翻刻
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
四一〇【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
因明大疏私抄卷第八
【枠外右横下】
六二
【二段構成】
【上段】
而宗￣ニ犯＿二俱不極成￣ニ＿一之量￣ニ豈無＿二此￣ノ所依不成￣ノ能立不
成＿一乎《割書：爲言》。 若言卽依因者。又轉救也。以＿レ因爲＿二喩所依＿一
《割書：爲言》。 如闕宗因等者難也。若爾因不＿レ成之量￣ニ可＿レ有＿二此
過＿一《割書：爲言》。是卽自義￣ニ 難￣シ入￣レ了。上￣ニ疏主￣ノ正義￣トシテハ專￣ラ因￣ヲ
喩之依￣ト爲￣スルニ付￣テ出＿二￣テ作法￣ヲ＿一擧＿二第四過＿一了故也。文￣ニ云＿二
如闕宗因＿一者。宗之因云事歟。又文￣ニ云＿二喩上所立無常《割書：乃至》
依極微故＿一者。不＿レ言也。極微￣ハ常￣ノ同喩也。何云＿二無常＿一哉。
又此￣ハ付＿二￣テ論所陳￣ノ能立不成￣ノ作法￣ノ聲常￣ノ量＿一。難＿レ之
《割書：見タリ》。尤有＿二由來＿一故。若如＿レ文無常￣ナラハ者。付＿二￣テ聲無常￣ノ
量￣ニ＿一難￣セム＿レ之事。有＿二何由來＿一哉。有＿二此疑＿一故。披＿二明燈抄＿一。皆
云￣テ＿レ常￣ト不＿レ云＿二無常￣トハ＿一。仍准＿二彼抄＿一。付＿二￣テ常￣ノ本＿一料＿二-蕳【簡のたけかんむりが、くさかんむりに変っている】之＿一了。
若是或本不同歟。可＿レ尋＿レ之。
【一字下げ】
此事愚鈍之性。當座評定。如＿レ聾如＿レ盲未文所釋朦朦
之間。纔探＿二文相之微旨＿一。定違＿二明燈抄等＿一歟。追可＿二重
定＿一レ 之。
【字下げ終わり】
問。前喩上能立《割書：乃至》能立依何者。先￣ハ喩之上￣ノ常￣ト無礙￣トヲ
名＿二￣クルナリ喩上￣ノ能立￣ト＿一。此問意云。若極微￣ノ喩上￣ノ常￣ノ能
【下段】
立￣ハ以＿二￣テ所立常宗￣ヲ＿一者。不＿レ爲＿二所依￣ト＿一云￣イハヽ者。此常￣ノ能
立￣ハ以￣テカ＿レ何爲＿二所依＿一￣ト《割書：爲言》。極微￣ノ上￣ニハ本無＿二因￣ノ無質￣ノ能
立＿一故。約＿二￣テ常￣ノ能立￣ニ＿一問＿レ之歟。 答。二解《割書：乃至》因無無依￣ト
者。二解￣ト者。一￣ハ喩￣ハ以＿レ因爲＿二所依￣ト＿一。二￣ハ喩￣ハ以＿二喩依＿一爲＿二
所依＿一。是其二解也。凡於＿二喩之依＿一有＿レ 二。一所助依是因也。
二￣ハ自體依是喩依也。汎爾￣ニ喩￣ニ具＿二此二￣ノ依＿一事￣ハ必然也。
二俱￣ニ必可＿二具足＿一也。而￣ヲ今二釋￣ト者。今所￣ノ＿レ諍喩￣ノ所依
者。約＿二所助依￣ニ＿一論《割書：スト云》＿レ之歟。《割書：是一》。約＿二自體依＿一論《割書：スト云》＿レ之釋
《割書：是一》也。今文先擧＿二初釋＿一。初釋￣ノ心￣ハ極微￣ノ同喩須＿三無礙￣ノ因￣ヲ
爲＿二所體￣ト＿一。而無礙￣ノ因￣イ有礙￣ノ極微￣ノ上￣ニ無故。此喩旣無＿二
所依＿一。旣成￣ヌルカ＿レ無＿二￣キニ所依＿一故。依＿レ爲＿二能立不成￣ノ所依不
成￣ト＿一也《割書：爲言》。依＿二此義￣ニ＿一者。一切￣ノ能立不成￣ニハ皆可＿レ有＿二所
依不成之義＿一也。
【一字下げ】
尋云。上￣ニ 明＿二￣スニ能立不成￣ノ所體不成￣ヲ＿一。約＿二￣シテ依￣トスル＿レ因
之義＿一。全￣ク以＿二汎爾￣ノ能立不成￣ヲ＿一。不＿三卽爲＿二所依不成￣トハ＿一。
出＿二￣シテ別￣ノ作法￣ヲ＿一。顯＿二此過￣ヲ＿一。所謂數論對＿二佛法＿一。立＿三思￣ハ
受＿二-用諸法￣ヲ＿一。以＿二是神我＿一故。如＿二眼等根＿一。是其作法也。此
【左頁】
【枠外左上】
四一一【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
因明大疏私抄卷第八
【枠外左横下】
六三
【二段構成】
【上段】
乃喩有＿二￣テ能立不成＿一。而因￣ニ有＿二隨一不成＿一故。所助依￣ノ體
不￣ヲハ＿レ成。爲＿二能立不成￣ノ所依不成￣ト＿一也。其義最可＿レ然。而
今所＿レ成￣ト與＿二此趣＿一別也。疏￣ノ上下豈致＿二￣サム相違＿一乎。無質
礙￣ノ所依有＿二何￣ノ不定＿一哉。所以可＿レ謂今文￣モ如＿レ 上。因無
無依￣ト者。因￣ノ體不＿二極成＿一故。《割書：隨一。或兩俱｜等可＿レ隨＿レ應。》無＿二喩￣ノ所依＿一云
也。
答。今所＿レ成者。裏書之趣也。所難之趣。又似＿レ有＿二其謂＿一。
但倩案＿レ之。裏書之意趣尤深遠也。何者。於＿二今此二解＿一。
初解聊似￣タリ＿レ違￣スルニ＿レ論￣ニ。所謂凡能立不成￣ト者。但是喩￣ノ
過也。無礙因。極微￣ノ同喩。是其作法也。此乃無礙￣ノ因￣ハ
全￣ク無＿二￣クレトモ不成￣ノ過＿一。極微之處￣ニ無礙￣ノ能立￣ノ義闕故爲＿レ
過。但是喩￣ノ處￣ノミ蒙＿レ過￣ヲ也。所以設雖＿レ開＿二 四不成＿一。不＿レ
可＿レ出＿二此分齊￣ヲハ＿一。而何至￣テ＿レ作＿二￣クルニ所依不成￣ヲ＿一。寄＿二￣テ事於
因￣ノ不成＿一。不＿レ限＿二喩￣ノ一處￣ニ＿一乎。今有＿二此疑＿一故。裏事￣ハ煩￣ク
初￣ノ解得￣ノ＿レ意。欲＿レ合￣セムト＿レ論￣ニ也。所謂初解之意。因￣ニ有＿二￣ル
不成＿一能立不成￣ヲ爲＿二喩￣ノ所依不成￣ノ能立不成￣ト＿一事￣ハ地
體也。上￣ニ出＿二是神我故￣ノ之量＿一。下￣ニ致＿二重重￣ノ問答￣ヲ＿一。皆
【下段】
此類也。而因￣ニ無￣キ＿二不成＿一能立不成￣ヲ卽爲＿二￣スル所依不成￣ノ
能立不成￣ト＿一事。定又不＿レ許＿レ之。論所陳之分齊。但於＿二喩
一處￣ニ＿一論＿レ過￣ヲ。付＿二￣テ此分齊￣ニ＿一。四不成￣ヲ作￣クリ已￣ツル之分。
決定可＿レ有故也。仍今￣ノ以依因故無無體￣ト者。無礙￣ノ因
喩上無￣キヲ卽爲＿二所依不成￣ト＿一云也《割書：爲言》。
【字下げ終わり】
問。若因無依《割書：乃至》卽是喩中所依不成￣ト者。問意云。若因□【□：＿レの誤植？】
無＿二所依＿一之時￣ニハ喩￣ノ中￣ニ有＿二何過￣カ＿一哉《割書：爲言》。是￣ハ欲＿下問顯＿中￣サムト
上￣ニ所￣ノ＿レ出因￣ニ有＿二￣テ不成＿一而成＿二￣ナル喩￣ノ能立不成￣ノ所依不
成￣ト＿一之類￣ヲ＿上 也。 答￣ノ意。因若無￣ケレハ＿レ依。因￣ニ有＿二不成過＿一。因￣ニ
有＿二￣レハ不成￣ノ過＿一。喩￣ノ中￣ニハ有＿二所依不成＿一也《割書：爲言》。仍初解意。
於＿二喩￣ノ能立不成￣ノ所依不成＿一。有＿二 二類＿一也。一￣ハ能立不成￣ヲ
卽爲＿二所依不成￣トモ＿一。一￣ハ因￣ニ有＿二不成＿一故。成＿二所依不成＿一。初
重￣ノ問答￣ハ顯＿二初￣ノ類￣ヲ＿一。今￣ノ問答￣ハ顯＿二後類＿一也。 因體非有￣ト
者。因體不成《割書：爲言》。 問若言因無依等者。付＿二 上￣ノ後類￣ニ＿一問
也。 意云。前言無＿二￣ケレハ所依￣ノ宗＿一。因￣ニ有＿二不成＿一。因￣ニ有＿二￣レハ不
成＿一。喩￣ニ無＿二所依＿一者。宗￣ノミ無￣クシテ因喩有￣ルカ等￣ヲ諸缺減￣ノ過。
豈有＿レ之哉。今如＿レ成者。宗若無￣クハ因喩必隨￣テ不＿レ可＿レ有故。
現代語訳
【右頁】
410
因明大疏私抄巻第八
62
【上段】
而して宗に俱不極成を犯す量に豈にこの所依不成の能立不成が無からんや【為言】。「若し即ち因に依すと言わば」とは、また転救である。因を以て喩の所依と為す【為言】。「宗因を闕くが如し等」とは難である。若し爾らば因不成の量にこの過があるべし【為言】。これは即ち自義に難が入り了った。上に疏主の正義として専ら因を喩の依と為すについて作法を出し、第四の過を挙げ了ったからである。文に「宗因を闕くが如し」と云うのは、宗の因ということか。また文に「喩上の所立は無常【乃至】極微に依るが故に」と云うのは、不言である。極微は常の同喩である。何ぞ無常と云うや。またこれは論所陳の能立不成の作法の声常の量について、これを難ずると見たり。尤も由来があるが故に。若し文の如く無常ならば、声無常の量について之を難ずることに、何の由来があるや。この疑いがあるが故に、明燈抄を披く。皆常と云って無常とは云わない。仍って彼の抄に准えて、常の本について料簡し了った。若しこれは或る本の不同か。これを尋ねるべし。
【一字下げ】
この事は愚鈍の性で、当座の評定として、聾の如く盲の如く未だ文の釈すところ朦朧の間で、僅かに文相の微旨を探る。定んで明燈抄等に違うか。追って重ねて定むべし。
【字下げ終わり】
「問う。前に喩上の能立【乃至】能立は何に依するか」とは、先は喩の上の常と無礙とを喩上の能立と名付ける。この問いの意に云う。若し極微の喩上の常の能
【下段】
立は所立常宗を以てしても所依と為さずと云わば、この常の能立は何を以て所依と為すか【為言】。極微の上には本より因の無質の能立が無いが故に。常の能立について問うのか。
「答う。二解【乃至】因無くして依無し」とは、二解とは、一は喩は因を以て所依と為す。二は喩は喩依を以て所依と為す。これがその二解である。凡そ喩の依について二つがある。一は所助依でこれは因である。二は自体依でこれは喩依である。汎爾に喩にこの二つの依を具することは必然である。二つとも必ず具足すべきである。而して今の二釈とは、今争う所の喩の所依は、所助依について論ずるか【これは一つ】、自体依について論ずる釈か【これは一つ】である。今の文は先ず初釈を挙げる。初釈の心は極微の同喩は須く無礙の因を所体と為すべし。而して無礙の因が有礙の極微の上に無いが故に、この喩は既に所依が無い。既に所依が無きに成るが故に、能立不成の所依不成と為すのである【為言】。この義に依れば、一切の能立不成には皆所依不成の義があるべきである。
【一字下げ】
尋ね云う。上に能立不成の所体不成を明かすに、因に依することの義について、全く汎爾の能立不成を以て、即ち所依不成とはせず、別の作法を出し、この過を顕す。所謂数論が仏法に対し、「思は諸法を受用す。是れ神我なるが故に。眼等の根の如し」と立つ。これがその作法である。この
【左頁】
411
因明大疏私抄巻第八
63
【上段】
乃ち喩に能立不成があって、而して因に随一不成があるが故に、所助依の体が成らず、能立不成の所依不成と為すのである。その義は最も然るべし。而して今成すところは此の趣と別である。疏の上下豈に相違を致さんや。無質礙の所依に何の不定があるや。所以に今の文も上の如く謂うべし。「因無くして依無し」とは、因の体が極成せざるが故に【随一、或いは両俱等応に随うべし】、喩の所依が無いと云うのである。
答う。今成すところは、裏書の趣である。難ずるところの趣も、またその謂れがあるようである。ただ倩に案ずれば、裏書の意趣は尤も深遠である。何となれば、今此の二解について、初解は聊か論に違するに似たり。所謂凡そ能立不成とは、ただこれ喩の過である。無礙の因、極微の同喩、これがその作法である。これは乃ち無礙の因は全く不成の過が無けれども、極微の処に無礙の能立の義が闕けるが故に過と為す。ただこれ喩の処のみが過を蒙るのである。所以に設い四不成を開くといえども、この分斉を出すべからず。而して何ぞ所依不成を作くるに至って、事を因の不成に寄せて、喩の一処に限らざるや。今この疑いがあるが故に、裏事は煩く初の解得の意を、論に合せんと欲するのである。所謂初解の意は、因に不成があって能立不成を喩の所依不成の能立不成と為すことは地体である。上に「是れ神我なるが故に」の量を出し、下に重重の問答を致す。皆
【下段】
この類である。而して因に不成が無くて能立不成を即ち所依不成の能立不成と為すことは、定んでまたこれを許さない。論所陳の分斉は、ただ喩の一処において過を論ず。この分斉について、四不成を作り已つる分は、決定してあるべきが故である。仍って今の「依因するが故に無体無し」とは、無礙の因が喩上に無きを即ち所依不成と為すと云うのである【為言】。
【字下げ終わり】
「問う。若し因依無くば【乃至】即ちこれ喩中の所依不成」とは、問いの意に云う。若し因に所依が無い時には喩の中に何の過があるか【为言】。これは上に出すところの因に不成があって喩の能立不成の所依不成と成る類を問い顕さんと欲するのである。答えの意は、因若し依が無ければ、因に不成の過がある。因に不成の過があれば、喩の中には所依不成がある【为言】。仍って初解の意では、喩の能立不成の所依不成について、二類がある。一は能立不成を即ち所依不成と為すもの。一は因に不成があるが故に、所依不成と成るもの。初重の問答は初の類を顕し、今の問答は後の類を顕すのである。
「因体非有」とは、因体不成【为言】。
「問う。若し因依無しと言わば等」とは、上の後類について問うのである。意に云う。前に所依の宗が無ければ、因に不成があり、因に不成があれば、喩に所依が無いと言う。宗のみ無くして因喩があるなど、諸々の欠減の過が、豈にこれがあるや。今成すが如くならば、宗若し無くば因喩必ず随って有るべからざるが故に。
英語訳
[Right Page]
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 8
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[Upper Section]
And in inferences that violate mutual non-extreme-establishment in the thesis, how could there not be this basis non-establishment probans non-establishment? [so to speak]. "If one says it depends on the reason" is another counter-rescue. Using the reason as the basis for the example [so to speak]. "Like lacking thesis and reason, etc." is a challenge. If so, there should be this fault in reason non-establishment inferences [so to speak]. This means the challenge has entered one's own position. This is because above, as the commentary master's correct position, he specifically made the reason the basis of the example, presented methods, and raised the fourth fault. In the text saying "like lacking thesis and reason," does this mean the reason of the thesis? Also, the text saying "the thesis-predicate on the example is impermanent [through] because it depends on atoms" is unclear. Atoms are homologous examples of permanence. Why call it impermanent? Also, this appears to challenge the inference of sound's permanence in the probans non-establishment method stated in the treatise. This has good reason. If it were impermanent as the text suggests, what reason would there be to challenge the inference of sound's impermanence? Having this doubt, I consulted the Myōtō Commentary. They all say "permanent" and do not say "impermanent." Therefore, following that commentary, I have examined regarding the original "permanent." Perhaps this is a discrepancy in some editions. This should be investigated.
[One character indent]
Regarding this matter, with my dull nature, as an impromptu evaluation, like being deaf and blind, while the textual interpretation remains unclear, I barely explore the subtle meaning of the textual form. This probably differs from the Myōtō Commentary, etc. I should re-examine this later.
[End character indent]
"Question: Previously the probans on the example [through] what does the probans depend on?": Previously, the permanence and non-obstruction on the example are called probans on the example. This question's meaning says: If the permanent probans on the atoms example does not use the thesis-predicate permanent thesis as its basis, then what does this permanent probans use as its basis? [so to speak]. Because originally there is no probans of non-materiality of the reason on the atoms. Is this questioned regarding the permanent probans?
[Lower Section]
"Answer: Two explanations [through] no reason means no basis": The two explanations are: first, the example uses the reason as its basis; second, the example uses the example's basis as its basis. These are the two explanations. Generally, regarding the example's basis, there are two: first is the supporting basis, which is the reason; second is the essential basis, which is the example's basis. Generally, that examples possess these two bases is inevitable. Both must be complete. Now these two explanations mean: regarding what is disputed as the example's basis, does one discuss it regarding the supporting basis [this is one], or is it an explanation discussing it regarding the essential basis [this is one]? The current text first raises the initial explanation. The initial explanation's intention is that the atoms homologous example should necessarily make the non-obstruction reason its essential nature. But since the non-obstruction reason does not exist upon the obstructed atoms, this example already lacks a basis. Since it already becomes lacking a basis, it becomes probans non-establishment's basis non-establishment [so to speak]. According to this meaning, all probans non-establishments should have the meaning of basis non-establishment.
[One character indent]
Question: Above, in clarifying probans non-establishment's essential non-establishment, regarding the meaning of depending on reasons, they do not immediately make general probans non-establishment into basis non-establishment, but present separate methods to reveal this fault. Namely, Sāṃkhya establishes against Buddhism: "Thought experiences all dharmas. Because it is the self. Like sense organs such as eyes." This is that method. This
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[Upper Section]
indeed has probans non-establishment in the example, and since there is one-sided non-establishment in the reason, the supporting basis's essence does not establish, becoming probans non-establishment's basis non-establishment. That meaning is most reasonable. But what is established now differs from this approach. How could the commentary's upper and lower parts cause contradiction? What uncertainty is there regarding non-obstruction's basis? Therefore, the current text should also be understood like the above. "No reason means no basis" means: because the reason's essence is not extremely established [one-sided, or mutual, etc. should follow accordingly], there is no basis for the example.
Answer: What is established now follows the back-writing's approach. The approach of the challenge also seems to have its reasoning. But carefully considering it, the back-writing's intention is extremely profound. Why? Regarding these two explanations, the first explanation seems somewhat contrary to the treatise. That is, generally probans non-establishment is merely an example's fault. Non-obstruction reason, atoms homologous example - this is that method. This means although the non-obstruction reason has no fault of non-establishment, it becomes a fault because the meaning of non-obstruction probans is lacking at the atoms' location. Only the example's location suffers the fault. Therefore, even if opening the four non-establishments, one should not exceed this boundary. But why, when creating basis non-establishment, does one relate matters to reason's non-establishment, not limiting to the example's single location? Having this doubt now, the back matter extensively takes the first explanation's obtained meaning, wanting to harmonize with the treatise. That is, the first explanation's meaning is that having non-establishment in the reason and making probans non-establishment into the example's basis non-establishment probans non-establishment is fundamental. Above, presenting the inference "because it is the self," below creating repeated questions and answers, all
[Lower Section]
are this type. But having no non-establishment in the reason and immediately making probans non-establishment into basis non-establishment probans non-establishment - this is definitely not permitted. The treatise's stated boundary merely discusses faults at the example's single location. Regarding this boundary, the portion of creating the four non-establishments is already complete and should definitely exist. Therefore, the current "because depending on reason, there is no essence" means: taking the absence of the non-obstruction reason on the example as basis non-establishment [so to speak].
[End character indent]
"Question: If reason lacks basis [through] this is basis non-establishment in the example": The question's meaning says: When the reason lacks a basis, what fault is there in the example? [so to speak]. This wants to question and reveal the type mentioned above where having non-establishment in the reason becomes the example's probans non-establishment basis non-establishment. The answer's meaning is: if the reason lacks basis, there is a non-establishment fault in the reason. If there is a non-establishment fault in the reason, there is basis non-establishment in the example [so to speak]. Therefore, according to the first explanation's meaning, regarding the example's probans non-establishment basis non-establishment, there are two types. One immediately makes probans non-establishment into basis non-establishment. One becomes basis non-establishment because there is non-establishment in the reason. The first set of questions and answers reveals the first type, the current questions and answers reveal the latter type.
"Reason essence non-existent" means reason essence non-establishment [so to speak].
"Question: If one says reason lacks basis, etc.": This questions regarding the above latter type. The meaning says: previously saying if there is no basis thesis, there is non-establishment in the reason; if there is non-establishment in the reason, the example lacks basis - but having only the thesis absent while reason and example exist, etc., various faults of deficiency - how could these exist? As established now, if the thesis is absent, reason and example necessarily cannot exist accordingly.