切支丹御退治記 49巻. [8] - 翻刻

翻刻

　丸之時向寄手兵料識寄手平日望出丸今城中
　弃渡出丸云々則鍋島信濃守以使者告奏松平
　伊豆守相伴戸田左門氏鉄到彼所循見之上謀
　信濃守軽卒令毀出丸之塀軽卒出入出丸登塀
　毀之時自城中放鉄砲而倒絶軽卒伊豆守左門
　下知引挙軽卒伊豆守直則戸田左門仮屋集列
　陣之御譜代衆暫有閑談然処自鍋島信濃守備
　非令攻城他備之士卒見之各自相進当此時雖
　紛結以約束既明故諸部渾々張々無錯乱未刻
　責取出丸幷二三之丸酉刻乗取本丸海手之方

　本丸五分之一程依夜陰付柵待其夜之明る
松平伊豆守島原陣之覚曰二月廿七日廿八日惣
　責御内談相定処に不意に出丸ゟ乗入惣軍前
　後左右無差別惣乗に而早速二之丸小屋放火
　す
又曰寄手之惣仕寄敵城之塀際迄其間或三間斗
　茂可有之候諸手最初ゟ鉄砲を被打懸悉致迷
　惑城中三之丸ゟ本丸大手口に而道通りを大
　方人長け程堀を堀矢道を防申候然処に出丸
　東之脇有馬玄蕃仕寄先之井樓ゟ横に西之方

現代語訳

丸の時、寄手に向かって兵は寄手を見分け、寄手は平日出丸を望んでいたが、今城中から出丸を捨てて渡すという。そこで鍋島信濃守が使者をもって松平伊豆守に告げ、戸田左門氏鉄と共にその場所に到着し、見回した上で謀った。信濃守は軽卒に命じて出丸の塀を毀させた。軽卒が出丸に出入りし、塀に登って毀している時、城中から鉄砲を放たれて軽卒は倒れ絶命した。伊豆守と左門は下知して軽卒を引き上げた。伊豆守はすぐに戸田左門と仮屋に集まり、陣の御譜代衆を列して、しばらく閑談していた。ところが鍋島信濃守の備えではなく攻城を命じたのではないが、他の備えの士卒がこれを見て、各自が相進んだ。この時は紛糾したものの、約束がすでに明らかになっていたので、諸部隊は皆一致団結し、混乱なく未の刻に出丸並びに二の丸、三の丸を攻め取り、酉の刻に本丸海手の方に乗り取った。

本丸の五分の一程は夜陰により柵に付け、その夜の明けるのを待った。

松平伊豆守島原陣の覚によると、二月二十七日、二十八日の総攻撃の御内談が相定まったところ、不意に出丸から乗り入れ、総軍が前後左右の差別なく総攻撃となり、早速二の丸の小屋に放火した。

また曰く、寄手の総仕寄けは敵城の塀際まで、その間は三間ばかりもあろうか。諸手は最初から鉄砲を打ちかけられ、ことごとく迷惑した。城中では三の丸から本丸大手口において、道通りを大方人の背丈程の堀を掘り、矢道を防いでいた。ところが出丸東の脇で、有馬玄蕃の仕寄け先の井楼から横に西の方

英語訳

When approaching the outer bailey (demaru), the besieging forces could identify each other, and while the besiegers had long desired to take the outer bailey, now the castle was abandoning and surrendering it. Nabeshima Shinano-no-kami sent a messenger to inform Matsudaira Izu-no-kami, who arrived at the location together with Toda Saemon Ujitetsu, surveyed the situation, and made plans. Shinano-no-kami ordered light infantry to destroy the palisades of the outer bailey. As the light infantry entered and exited the outer bailey, climbing and destroying the palisades, musket fire from within the castle struck and killed the light infantry. Izu-no-kami and Saemon ordered the withdrawal of the light infantry. Izu-no-kami immediately gathered with Toda Saemon at the temporary quarters, assembled the hereditary retainers of the formation, and had a brief discussion. However, though Nabeshima Shinano-no-kami's unit had not been ordered to assault the castle, soldiers from other units saw this and each advanced on their own initiative. Although this caused confusion at the time, since the arrangements were already clear, all units worked in unison without disorder. At the hour of the sheep (around 2 PM), they captured the outer bailey along with the second and third baileys, and at the hour of the cock (around 6 PM), they took the seaside section of the main bailey.

About one-fifth of the main bailey remained, and due to the darkness of night, they built palisades and waited for daybreak.

According to Matsudaira Izu-no-kami's memoir of the Shimabara campaign, the private consultation regarding the general assault planned for February 27th and 28th had been decided, when unexpectedly there was an entry from the outer bailey, and the entire army launched a general assault without distinction of front, rear, left, or right, quickly setting fire to the huts in the second bailey.

It also states that the besiegers' approach works reached the very edge of the enemy castle's palisades, with perhaps only about three ken (approximately 5-6 meters) between them. From the beginning, all attacking forces were subjected to musket fire, causing universal confusion. Within the castle, from the third bailey to the main bailey's main entrance, they had dug trenches roughly the height of a person across the roadway to block arrow paths. However, at the eastern side of the outer bailey, from the watchtower at the front of Arima Gemba's approach works, horizontally toward the west...