二非實宗因＿一之時。義不＿二相關＿一。不＿レ望＿二德業無實之
義＿一故。似＿二有法有性不＿一＿レ有＿二德業無實＿一也。《割書：此義猶☐【「難」ヵ】。｜且致【二点脱ヵ】會釋＿一。》
○有性有法有一實因《割書：等云云》
濟恩寺僧都傳云。疏上卷云。但遍＿二￣セルイ有法＿一。若有＿二￣ニマレ
別體＿一。若無＿二￣ニマレ別體＿一。竝能成＿レ宗。義相關故。必是宗法￣ナリ。
如＿下【三点ヵ】薩婆多對＿二匕乘《割書：考【四角囲み文字】匕乘二字｜恐譬喩歟》者＿一。立＿下命根實以＿レ有＿レ業故
如＿中 五根等＿上。豈以＿下命根與＿レ業別體＿上。則非＿二正因＿一。故有＿二￣ニマレ
別體＿一。若無＿二￣ニマレ別體＿一。義相關帶￣セルハ。必是宗法。皆得＿三說
爲＿二宗之法性＿一。非＿二無￣ハ體是￣ニシモ＿一。非＿二有￣ハ體非￣ニシモ＿一《割書：云云》。今准＿二
此命-根實-有宗以有-業故因關帶之義＿一。於＿二有性有法有
一實因＿一。問＿レ可＿レ有＿二兩俱不成＿一也。意有性非實宗。有一實
因。旣是別體也。非＿二￣ルニナヌ有法上義爲＿一＿レ因。云何不＿二是兩
俱不成＿一乎￣ト問難也。
僧都云。可＿レ用＿二此義＿一。不＿レ可＿二異求＿一。
○旣於德業一一皆有《割書：等云云》
【左頁】
【枠外左上】
三四一【但し算用数字】
【枠外左横上】
左府抄下
【枠外左横下】
二三
【上段】
無＿二指事＿一
謂子微等皆有＿レ實故。德業無＿レ簡。不＿レ須＿二 一言＿一。
尋云。於＿二有一實因＿一。一實之言。可＿レ攝＿二子孫微＿一乎否。兩樣
難＿レ思。何者若攝＿二子孫＿一者。勝論所立。四種之中。以＿二大有
同異＿一。名＿二有一實＿一者。是依＿レ有＿二 九實一一＿一也。案＿二 四類廢立＿一。
以＿二實德業和合四句＿一。名＿二無實＿一。以＿レ有＿二實句一一＿一。大有同
異。名＿二有一實＿一。實句中。於＿二 四大種＿一。所生子微。云＿二有二實＿一。
孫微名＿二有多實＿一。然於＿二大有同異＿一者。悉有＿二諸實＿一故。有＿二 九
實一々＿一。名＿二有一實＿一有＿二子孫＿一《割書：考【四角囲み文字】孫恐｜子微字》名＿二有二實＿一。有＿二孫微＿一
名＿二有多實＿一也。故疏文云。大有同異能有＿二諸實＿一亦得＿三名爲＿二
有一實有二實有多實＿一《割書：等云云》。然今有一實因者。取＿二 四種
中第二有一實＿一也。豈有一實言。亙＿二子孫等＿一乎。若許＿レ爾
者。頗背＿二疏旨＿一。各別擧＿レ之故。加＿レ之文云。亦欲＿レ顯＿二 九實￣ノ
一一￣ヲ皆有￣スト《割書：云》￣フヲ＿一故云＿二有一實＿一《割書：云云》。以知。限＿二本微＿一不＿レ通＿二
子孫＿一。若限＿二本九種＿一者。亦不＿レ可＿レ然。於＿二有性非實一量＿一。非
實之言。嫌＿二諸實＿一也。子孫旣實也。何簡殘＿レ之乎。有一實
故因。不＿レ含＿二子孫＿一故。若爾者。有一實之因。有＿二不遍之過＿一。
【下段】
何者。法宗非實之言。簡＿二諸實句＿一。不＿レ捨＿二子孫＿一。因旣限＿二本
微＿一。非實之言。豈遍＿二有二多＿一乎。爾者何可＿レ定＿レ之乎。
已上書＿二-寫僧都抄出＿一。
問。自義如何。 答。有一實因。限＿二本微＿一不＿レ遍＿二子孫＿一也。
○疏云心心所法是能緣性有緣謂境有＿二能緣＿一故《割書：乃至》以＿二
其因＿一故緣＿レ無不＿レ生《割書：云云》。
尋云。付＿下今此以＿二有性＿一名＿二有緣性＿一之義＿上。若以＿三有性自有＿二
能緣＿一。名＿二有緣性＿一耶。若以＿乙令＿下＿二實等＿一有＿上＿レ緣之性＿甲。名＿二有緣
性＿一耶。 二俱有＿レ過。若以＿三自有＿二能緣＿一名＿二有緣＿一者。稍背＿二疏
前後之文＿一。所＿レ謂上文。釋＿二詮緣之義＿一云。實德業三和合之
時《割書：乃至》大有能有＿二實德業＿一故《割書：云云》。惣意云。實等三句。與＿二
大有性＿一。和合之時。三句同起＿下詮＿二-緣實等＿一爲＿レ有之詮智＿上。三
句￣イヽ如＿レ是爲＿二心等＿一因￣トナツテ起＿二詮緣＿一之因￣ハ卽大有句。大有
句能有＿二實等＿一令＿二體非無＿一故《割書：爲言》。以知。有緣之言。非＿二大有
自有＿一＿レ緣。是令＿二實等有＿一＿レ緣也。令＿レ有＿レ緣之因緣性故。名＿二有
緣性＿一。若此文非＿レ釋＿二有性之有緣性＿一者。是何爲耶。況今
文。旣置＿二之言＿一。有緣與＿レ性別釋＿レ之。依＿レ之。先德之意。盛
現代語訳
【右頁】
量はこれに准じて知るべきである。然るに有性非実を立てる時、有無実故の因を用いるなら、三つの過失があるべきである。一つは、無実の言が、和合無実を挙げられる。而して実の上の不無の有はこれを有しない。故に両俱不成がある。二つは、同喩の同異性は、和合無実を有しない。故に能立不成がある。三つは、因もまた遍せず。謂わく無実の言は、德業無実を含む。然るに非実の一量において、有法有性は、唯だこれ実の上の不無の有である。実の上の不無の有は、德業無実を有しない故に、有法に遍しない。ただ唯だ実句の無実を有するに似る故《為言》。喩能立不成を待って因言を置き、上の因和合句無実を見て亦言を置く。文の如く之を悉くすべし。有一実の因において、不遍の過は無い。故にこれを取り彼を捨てるのである。問う。爾らば、その不遍とは、三十三過の中の何か。答う。両俱不成とすべきである。謂わく德業の無実が有法に遍しない。故に惣じてこれを言うに、三量の因を取り差う両俱不成である。思うべし。この義の意に云わく、前後二過は、俱に因寛宗狭の両俱不成である。
已上僧都の抄出を書写す。僧都語って云く。故に大僧正《覚信》が良撰に対して、因明の深義を伝え、記し置いた。縁りて露わさず。大僧正隠後、僧正《玄覚》并びに恵曉が、相俱に封を開いてこれを見た。その旨はこれを過ぎない。
僧都云く。湛秀云く。二巻の私記の義を用いるべし。問う。若し爾らば、清水の難は如何に言うべきか。答う。有一実の因とは、実句に限って德業に応じない。故に法宗と相合し、不遍の異は無い。有無実の因においては、德業無実を兼ぬと雖も、非実宗の因と為る時、義が相関しない。德業無実の義を望まない故。有法有性が德業無実を有しないに似るのである。《この義は猶お難し。且く会釈を致す。》
○有性有法有一実因《等云云》
済恩寺僧都伝えて云く。疏の上巻に云く。但だ有法に遍せば、若し別体あり、若し別体なし、並びに能く宗を成す。義相関する故。必ずこれ宗法である。例えば薩婆多が乗者に対して、命根は実なり、業あるを以ての故、五根等の如しと立つるが如し。どうして命根と業と別体なるを以って、則ち正因に非ずとするか。故に別体あり、若し別体なし、義相関し帯びるは、必ずこれ宗法である。皆宗の法性と為すことを得。体無きにあらず、体有るにあらず《云云》。今この命根実有宗の有業故因の関帯の義に准じて、有性有法有一実因において、両俱不成があるべきかと問う。意は有性非実宗において、有一実因は、既にこれ別体である。有法上の義を因と為すにあらず。云何ぞこれ両俱不成にあらざるかと問難するのである。
僧都云く。この義を用いるべし。異求すべからず。
○既に德業一一に皆有《等云云》
【左頁】
指すことはない
謂わく子微等皆実を有する故。德業は簡ぶことなし。一言を須いず。
尋ねて云く。有一実因において、一実の言は、子孫微を摂すべきか否か。両様に思い難し。何となれば、若し子孫を摂するなら、勝論の所立において、四種の中、大有同異を以て、有一実と名づけるは、これ九実一一を有するに依るのである。四類の廃立を案ずるに、実德業和合の四句を以て、無実と名づけ、実句一一を有するを以て、大有同異を、有一実と名づく。実句中において、四大種において、所生の子微を、有二実と云い、孫微を有多実と名づく。然るに大有同異においては、悉く諸実を有する故、九実一々を有し、有一実と名づけ、子孫を有するを有二実と名づけ、孫微を有するを有多実と名づくのである。故に疏文に云く。大有同異は能く諸実を有し、亦た名づけて有一実有二実有多実と為すことを得《等云云》。然るに今有一実因とは、四種中の第二有一実を取るのである。どうして有一実の言が、子孫等に亙ろうか。若しこれを許すなら、頗る疏旨に背く。各別にこれを挙ぐる故。これに加えて文に云く。亦た九実の一一を皆有すことを顕さんと欲する故に有一実と云う《云云》。以て知る。本微に限って子孫に通じない。若し本九種に限るなら、亦た然るべからず。有性非実の一量において、非実の言は、諸実を嫌うのである。子孫は既に実である。何ぞこれを簡び残すのか。有一実故の因は、子孫を含まない故。若し爾らば、有一実の因は、不遍の過がある。
何となれば、法宗の非実の言は、諸実句を簡び、子孫を捨てない。因は既に本微に限る。非実の言は、どうして有二多に遍しようか。爾らば何をかこれを定むべきか。
已上僧都の抄出を書写す。
問う。自義は如何。答う。有一実因は、本微に限って子孫に遍しないのである。
○疏に云く心心所法はこれ能縁性なり緣あり境と謂う能縁あるの故《乃至》その因を以ての故縁無きとも生ぜず《云云》。
尋ねて云く。今この有性を以て有縁性と名づけるの義について、若し有性自ら能縁を有するを以て、有縁性と名づけるか。若し実等をして縁を有せしむるの性を以て、有縁性と名づけるか。二俱に過がある。若し自ら能縁を有するを以て有縁と名づけるなら、稍や疏の前後の文に背く。所謂上文において、詮縁の義を釈して云く。実德業三和合の時《乃至》大有は能く実德業を有する故《云云》。総意に云く。実等の三句が、大有性と、和合の時、三句同じく実等を詮縁して有と為すの詮智を起こす。三句かくの如く心等の因と為って詮縁を起こすの因は即ち大有句である。大有句は能く実等を有して体をして非無ならしむる故《為言》。以て知る。有縁の言は、大有自ら縁を有するにあらず。これ実等をして縁を有せしむるなり。縁を有せしむるの因縁性故。有縁性と名づく。若しこの文が有性の有縁性を釈するにあらざるなら、これ何の為ぞや。況んや今文は、既に之言を置いて、有縁と性とを別に釈す。これに依って、先德の意は、盛んに
英語訳
【Right Page】
The [other] inferences can be known by analogy to this. However, when establishing "existence-nature is non-substantial," if one uses the cause "because of having non-substantial," there should be three faults. First, the words "non-substantial" include conjunction's non-substantiality. But the non-non existence on substance does not have this. Therefore there is the fault of both not established. Second, the same example's similarity-difference does not have conjunction's non-substantiality. Therefore there is the fault of proof not established. Third, the cause also does not pervade. Namely, the words "non-substantial" include quality-action's non-substantiality. However, in the one inference of "non-substantial," the subject existence-nature is only the non-non existence on substance. Since the non-non existence on substance does not have quality-action's non-substantiality, it does not pervade the subject. It only seems to have substance-sentence's non-substantiality《meaning》. Awaiting the example's proof not established, placing the cause words; seeing the above cause conjunction-sentence's non-substantiality, placing the word "also." As the text shows, this should all be understood. Regarding the cause "having one substance," there is no fault of non-pervasion. Therefore taking this and abandoning that. Question: If so, what among the thirty-three faults is that non-pervasion? Answer: It should be both not established. Namely, quality-action's non-substantiality does not pervade the subject. Therefore generally speaking of this, it is the both not established of taking and differentiating the three inferences' causes. This should be contemplated. The meaning of this doctrine says: the前後二過 are both the both not established of cause broad, thesis narrow.
Above copied and written from the Monastic Director's excerpts. The Monastic Director spoke saying: Therefore the great monastic supervisor《Gakushin》transmitted the profound meaning of logic to Ryōsen, recording and placing it. Due to circumstances it was not revealed. After the great monastic supervisor's passing, the monastic supervisor《Genkaku》and Ekyō together opened the seal and saw it. Its purport does not exceed this.
The Monastic Director says: Tanshū says: The doctrine of the second volume's private record should be used. Question: If so, how should Shimizu's challenge be addressed? Answer: The cause "having one substance" is limited to the substance-sentence and does not correspond to quality-action. Therefore it accords with the thesis-predicate and has no difference of non-pervasion. Regarding the cause "having non-substantial," although it includes quality-action's non-substantiality, when serving as cause for the non-substantial thesis, the meaning does not correlate. Since it does not regard the meaning of quality-action's non-substantiality, it seems the subject existence-nature does not have quality-action's non-substantiality.《This doctrine is still difficult. For now providing an explanatory interpretation.》
○ Subject existence-nature, cause having one substance《etc.》
The Monastic Director of Saion-ji transmitted saying: The commentary's upper volume says: "If it only pervades the subject, whether having separate substance or not having separate substance, both can establish the thesis. Because meanings correlate, it must be a thesis-dharma. For example, when Sarvāstivāda establishes against the Vehicle adherents: 'Life-faculty is substantial because of having karma, like the five faculties etc.' How could it be that because life-faculty and karma have separate substances, it would not be a correct cause? Therefore having separate substance or not having separate substance, if meanings correlate and connect, it must be thesis-dharma. All can be called the thesis's dharma-nature. Not non-substantial, not substantial"《etc.》. Now analogizing to this life-faculty substantial-existence thesis's "because of having karma" cause's correlating meaning, regarding the subject existence-nature's cause "having one substance," one asks whether there should be both not established. The meaning is: in the existence-nature non-substantial thesis, the cause "having one substance" is already a separate substance. It is not making the subject's meaning into a cause. How is this not both not established? - this is the challenging question.
The Monastic Director says: This doctrine should be used. One should not seek differently.
○ Already each of quality-action all has《etc.》
【Left Page】
No pointing matters
Namely, because child-atoms etc. all have substance. Quality-action have no discrimination. One word is not needed.
Inquiring: Regarding the cause "having one substance," should the words "one substance" include child and grandchild atoms or not? Both ways are difficult to consider. Why? If including child and grandchild, in Vaiśeṣika's establishment, among the four types, taking great existence and similarity-difference and naming them "having one substance" depends on having each of the nine substances. Examining the establishment and abandonment of the four categories: taking the four sentences of substance-quality-action-conjunction and naming them "non-substantial"; having each substance-sentence, great existence and similarity-difference are named "having one substance." Among substance-sentences, regarding the four great elements, the produced child-atoms are called "having two substances," grandchild atoms are named "having many substances." However, regarding great existence and similarity-difference, since they have all substances, having each of the nine substances is named "having one substance," having child-grandchild is named "having two substances," having grandchild atoms is named "having many substances." Therefore the commentary text says: "Great existence and similarity-difference can have all substances, also can be named having one substance, having two substances, having many substances"《etc.》. However, now the cause "having one substance" takes the second "having one substance" among the four types. How could the words "having one substance" extend to child-grandchild etc.? If permitting this, it quite contradicts the commentary's purport, since they are mentioned separately. Adding to this, the text says: "Also wanting to show that each of the nine substances all has, therefore saying 'having one substance'"《etc.》. Thus we know it is limited to original atoms, not extending to child-grandchild. If limited to the original nine types, this also cannot be so. In the one inference "existence-nature is non-substantial," the words "non-substantial" reject all substances. Child-grandchild are already substantial. Why discriminate and leave them out? The cause "because of having one substance" does not include child-grandchild. If so, the cause "having one substance" has the fault of non-pervasion.
Why? The thesis-predicate's words "non-substantial" discriminate all substance-sentences, not abandoning child-grandchild. Since the cause is already limited to original atoms, how could the words "non-substantial" pervade "having two" and "having many"? Then how should this be determined?
Above copied and written from the Monastic Director's excerpts.
Question: What is your own doctrine? Answer: The cause "having one substance" is limited to original atoms and does not pervade child-grandchild.
○ The commentary says: "Mind and mental factors are capable-of-cognizing nature. Having cognition means境界 having capable-cognition therefore《etc.》because of that cause, even without cognition it does not arise"《etc.》.
Inquiring: Regarding this doctrine of taking existence-nature and naming it capable-cognizing nature, is it that existence-nature itself has capable-cognition and is named capable-cognizing nature? Or is it that the nature of causing substances etc. to have cognition is named capable-cognizing nature? Both have faults. If taking having capable-cognition itself as having-cognition, it somewhat contradicts the commentary's preceding and following texts. Namely, the above text, explaining the meaning of indicating cognition, says: "When substance-quality-action three are conjoined《etc.》great existence can have substance-quality-action therefore"《etc.》. The general meaning says: When the three sentences of substance etc. are conjoined with great existence-nature, the three sentences together arise the indicating cognition that indicates and cognizes substance etc. as existence. The three sentences thus becoming causes for mind etc., the cause of arising indicating cognition is precisely the great existence sentence. The great existence sentence can have substance etc., causing their substance to be non-non therefore《meaning》. Thus we know the words "having cognition" are not great existence itself having cognition, but causing substance etc. to have cognition. Because of the causal nature of causing to have cognition, it is named capable-cognizing nature. If this text does not explain existence-nature's capable-cognizing nature, what is it for? Moreover, the present text already places the word "of," separately explaining having-cognition and nature. Based on this, the former masters' intention abundantly...