英語訳
[Right Page]
404
Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 7
56
[Upper Section]
There is definite contradiction with the thesis. That is, the next inference below says: "The audible-nature reason is an indefinite reason, etc." This is a definite contradictory inference [so forth].
"The accepted quality-inclusion reason is called other non-common because it exists in neither homologous nor heterologous cases": Inquiring: Above, raising the method, it says: "That real is not real. Because it depends on qualities [so forth]." When it comes to showing the fault-characteristics, why is the reason changed to say "quality-inclusion"? Moreover, considering the principle, how could there be quality-sentence inclusion meaning above the real-sentence? Even though it becomes quality-dependent, it is not included in quality-sentences. Answer: A certain text says: "Because it depends on accepted qualities [so forth]."
The purport of the present inquiry is necessarily reasonable. Therefore we should rely on this text. The text with "accepted quality-inclusion reason" has the greatest doubt.
Regarding "Therefore, as before, it also becomes indefinite" below
"Like the previously explained Master Śeṅgjun, etc.": Inquiring: Is the different-partial same-complete indefinite of Śeṅgjun's inference a self different-partial same-complete, or a common different-partial same-complete? Answer: Should it be included in common different-partial same-complete? This should be considered.
Regarding "Operating in one part of both categories, etc." below
"Because of non-obstruction, space-element serves as ear-faculty, etc.": Vaiśeṣika does not separately establish the five faculties. The space-element among real-sentences immediately becomes the ear-faculty. This is based on sound having no obstruction, making space-element the ear-faculty. Perhaps because the non-obstruction of space can well hear non-obstructed sound.
[Lower Section]
Regarding "Therefore this reason, with pleasure, with space, etc." below
"Or among them, those that exist in both parts are not only this one, etc.": This is the second explanation of the text "If among them both parts exist, etc." from the Nyāyamukha treatise. The first explanation only related to the both-categories one-part operating indefinite and finished explaining it. Now the second explanation means this text also includes the remaining indefinites [so to speak]. That is, "If among them [through] it is also a definite reason" refers to the indefinites excluding non-common. The meaning is that this text calls the two categories of homologous and heterologous "both parts." It is not one part of the two categories. Since it now definitely operates in these two categories, it says "it is also a definite reason" [so to speak]. "Because of distinguishing the remainder, this is called differentiation" refers to non-common indefinite. This does not operate in the two categories and has no definite meaning. It differs from the other indefinites. Therefore it says "because of distinguishing the remainder, this is called indefinite" [so to speak]. However, whether contradictory-definite is included in the present Nyāyamukha text is unknown. According to the earlier commentary, when it says "if making the later explanation, it includes all indefinites," should it also include contradictory-definite?
Inquiring: The commentary only says "not only this one - third, fourth, fifth." Does it not appear that the first, second, and sixth are included in this text? Answer: That it includes all six indefinites is clear from the text "includes all indefinites." However, the inquiring text first標 regarding the scope of "both parts exist," so it does not raise the second non-common. Because non-common relates to the lower sentence [the sentence "because of distinguishing the remainder," etc.]. Also, the first common is necessary, so it is temporarily set aside. It is not that it is not included. Also, the sixth contradictory-definite should perhaps relate to the sentence "because of distinguishing the remainder." This should be considered.
[Left Page]
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 7
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[Upper Section]
Regarding "Contradictory-definite" below
"Achieving contradictory thesis [through] this is possessive interpretation": The Bright Lamp Commentary says: ○ "Produced" and "audible" possess the three-characteristic reason, each definitely achieving the contradictory thesis of permanent and impermanent. This is called contradictory-definite. Contradiction belongs to the thesis, definite belongs to the reason. "Definite of contradiction" is the sixth case. "Definitely causing contradiction" is the third case. Both are possessive interpretations. The two cases of sixth and third - what is their characteristic? ○ Third is instrumental case. ○ Sixth is genitive case. ○ Like a tree belonging to an official is "the official's tree." Contradiction belonging to the thesis is "definite of contradiction." Therefore it is possessive interpretation.
Making a tree fall by cutting it immediately depends on person and axe, therefore called "instrumental case." Making the thesis contradictory immediately depends on the power of the reason. Definitely causing contradiction is possessive interpretation [so forth].
Inquiring: What is the meaning of the commentary's "achieving contradictory thesis"? Answer: Like the interpretation of the Bright Lamp Commentary, achieving the contradictory thesis of permanent and impermanent [so forth]. The meaning of this interpretation should be considered.
"The two-eight sentence reasons constitute reasons [through] like other correct reasons": Inquiring: Does this inference not regard homologous examples? How could the various correct reasons go beyond the eight-two sentences? Yet raising two-eight as the subject-predicate, saying "besides this, like other correct reasons" - what is their essence? Answer: Actually it does not regard seven, but the two-eight sentences are established in the nine-sentence method in opposition to the four-six sentences. Their essence is precisely the two reasons of "produced" and "effort." Therefore, besides this, should the remaining correct inference reasons not included in the nine-sentence method be taken as homologous examples? Although they ultimately should not go beyond the eight-two sentences, what they regard is separate
[Lower Section]
This should be considered.
Regarding "These two are both hesitant reasons, etc." below
"Ancient assertions exist [through] later-subsequent becomes superior": This is Master Wengui's assertion. It is the inclusion of the slow. Taking holding go-stones as analogy. Among the two reasons of contradictory-definite, he asserts the later inference as superior.
"If so, although sound, etc.": The commentary master challenges Wengui.
"He explains this reason, etc.": This states the correct doctrine. The commentary master's intention is first to rely on Nyāyamukha, using the power of manifest teaching to make Vaiśeṣika superior, not Wengui's analogy of slow go-playing.
"Now this and that are contradictory in sequence, etc.": The Bright Lamp Commentary says: This Nyāyapraveśa first raises Vaiśeṣika, then raises sound-theory. That Nyāyamukha first raises sound-theory, then raises Vaiśeṣika, etc. [so forth].
"Manifest means worldly [through] taking their explained teaching": Explaining "manifest teaching" has three approaches. "Manifest means worldly, etc.": The word "manifest" belongs to worldly direct knowledge, "teaching" belongs to Buddhist teaching. "Manifest" and "teaching" are called "manifest teaching" [so to speak].
"Also Śākyamuni Buddha, etc.": The two words "manifest teaching" both belong to Buddhist teaching. Because it is teaching of direct perception and verification, "manifest teaching" is called "manifest teaching" [so to speak]. "Also various non-Buddhists, etc.": The two words "manifest teaching" both belong to the world. Because it is currently worldly trustworthy teaching, also "manifest teaching" is called "manifest teaching" [so to speak].
"They also have sound-superior two meanings, etc.": In Nyāyamukha, sound-theory comes first, Vaiśeṣika comes later. Yet relying on the power of manifest teaching, Vaiśeṣika becomes superior. However, they generally regarding the sound-superior