英語訳
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary of Hetuvidyā, Volume 8
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They successively do not establish. That principle is inevitable [so to speak]. "If one says there is no predicate, etc." means making them rescue from this challenge, then challenging the rescue. The rescue's intention says: In times of deficiency, having no thesis means explaining the absence of a predicate as no-thesis. When there is no predicate, since reason and example successively perish, there cannot be faults of deficiency such as having no thesis but having reason and example. The subject can exist. Therefore it should not perish accordingly.
Therefore, the intention of challenging the rescue says: Subject and predicate are both the thesis. Why explain only the absence of predicate as no-thesis? The absence of subject - is this also not no-thesis? [so to speak]. "If one says no subject means no thesis-reason" means making them rescue again. The intention says: The absence of subject also constitutes no-thesis. At this time, if there is no thesis then there is no reason, and if there is no reason then there should be no example [so to speak].
"Reason having three characteristics [note enclosed: three, probably superfluous], etc." means challenging again. The intention says: Reasons have three characteristics. All three characteristics are reason. If there is no subject, only the first should be lacking. Though the first is lacking, the latter two characteristics can exist. Why say there is no basis and thus generally no reason? The latter two characteristics already exist. Why not name them reason? [so to speak]. "If one says because of faults they are not named reason" means making them rescue again. The intention says: Though there are the latter two characteristics, since the first characteristic is lacking, this reason already has faults, therefore it is not made into reason.
"Namely the fourteen reason [faults] [...] why need separate explanation" means challenging again. The intention says: Regarding the fourteen faults of reasons, non-establishment has faults therefore does not become reason, hence is named non-establishment. Uncertainty and contradiction, though having faults, do not fail to be reasons. Therefore they are given separate names. If so, saying that having faults means not being reason is improper. If according to this principle, all fourteen reasons should
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be given the name of non-establishment. Because they all have faults. Because they all cannot be reasons. Since it is not so and they are given separate names, we know that though having faults, they can still be named reasons [so to speak]. All the above are questions. Within the questions, they repeatedly investigate.
"However, according to logic, etc." is the answer. The intention says: Though reasons have three characteristics, when properly speaking of reason, only the first characteristic is taken. Because it is not the latter two characteristics. Though lacking the latter two characteristics, if the first characteristic is not lacking, it is named three-reason. Not giving uncertainty and contradiction the name of non-establishment is for this reason. But if there is no subject, the first characteristic necessarily lacks. If the first characteristic lacks, then even having the latter two characteristics, it is not reason. Because it is not reason, the example has no basis. Because there is no basis, it becomes probans non-establishment's basis non-establishment. This means even if there is a predicate, if there is no subject, it is like this. Here we know: having non-establishment in the reason, one becomes the example's basis non-establishment [so to speak].
"First saying, speaking exhaustively, etc." is the second explanation among the two explanations marked above. Among the example having two bases, the current example's basis non-establishment discusses it regarding essential substance [so to speak]. The non-obstruction reason stated in the treatise has no non-establishment at all. Sound and Vijñānavāda are mutually extremely established. Because one cannot say it is not permitted in both mutual or one-sided cases. Not relating matters to reason's non-establishment, but only within the example should the four non-establishments be exhausted. Following the example's substance being mutual, following one's permission or non-permission, one should distinguish probans non-establishment's basis non-establishment. This explanation already accords with the treatise's stated probans non-establishment methodological text, therefore it is good [so to speak].
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However, all consciousness can establish dharmas, etc., below.
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"The text follows the previous" means, the back-writing says: Zhou says: "In the previous explanation of the probans' absence, adding treatise text saying: 'Because of the permanent nature of all atoms.' Now this also follows the thesis-predicate below, combining to say 'Because all consciousness is non-obstructed.' Therefore it says 'follows the previous' [text]."
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The established dharma's permanent nature being absent, etc., below
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"Provisionally regarding depending on thesis as the example's basis, etc." means, the back-writing says: Regarding the example's basis non-establishment, there are three explanations. First: the thesis-predicate on the example uses the thesis-predicate's inseparable thesis as its basis. Second: using the probans reason as basis. Third: using the example's basis as basis. Among these, the third is superior. The current commentary text discusses the first explanation. [etc.]. Probans basis non-establishment has two explanations. First: making reason the essence. Second: making example-basis the basis. The current thesis-predicate basis non-establishment has three explanations, adding making thesis the basis. That there are differences of two explanations and three explanations following probans and thesis-predicate non-establishments may be because looking toward reason [probans non-establishment] and looking toward thesis [thesis-predicate non-establishment] are the same.
"Some say: already having probans, etc." refers to Master Wengui. The back-writing says: Kuiji says: "The ancient commentary's intention says: 'Like the previous inference, though there is no thesis-predicate self, there is the reason of aggregative nature. The thesis-predicate on the example immediately has a basis.' Next, challenging 'If both establishments are absent' means: 'If Sāṃkhya establishes the reason of aggregative nature, it can be as stated. If establishing the reason of transformation-impermanence, then both establishments are absent. Is this not thesis-predicate basis
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non-establishment? Why not permit having the fourth?' [etc.]."
"Question: The thesis-predicate on the example, etc." means, this question's intention says: The permanent thesis-predicate on the consciousness example - what dharma does it use as its basis? If one says it depends on the probans reason, one cannot say only the reason independently depends on the subject. The example should also depend on the subject. Both reason and example are probans and should be comparable. Therefore, if one says it depends on the thesis-predicate in the thesis, it is as previously challenged [so to speak]. "As previously challenged" means, the back-writing says: Kuiji says: "The previous challenge said: Reason and example are similar. Example depends, reason doesn't depend - this is logically unacceptable. Also, the opponent doesn't accept the thesis-predicate thesis. How can one speak of essence?" [etc.].
"Answer ○ First: Though reason and example are both probans, etc." means, there are three explanations in the answer. This first explanation's intention says: The thesis-predicate on the example uses the probans reason as its basis. But regarding the analogical challenge: though reason and example are both probans, because the example obstructs the reason, it doesn't depend on the subject [so to speak].
"Similarly, if so then there is one-sided, etc." means raising a question regarding the second explanation. The question's intention, the back-writing says: "The intention says: If the thesis-predicate on the example depends on the thesis thesis-predicate, provisionally regarding the sound-impermanence inference, challenge saying: If the impermanence thesis-predicate on examples like pots depends on the impermanence thesis-predicate of the thesis, then the pot example has other's one-sided basis non-establishment. Because the opponent Sound-school doesn't permit impermanence to exist on sound. Since the impermanence thesis-predicate on the pot example lacks a basis, therefore the example has the fault of one-sided basis non-establishment" [etc.]. Therefore this question's intent is that all inferences could have this fault. Therefore there can be no correct inferences [so to speak].
"Answer: Already saying all, etc." means, the back-writing says: