英語訳
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 3
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establish the cause. Or conversely establish the dissimilar dharma [meaning].
Question "Since means of proof are many, why one word?" etc. Collected Records says: Eup says: This question's meaning is - since means of proof already have many types, one should say "means of proof cause," "similar-dissimilar," etc. Why use just one word "means of proof" to express means of proof? [考note: Marginal note in original says: Should say means of proof cause, means of proof similar example, means of proof dissimilar example, meaning.] Commentary's answer "reaching to means of proof nature." Eup says: Although means of proof have many types, in order to show generally accomplishing means of proof nature, one word expresses means of proof. If stated separately, then each component would independently establish means of proof. Now, since lacking any one component means no means of proof, we know it generally forms one means of proof.
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Kyōhō 8th year, first month, 30th day. Completed repairs. Due to having considerations, divided the first volume of the upper volume into two volumes. Kungen (age 17)
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 2 (End)
[Lower Section]
Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā (End of Upper Volume)
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"In this, thesis" below
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Individual characteristics are accomplished. [Meanings like impermanence]. Within one's dharma nature. [Self-nature like sound].
Definitive reasoning based on directly witnessed things. [Based on directly witnessed things (examples), definitive reasoning (cause), meaning cause based on examples.]
"Since cause already bears similarity, reason requires further establishment" etc. The meaning says: If cause is already a fallacious cause, reason requires using separate cognition to establish this cause, gaining mutual acceptance to make it a cause. If so, cause also like thesis establishes the nature of what is to be established, having no difference from the previous thesis [meaning].
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Question: According to this interpretation, the "all according to no-self" cause in Vijñānavāda treatise is established through separate cognition, gaining mutual acceptance as cause. Does this also not have the fault of being the same as what is accomplished? Is this example not consistent? Answer: That "all according to no-self" cause requires the cause essence to be established by extremely accomplished things. However, other schools violate it. Therefore "self-permitted" words are used, or separate cognition establishes it. Therefore it is a correct cause. What is interpreted here is that completely non-extremely-accomplished things are further established, therefore becoming a fault. Or also, Vijñānavāda hetuvidyā fundamentally does not necessarily raise true standards, so if it has such faults of being the same as what is accomplished, what is the problem?
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"Fallacious thesis and two examples are also included in this category." Above interpreted fallacious thesis-cause, but has not yet interpreted fallacious two examples, so those fallacious examples are also categorically included within this interpretation of fallacious causes [meaning].
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 3
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[Upper Section]
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"Called extremely accomplished subject, extremely accomplished predicate" below
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"There are still other faults." If following Bright Lamp Commentary's meaning, this is the completeness of the first fault of establishing different meanings. [考note: "completeness" perhaps should be "fault"] "If permitting predicates are not mutually extremely accomplished" etc. below is the second fault. If following Zhou's interpretation cited in Collected Records, to express the second fault of "if permitting predicates" etc., "there are still other faults" below is the second fault. Now following Bright Lamp Commentary's meaning, regarding the essence of "there are still other faults," that commentary says: The commentary's later text says: Question "Since saying extremely accomplished... Answer: Predicates are definitely established, and within subjects there are self-non-accomplishment, other-non-accomplishment, mutual-non-accomplishment, mutual-non-non-accomplishment. Thus extensively having over twenty sentences, explaining faults of predicate-subject non-accomplishment. Now pointing to those faults, therefore saying 'there are still other faults.'" Tang Previous Record says: "There are still other faults" means mutual complete partial complete [考note: perhaps "complete two," "character perhaps superfluous"] mutual partial complete etc. faults. As below, should be known. [Above etc.]
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This commentary is not the interpretation cited in Collected Records, violating the commentary's intention [etc.].
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"Dissimilar example partial or universal occurrence fault." First, dissimilar example partial: Mahāyāna establishing cognition against Sarvāstivāda could say: True ālaya-vijñāna must definitely be the eighth. Because of karmic results. Similar examples lacking. Dissimilar examples are the other seven consciousnesses. The cause "because of karmic results" occurs in this dissimilar class, occurring in six consciousnesses but not occurring in the seventh. Therefore called "partial." Next, dissimilar example universal occurrence: The previous cognition requires the cause "because of consciousness nature." Dissimilar examples of seven consciousnesses all have consciousness nature, therefore called "universal occurrence." The form of that fault is roughly like this. This is predicate non-accomplishment, cognition lacking similar examples, the fault of dissimilar example partial or complete.
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"Buddhabhūmi-śāstra says that hetuvidyā treatise's dharma individual characteristics" etc. - citing proof that essence is called self-nature, meaning is called differentiation?
"These two types do not definitely belong to one category." These two types of self-nature-differentiation are indefinite, belonging to separate categories of essence-meaning as follows. Or possibly meaning is self-nature while essence is differentiation [meaning]. Since self-nature-differentiation are already thus, names of other dharma-dharmin, subject-predicate can be known by analogy. Also maintaining not definitely belonging to one category.
Another version says: "These two's three types" [etc.]. This version's "these two" refers to essence-meaning two. "Three types" means three names each. This is what now saying "not definitely belonging to one category" is to show not being the same as abhidharma's definite self-characteristics-universal-characteristics essence-meaning. That is, the next text saying "not the same as Mahāyāna [...] not separate from conceptual cognition and words" describes Mahāyāna abhidharma's self-characteristics-universal-characteristics as layered, saying today's hetuvidyā self-characteristics etc. are not the same as this.
"Hetucakra says 'observing what is accomplished'" etc. This Hetucakra text's meaning is: within what is established, establishing dharma-dharmin. These dharma-dharmin names mutually connect. Not like outsiders' quality (quality-category) and qualified (substance-category), whose names definitely do not mutually connect [meaning]. When discussing actual principle, both premise and conclusion possess two meanings - this cites supporting text.
"Fourth, there is existence." Within mutual-non partial subject non-accomplishment, there are "is" and "non." "Is" means even partial is not non-accomplished, complete extremely accomplished. "Non" means not non-partial non-accomplished.