英語訳
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 7
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[Upper Section]
sentences. In total, combined there are twenty-seven sentences. "Because by this inconclusive all combined total twenty-seven" - this is it.
"Initially, the pervading subject-predicate generally forms three sentences": The upper volume says: There are subject-predicates that are not pervading. There are those that are pervading and also subject-predicates. There are those that are neither pervading nor subject-predicates. There are definitely no sentences that are pervading but not subject-predicates [so forth]. The present three sentences are these. The four inconclusives are faults of the first characteristic, so regarding the three sentences of the first characteristic, we intend to explain them.
First, "subject-predicate but not pervading [through] combined encompasses twelve sentences": The number of partial sentences contained in the four inconclusives is twelve. Both-common inconclusive has two sentences: substantial partial both-common, no-essence partial both-common. Either-one inconclusive has four sentences: substantial other partial either-one, substantial self partial either-one, no-essence other partial either-one, no-essence self partial either-one. Hesitant inconclusive has three sentences: both-common partial hesitant, other-one partial hesitant, self-one partial hesitant. Subject-dependent inconclusive has three sentences: substantial partial both-common subject-dependent, substantial other partial either-one subject-dependent, substantial self partial either-one subject-dependent. Two, four, three, three - combined twelve sentences. When the upper volume says "the twelve partial inconclusives are all like the explanation below," it points to this. Regarding not making no-essence partial sentences in subject-dependent inconclusive, the reason is as above.
"Neither pervading nor subject-predicate [through] combined encompasses fifteen sentences": The number of complete sentences contained in the four inconclusives is fifteen. Both-common inconclusive has two sentences: substantial complete both-common, no-essence complete both-common. Either-one inconclusive has four sentences: substantial other either-one, substantial
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self either-one, no-essence other either-one, no-essence self either-one. Hesitant inconclusive has three sentences: both-common complete hesitant, other-one complete hesitant, self-one complete hesitant. Subject-dependent inconclusive has six sentences: substantial complete both-common subject-dependent, no-essence complete both-common subject-dependent, substantial other either-one subject-dependent, substantial self either-one subject-dependent, no-essence other either-one subject-dependent, no-essence self either-one subject-dependent. Two, four, three, six - combined fifteen sentences. When the upper volume says "the fifteen complete inconclusives are also like the explanation below," it points to this. The reason for not distinguishing substantial and no-essence in hesitant inconclusive is as the commentary states: because it is necessarily substantial. Although saying "initially the pervading subject-predicate generally forms three sentences," we only explain two sentences among them. The sentence "pervading and subject-predicate" is not a fault. Now we explain the faults of the first characteristic.
"In reality this reason also has four inconclusives as appropriate beyond homologous and heterologous [through] however, naming indefinite and naming contradictory do not name inconclusive": Inquiring: The above and below texts seem contradictory - how so? Answer: Although in reality reasons beyond homologous and heterologous could appropriately also be called the four inconclusives, however they are named indefinite and named contradictory, not named inconclusive [so to speak]. Where is there contradiction?
Regarding "like being the measurable nature of jars, etc." below
"Therefore this and the non-common two indefinites differ" etc.: Inquiring: Taking the reason "because of measurable nature" and placing distinctions to escape faults as the reason - the significance of the text about the difference between common indefinite and non-common indefinite appearing - what is its meaning? Based on what does it have this difference? Answer: The
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 7
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[Upper Section]
When not placing distinctions in the measurable nature reason, it is common indefinite. When placing the distinctions of ear, mind, mental factors and opposing Vaiśeṣika, there is no fault. Because sound-nature is taken as the homologous example. Because Vaiśeṣika also establishes sound-nature. It does not operate in heterologous cases. Therefore placing this distinction, when opposing non-Vaiśeṣika others, it becomes non-common indefinite. Because it does not operate in heterologous cases. Because there are no homologous examples. Because besides sound-nature there are no homologous examples. Because others all do not establish sound-nature. The principle is like this. However, the present text places the distinctions of ear, mind, mental factors, and when opposing others, it becomes non-common indefinite. Therefore secretly maintaining this purport, by raising the reason of placing distinctions, it is the difference between the two indefinites of common and non-common. That one is absent in all categories; this one is commonly possessed by both. According to this meaning, should we attach the character "therefore" above and say "then there is no fault"? Should "this and non-common" below be this text? If attaching the character "therefore" below, when opposing Vaiśeṣika to escape faults, it seems to immediately become non-common indefinite. This should be considered.
"However, logical inferences briefly have three types [through] in other-inferences briefly there are three commons" etc.: In the three logical inferences of self, other, and common, each has faults of self, other, and common. Generally, that there are self, other, and common in other-inferences: although the inference is other-inference, attaching faults using dharmas accepted by the proponent is called self-fault, attaching faults using dharmas accepted by the opponent is called other-fault, attaching faults using mutually accepted dharmas is called common fault. It is like this. Therefore in other-inference there are also self, other, and common. That self-inference and common-inference each have three matters should also be understood analogously. However, now regarding common indefinite, generally
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in other-inference, there are three common indefinites: self common indefinite, common common indefinite. The "common" of self-other-common is the meaning of what proponent and opponent share. The "common" of common indefinite is the meaning of being common to two examples. That the remaining self-inference and common-inference each have three common indefinites should also be analogized. Therefore combined there are nine common indefinites.
"Now this raises three [through] first other-common, second self-common, third common-common": These are the other-common indefinite in other-inference, the self-common indefinite in self-inference, and the common common indefinite in common-inference. In the next lower text producing the method, this purport is clear. Although in the three inferences each has three common indefinites, fearing complexity, we raise one of each. The "other" in other, the "self" in self, the "common" in common - each is what serves as the basis. Therefore among the nine, we generally raise these three. What the present treatise correctly raises is the common common indefinite of common-inference.
"This audible nature - what is it like?" below
"Question ○ The thesis already conforms to the prior" etc.: Because there is no sequential establishment of homologous examples, even though raising the reason, the thesis is not further established. Therefore the present thesis is like the prior time when no reason was raised. ["Conforming to prior" means this.] It is the time when the thesis has not yet been established. By what does the reason obtain the name indefinite? [So to speak] The meaning is that like common indefinite, only after establishing the thesis can there be indefiniteness, and only then should it be called indefinite - maintaining this, the question is asked like this.
"According to this intentional dharma, there is definite contradiction": The Collected Records say: Xian says: That is, in the prior Nyāyamukha treatise's inference it says: The audible reason is not included in indefinite. Because the heterologous of the thesis is absent. The reason now with this dharma