英語訳
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 8
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"One-sided non-establishment [through] like action (karma). The Buddhist teaching does not permit this, etc.": In the homologous example "like action" in this inference established by the Vaiśeṣika school, this corresponds to provisional action in front of Buddhist teaching. This is because the Vaiśeṣika school does not establish real mental action. Since provisional action is material dharma, it has obstruction. Therefore, the opponent Buddhist teaching does not permit that the reason "non-obstruction" exists upon the action in the homologous example. Hence it becomes one-sided probans non-establishment. If it were real action, since this is mental activity, it would also be non-obstructed in front of Buddhist teaching.
"Hesitant non-establishment [through] or both are not hesitant": These four sentences create four alternatives by contrasting reason's hesitant non-establishment with example's probans non-establishment. This follows from the previously explained reason's hesitant non-establishment, where thesis hesitation and reason hesitation were distinguished in detail. Following this precedent, now explaining example hesitant non-establishment, again distinguishing in detail reason's hesitant non-establishment and example hesitant non-establishment. However, since this text explains probans non-establishment, within examples it takes the hesitation of probans non-establishment and contrasts it with reason's hesitation to distinguish four sentences. That is, speaking in full: either reason's hesitant non-establishment but not example's probans hesitant non-establishment, or example's probans hesitant non-establishment but not reason's hesitant non-establishment [the latter two sentences are easy to understand]. Therefore, among these four sentences, the first three are faults, the fourth is not a fault. Among the first three, the second and third are precisely the current hesitant probans non-establishment. The first is merely reason without example's probans non-establishment. Since they contrast to exhaust the sentence patterns, although it is not the current fault, the first sentence is mentioned. This is like mentioning the fourth sentence which is entirely not a fault. One should understand by analogy.
"Provisionally, reason is hesitant but not example probans
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establishment [through] like places such as kitchens": This provisionally presents the method of the first sentence. Looking at this inference, the reason has hesitant non-establishment, while the example lacks hesitant probans non-establishment. This is because smoke at mountain places originally involves doubt, so when directing the reason upward to the subject-predicate and looking down, the reason has hesitant non-establishment. Smoke at kitchens originally involves no doubt, so when directing the reason downward to the homologous example and looking up, the example lacks hesitant establishment non-establishment. Therefore this inference is taken as the method of the first sentence.
"Raising one to exemplify the rest, one should immediately contemplate": By raising one method of the first sentence, one should contemplate the methods of the remaining three sentences by analogy [so to speak]. Now provisionally contemplating the method of the second sentence: A certain person arrives at one mountain place, observes and sees it is smoke with no further doubt about mist, etc. At other mountain places, there is still doubt about smoke, mist, etc. This person establishes an inference saying: "That one mountain place definitely should have fire. Because there is smoke. Like other mountain places." In this inference, the example also has hesitant probans non-establishment, while the reason lacks hesitant non-establishment. The methods of the latter two sentences are easy to understand by analogy.
"Or the reason is a thesis-property [through] how does it constitute hesitation? Another explanation: the reason possesses the three characteristics [through] how is it not hesitant?": This generally discusses the presence or absence of example hesitation, having two explanations. It does not relate to the above four-sentence framework. The first explanation's intention is that it is generally difficult for examples to have hesitation [so to speak]. Therefore, according to this explanation, examples only have three non-establishments, and hesitant non-establishment should not exist. The latter explanation's meaning is: why would there be no example hesitant non-establishment? [so to speak]. According to this explanation, all four non-establishments should exist.
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 8
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Question: The above four sentences are precisely explanations that permit example hesitant non-establishment. If not so, there could not be four sentences. But now the latter explanation also states this meaning. What difference is there from the former?
Answer: Not blocking the former and latter, that their intention is the same. But now their difference is that formerly it made one contemplate and analogize regarding the four sentences. Now it does not enter the four sentences but discusses generally, so it is different [this matter is not clear]. Therefore there are three explanations in total. The four-sentence text, "or the reason is," and "another explanation: the reason possesses" - these are it.
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The above back-writing, etc. has this general meaning.
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I say: "Or the reason is, etc." explains establishing the inference "because of present smoke, like kitchens, etc." as the method of the first sentence. Though its meaning is not different from the above, placing the word "or" is to contrast with the "another explanation" below. "Another explanation: the reason possesses three characteristics, etc." is a separate explanation. Now in this example "like kitchens, etc." there should be hesitant probans non-establishment. The example is precisely the reason. Since the reason already has hesitation, the homologous example should also have it [so to speak]. Therefore, according to this explanation's intention, using this current inference, one probably should not consider it as the method of the first sentence. It corresponds to the method of the third sentence of mutual hesitation. Also, therefore "or possibly [through] another explanation" - regarding the currently presented inference "because of present smoke, like kitchens, etc.," there are two explanations: either calling it the first sentence method, or saying it is not so. Generally, there probably are no explanations that do not permit example hesitant non-establishment.
"However there is a theory [through] now I consider this incorrect, etc.": This theory holds that in probans non-establishment methods, the thesis-predicate is necessarily established. The example should use this thesis-predicate as its basis. Since the basis already
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exists, there cannot be example basis non-establishment. Therefore probans non-establishment definitely cannot carry basis non-establishment. Now in the probans non-establishment method "sound is permanent, because it lacks obstruction, like atoms," the thesis-predicate is definitely established [so to speak] [Using the refuting position to challenge the refuted meaning is like this]. Now the intention of refuting this says: What is the essence of what you call the thesis-predicate that serves as the example's basis? Is it the permanent thesis-predicate of the thesis's predicate? Or is it taking the permanence upon the atoms of the homologous example as the thesis-predicate? If the homologous example uses the thesis's thesis-predicate as its basis, then thinking by analogy, the reason should also use the thesis's predicate as its basis. Since reason and example have similar meanings. Since that is already not so, the example also cannot serve as the essence. If the homologous example uses the permanent thesis-predicate upon the homologous example as its basis, then that permanent meaning is precisely the example's essence. It is not the example's basis. The example's basis is atoms. Therefore, using the thesis-predicate as the example's basis is most improper [so to speak].
"Even if there were a thesis-predicate, etc.": Regarding the inference that uses the thesis's thesis-predicate as the basis, still adding difficulty. The difficulty's meaning says: If probans non-establishment methods have the thesis-predicate's predicate, and therefore examples necessarily have a basis, then there would be no thesis-predicate non-establishment, only probans non-establishment. But there should be inferences where the thesis-predicate's predicate has the fault of non-extreme-establishment. That probans non-establishment already lacks the thesis-predicate's basis. How would one not establish basis non-establishment probans non-establishment? [so to speak].
"Even if it depends on both subject-predicate and predicate, etc.": Making a counter-rescue to challenge what is above the rescue. The rescue's intention is: when I say using the thesis-predicate as the example's basis, I mean using the general thesis's thesis-predicate of dharma and subject-predicate as the example's basis [so to speak]. The challenge's intention is: if so, having probans non-establishment,
[Note at bottom: In the 28th line, 12th character, there is a "." above "moreover" in the center. Possibly a typographical error.]