翻刻
【右頁】
【枠外右上】
四二六【但し算用数字】
【枠外右横上】
因明大疏私抄卷第九
【枠外右横下】
七八
【二段構成】
【上段】
義科＿一者。超＿二今疏所明＿一。難＿レ云＿二具辨＿一。倩見＿二此文＿一。定指＿二 二
量章＿一《割書：見タリ》。若爾能立不成已下。惣￣シテ淄洲御作歟。 明
燈抄云。廣此二量。如＿二義林章及法苑章第二卷辨＿一《割書：云云》。
此抄意。能立不成已下￣ノ本疏。尚慈恩御作￣ト存歟。
有依於此唯二量文等者。是文軌師說也。 如疏具述者。
彼師疏也。有＿レ過者。明燈抄云。卽軌師疏云。前所立量有＿二
相違因過＿一。卽法自相相違過￣ナリ等《割書：云云》。
又傳云外道《割書：乃至》非比極成現所有。一分不極性量《割書：乃至》簡
過如前者。裏書云。周云。此是賢法師在＿二北川＿一傳￣タル量￣ナリ。
法師集＿二此比量＿一也《割書：云云》。又云。邑云。問夫決定相違。有 法（陳那）
仍（違ル也）舊。今何改＿レ之。 答。外道本量。正以＿二現 所（至▢[▢：敎？]量）有量。比所（譬喩▢量）
有量＿一。而爲＿二有法＿一。餘之簡￣ハ＿レ過非＿二正有法＿一。設爾不同￣トモ無＿二
違＿レ理失＿一。然此相違量。理稱難＿レ解。且有法旣言＿二非現＿一。法
中而言＿二是現＿一。豈無＿二自語相違＿一。又云 極成（陳那初▢[違ヵ]決）比所有一分不
極成量者。卽散心緣至敎及義准量。亦在＿二其中＿一。今若成＿二
此量現量攝＿一。後有＿二 一分違宗之過＿一若以＿二 一分之言＿一。簡＿二￣ハヽ
義准等＿一。卽因有＿二不定＿一。爲如＿二現量＿一。比量所不攝￣ニシテ量所攝
【下段】
故。一分￣ノ定心所緣￣ノ至敎是現量攝￣ナラム。爲如＿二散心所緣至
極（敎歟）＿一。極成比量所不攝￣ニシテ量所攝故。一分不極成量￣ノ 非＿二是
現量攝＿一耶。宗中旣云＿二極成比＿一。故得＿下以＿二不極成比＿一以爲＿中
不定＿上也。有＿二此多過＿一。消息亦難。本量旣稱＿二傳立＿一。陳那之
量。亦是傳聞￣ナルノミ。旣無＿二典據可＿一レ憑。有￣トモ＿レ過不＿二卽爲＿一レ責。
但是疏主因＿レ言敍＿レ之《割書：云云。已｜上裏書。》准＿二此等記＿一。今此一段。非＿二疏
主自義＿一。只引＿二載傳說＿一給也。未＿三必一一文皆可＿二依憑＿一歟。
又陳那初違決作法。今疏本只云＿二非＿レ現比所有一分不極
成量＿一。准＿二邑記＿一可＿レ云＿二非＿レ現極成比所有￣ノ一分不極成量＿一
歟。是以後違決有＿二極成言＿一。准思￣ニ邑法師所覽本可＿レ爲＿レ勝
歟。但今一段大意云。量云。比非極成現所有量《割書：乃至》非現
量攝者。外道對＿二大乘＿一。成＿三現量外有＿二至敎量＿一之比量也。大
乘￣ハ至敎攝＿二現量＿一故《割書：爲言》。
又成立離比量外《割書：乃至》簡過如前者。外道對＿二大乘＿一。成＿三比量
外有＿二義准。譬喩等量＿一之比量也。大乘￣ハ義准等攝＿二比量＿一
故《割書：爲言》。初段中言非比量《割書：乃至》故云所有量者。釋＿二宗簡別＿一。
因中言極成《割書：乃至》非現量攝者。釋＿二因簡別＿一也。釋＿二宗簡別＿一
【左頁】
【枠外左上】
四二七【但し算用数字】
【枠外左横上】
因明大疏私抄卷第九
【枠外左横下】
七九
【二段構成】
【上段】
之中。然狹帶說故云所有量者。裏書云。周云。以＿二所有言＿一
含＿二至敎等＿一。名爲＿二狹帶＿一《割書：云云》。今此外道所立二箇比量。初
量正指＿二至敎量＿一。稱＿二現所有量＿一。故此量正。有法￣ハ至敎量
也。後量￣ハ正指＿二義准等＿一。稱＿二比所有量＿一故此量￣ノ正有法￣ハ
義准等也。次陳那菩薩等￣イフ已下。敵者大乘陳那於＿二前
二箇量＿一。各勘＿二相違決定過＿一也。其意易＿レ知。不＿レ改＿二至敎。義
准有法＿一故。是違決也。
其二相體《割書：乃至》不同經中所說等者。尋云。談＿二 二量相＿一事。
若如＿二 二相＿一。隨＿二因明内明二門＿一。有＿二不同￣ナルコト＿一哉。若二門全
同哉。若全同￣ナラ者。今此明＿二 二相＿一事。出＿二 二量所緣＿一也。二量
若二敎所明全同￣ナラハ。此之所緣￣ノ二相￣ヲハ隨＿二 二敎＿一不＿レ可＿レ
釋□何今云＿二不同經中所說自相＿一。云＿二亦與經中共相別□＿一【□二箇所：底本中の記号】
《割書：考【四角で囲む】別□｜恐體別》哉。【□：底本中の記号】若如＿二所緣二相＿一。能緣二量￣モ二敎可＿二不同＿一者。因
明門￣ニハ可＿レ云＿下緣＿二前陳＿一智￣ヲ名＿二現量＿一。緣＿二後陳＿一智￣ヲ名＿二比量＿一。
緣＿二言陳＿一智￣ヲ名＿二現量＿一。緣＿二意許＿一智￣ヲ名＿二比量＿一等￣ク＿上歟如何。
今尋重意云。因明現比。同＿二内明現比＿一歟。將不同歟。若
同￣ナラ者。所緣自共。定可＿レ如＿二内明門＿一。何今云＿レ異＿二經所說＿一
【下段】
哉。若不同者。其因明現比相。如何可＿レ云＿下緣＿二有法＿一智￣ヲ名＿二
現量＿一等＿上歟《割書：爲言》。 答。二明現比。其相不＿レ可＿レ替。只同事
也。但料＿二-簡今文＿一有＿二 二義＿一。或先德傳云。今文明＿二現比二
量￣ノ境＿一。卽緣＿二有法＿一爲＿二現量＿一。緣＿レ法爲＿二比量＿一云也。或義云。
今文但明＿二比量境＿一也。因明￣ノ自共二相。内明￣ニハ惣其相也。
二重境￣ノ二相￣ハ二明無＿レ替。因明￣ノ汎爾二相。不＿レ同＿二内明二
相＿一。是以上￣ニ依此二相唯立二量￣ト者擧＿二 二量所緣二相＿一。雖＿レ
同＿二經中所說二相＿一。次￣ニ其二相體今略明之￣ト者。卽明＿二因
明￣ノ自共二相＿一。故云＿レ不＿レ同＿二經中所說＿一也。《割書：今二義中。且｜可＿レ依＿二後義＿一。》凡内明
意￣ハ離言￣ヲ名＿二自相＿一。可言￣ヲ名＿二共相＿一。現量心。緣＿レ前比量￣ノ所
得￣ハ後之分齊也。其可言中。以＿レ義又建＿二-立二相＿一。事多重
也。此二相據＿レ實皆共相也。皆比量心所得之分齊故。今
因明自性差別者。此可言中二相也。三重對皆可言之分
齊也。局通￣ト云￣フモ於＿二可言分＿一。局＿二-附己體＿一。以＿レ貫＿二-通諸法＿一。
體￣ト義￣トヲ分也。餘二對准可＿レ知。《割書：如＿レ此歟。｜可＿レ尋之。》
有說自相《割書：乃至》此共相者。是文 軌說（彼疏二）也此義意。火熱相等。
其言￣ノ不＿レ得分￣ノ能燒體相￣ヲ名＿二自相＿一。現量心得＿レ之。其言￣ノ
現代語訳
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【上段】
義科でないならば、今の疏の所明を超えて、「具に弁ず」と云うことは難しい。この文をよく見れば、定めて二量章を指している【見たり】。もしそうならば能立不成以下、総じて淄洲の御作か。明灯抄に云う。「この二量を広くすること、義林章及び法苑章第二巻の弁の如し【云云】」。この抄の意では、能立不成以下の本疏は、なお慈恩の御作と存じるか。
「この唯二量の文等に依る者がある」とは、これは文軌師の説である。「疏に具に述べるが如し」とは、彼の師の疏である。「過がある」とは、明灯抄に云う。「即ち軌師の疏に云う。前に所立の量に相違因の過がある。即ち法自相相違の過である等【云云】」。
また伝に云う「外道【乃至】非比極成現所有。一分不極成量【乃至】過を簡ぶこと前の如し」とは、裏書に云う。周に云う。「これは賢法師が北川にて伝えた量である。法師がこの比量を集めたのである【云云】」。また云う。邑に云う。「問う。夫れ決定相違は、有法が（陳那）仍（違るなり）旧である。今何ぞこれを改めるのか。答える。外道の本量は、正に現所（至教量）有量、比所（譬喩量）有量を以て、有法と為す。その余の過を簡ぶのは正しい有法ではない。そうでなくても理に違う失はない。然してこの相違量は、理は称すれども解し難い。且つ有法が既に『現でない』と言い、法中にて『これは現である』と言う。豈に自語相違がないであろうか。また云う。極成（陈那初[违か]決）比所有一分不極成量とは、即ち散心が至教及び義准量に縁ずるもので、亦その中にある。今もしこの量が現量摂であることを成立させれば、後に一分違宗の過がある。もし一分の言を以て義准等を簡べば、即ち因に不定がある。現量の如くして、比量所不摂にして量所摂なる
【下段】
故に、一分の定心所縁の至教はこれ現量摂であろうか。散心所縁至極（教か）の如くして、極成比量所不摂にして量所摂なる故に、一分不極成量は現量摂でないのか。宗中に既に極成比と云う。故に不極成比を得て以て不定と為すのである。この多くの過があり、消息も亦難しい。本量が既に伝立と称し、陳那の量も、亦これ伝聞のみである。既に典拠で憑るべきものがなく、過があっても即ち責めと為さない。ただこれは疏主が言に因って敍べただけである【云云。已上裏書。】この等の記に准ずれば、今この一段は、疏主の自義ではない。ただ伝説を引き載せて給うのである。必ずしも一一の文が皆依憑すべきものであろうか。
また陳那初違決の作法で、今の疏本はただ「現でない比所有一分不極成量」と云う。邑記に准ずれば「現でない極成比所有の一分不極成量」と云うべきか。これを以て後の違決に「極成」の言があり、思うに邑法師の所覧本が勝れているか。ただ今の一段の大意に云う。量に云う。「比非極成現所有量【乃至】現量摂でない」とは、外道が大乗に対して、現量外に至教量があることを成立させる比量である。大乗は至教を現量に摂するが故に【為言】。
また「比量外を離れて成立する【乃至】過を簡ぶこと前の如し」とは、外道が大乗に対して、比量外に義准、譬喩等の量があることを成立させる比量である。大乗は義准等を比量に摂するが故に【為言】。初段中に「非比量と言う【乃至】故に所有量と云う」とは、宗の簡別を釈す。因中に「極成と言う【乃至】現量摂でない」とは、因の簡別を釈すのである。宗の簡別を釈す
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中で、然して狭帯説なる故に「所有量」と云うとは、裏書に云う。周に云う。「『所有』の言を以て至教等を含み、名づけて狭帯と為す【云云】」。今この外道所立の二個の比量で、初量は正に至教量を指し、「現所有量」と称する。故にこの量の正有法は至教量である。後量は正に義准等を指し、「比所有量」と称する故に、この量の正有法は義准等である。次に「陳那菩薩等が云う」以下、敵者である大乗の陳那が前の二個の量に、各々相違決定の過を勘るのである。その意は知り易い。至教、義准の有法を改めない故に、これは違決である。
「その二相の体【乃至】経中に所説と同じからず」等とは、尋ねて云う。二量の相を談ずる事で、もし二相の如くならば、因明内明二門に随って、不同があるのか。若しくは二門全く同じか。もし全く同じならば、今ここで二相を明かす事は、二量の所縁を出すのである。もし二量が二教の所明と全く同じならば、この所縁の二相を二教に随って釈すべきでないのに、何故今「経中に所説の自相と同じからず」と云い、「亦経中の共相と別□」と云うのか【□二箇所：底本中の記号】【考【四角で囲む】別□恐らく体別】【□：底本中の記号】。もし所縁の二相の如く、能縁の二量も二教が不同であるべきならば、因明門には「前陳に縁ずる智を現量と名づけ、後陳に縁ずる智を比量と名づけ、言陳に縁ずる智を現量と名づけ、意許に縁ずる智を比量と名づける」等と云うべきか。如何。
今尋ねる重意に云う。因明の現比は、内明の現比と同じか。将た不同か。もし同じならば、所縁の自共は、定めて内明門の如くであるべきなのに、何故今経の所説と異なると云う
【下段】
のか。もし不同ならば、その因明の現比の相は、如何に「有法に縁ずる智を現量と名づける」等と云うべきか【為言】。答える。二明の現比は、その相替わるべきではない。ただ同じ事である。ただ今の文を料簡するに二義がある。或る先徳の伝に云う。今の文は現比二量の境を明かす。即ち有法に縁ずるを現量と為し、法に縁ずるを比量と為すと云うのである。或る義に云う。今の文はただ比量の境を明かすのである。因明の自共二相は、内明には総じてその相である。二重境の二相は二明に替わりがない。因明の汎爾二相は、内明の二相と同じではない。これを以て上に「この二相に依って唯二量を立つ」とは二量の所縁二相を挙げる。経中に所説の二相と同じといえども、次に「その二相の体を今略してこれを明かす」とは、即ち因明の自共二相を明かす。故に経中の所説と同じでないと云うのである。【今の二義中、且く後義に依るべし。】凡そ内明の意は離言を自相と名づけ、可言を共相と名づける。現量心は前に縁じ、比量の所得は後の分斉である。その可言中に、義を以て又二相を建立する。事は多重である。この二相は実に拠れば皆共相である。皆比量心の所得の分斉なる故に。今因明の自性差別とは、この可言中の二相である。三重の対は皆可言の分斉である。局通と云うのも可言の分において、己体に局附し、義を以て諸法に貫通するもの体と義を分かつのである。余の二対は准じて知るべし。【この如きか。尋ねるべし。】
「自相という説がある【乃至】この共相」とは、これは文軌の説（彼の疏二）である。この義の意は、火の熱相等で、その言の得ざる分の能焼体相を自相と名づけ、現量心がこれを得る。その言の
英語訳
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Private Commentary on the Great Commentary on Hetuvidyā, Volume 9
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[Upper Section]
If it is not a doctrinal section, then surpassing what is clarified in the present commentary, it would be difficult to say "fully distinguished." Looking carefully at this text, it definitely points to the two-inference chapter [seen]. If so, then from "probans non-establishment" onward, is it generally Zizhou's composition? The Myōtō Commentary says: "Extensively explaining these two inferences, as distinguished in the Girin Chapter and Hōen Chapter Volume 2 [etc.]" In the intention of this commentary, is the original commentary from "probans non-establishment" onward still considered Cien's composition?
"There are those who rely on this text of only two inferences" - this is Master Bunki's teaching. "As fully described in the commentary" refers to that master's commentary. "There are faults" - the Myōtō Commentary says: "That is, Master Ki's commentary says: The previously established inference has the fault of contradictory reason. Namely, it is the fault of contradicting the dharma's own-characteristic, etc. [etc.]"
Also in the tradition it says "Non-theists [...] non-comparative established present possessed. Partially non-established inference [...] eliminating faults as before" - the marginal notes say: Zhou says: "This is an inference that Master Ken transmitted at Kitagawa. The master collected this inference [etc.]" Also says: Yup says: "Question: The decisive contradiction has the subject (Dignāga) still (contradicting) old. Why change it now? Answer: The non-theists' original inference correctly takes present-possessed inference and comparison-possessed inference as the subject. The rest of eliminating faults is not the correct subject. Even if different, there is no fault of violating reason. However, this contradictory inference, though the principle is acclaimed, is difficult to understand. Moreover, the subject already says 'not present,' while in the predicate it says 'this is present.' How could there be no self-contradictory language? Also says: Established (Dignāga's initial [contradictory] decision) comparison-possessed partially non-established inference refers to scattered mind relating to scriptural teaching and analogical inference, which are also included therein. Now if we establish that this inference is included in direct perception, later there will be the fault of partially contradicting the doctrine. If using the words 'partially' to eliminate analogical inference etc., then the reason has indeterminacy. Like direct perception, being unincluded in comparative inference yet included in inference
[Lower Section]
therefore, would partially concentrated mind's object of scriptural teaching be included in direct perception? Like scattered mind's object of ultimate (teaching?), being unincluded in established comparative inference yet included in inference, therefore would partially non-established inference not be included in direct perception? Since the thesis already says 'established comparison,' therefore one obtains using non-established comparison to make it indeterminate. Having these many faults, the circumstances are also difficult. The original inference already being called 'traditional establishment,' Dignāga's inference is also merely hearsay. Since there are no textual authorities to rely on, even having faults does not immediately become blame. This is just the commentary master narrating according to the words [etc. Above from marginal notes.]" According to these records, this present section is not the commentary master's own doctrine. It merely quotes and records traditional teachings. Must every single text necessarily be reliable?
Also regarding Dignāga's initial contradictory decision method, the present commentary base only says "non-present comparison-possessed partially non-established inference." According to Yup's record, should it say "non-present established comparison-possessed partially non-established inference"? Therefore the later contradictory decision has the word "established," and thinking about it, Master Yup's examined text might be superior. But the general meaning of this present section says: The inference says: "Comparison non-established present-possessed inference [...] not included in direct perception" - this is the non-theists' inference against Mahāyāna, establishing that outside direct perception there is scriptural inference. Because Mahāyāna includes scriptural teaching in direct perception [meaning].
Also "establishing apart from comparative inference [...] eliminating faults as before" - this is the non-theists' inference against Mahāyāna, establishing that outside comparative inference there are analogical, metaphorical and other inferences. Because Mahāyāna includes analogical inference etc. in comparative inference [meaning]. In the first section saying "non-comparative inference [...] therefore called possessed inference" explains the thesis's qualification. In the reason saying "established [...] not included in direct perception" explains the reason's qualification. Explaining the thesis's qualification
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[Upper Section]
within this, "because it is narrow-band explanation therefore called 'possessed inference'" - the marginal notes say: Zhou says: "Using the word 'possessed' to include scriptural teaching etc., naming it narrow-band [etc.]" In these two inferences established by non-theists now, the first inference correctly points to scriptural inference, calling it "present-possessed inference." Therefore this inference's correct subject is scriptural inference. The latter inference correctly points to analogical inference etc., calling it "comparison-possessed inference," therefore this inference's correct subject is analogical inference etc. Next, "Bodhisattva Dignāga etc. say" onward - the opponent Mahāyāna's Dignāga examines the fault of decisive contradiction for each of the previous two inferences. The meaning is easy to understand. Because it does not change the subjects of scriptural teaching and analogical inference, this is contradictory decision.
"The substance of these two characteristics [...] not the same as explained in the sūtras" etc. - inquiring: Regarding discussing the characteristics of two inferences, if like the two characteristics, following the two gates of hetuvidyā and inner teaching, are there differences? Or are the two gates entirely the same? If entirely the same, then clarifying the two characteristics here expresses the objects of the two inferences. If the two inferences are entirely the same as explained in the two teachings, then these object's two characteristics should not be explained according to the two teachings - why now say "not the same as the self-characteristics explained in sūtras" and say "also different □ from the universal characteristics in sūtras" [□ two places: symbols in base text] [examining [boxed] different □ probably substance-different] [□: symbol in base text]. If like the two characteristics of objects, should the two inferences of capable-cognition also be different in the two teachings, then in the hetuvidyā gate should one say "cognition relating to the former part is called direct perception, cognition relating to the latter part is called inference, cognition relating to verbal expression is called direct perception, cognition relating to mental intention is called inference" etc.? How so?
The重意 of present inquiry says: Are hetuvidyā's direct perception and inference the same as inner teaching's direct perception and inference? Or different? If the same, then the objects' self and universal should definitely be like the inner teaching gate - why now say different from what the sūtras explain
[Lower Section]
? If different, then how should the characteristics of hetuvidyā's direct perception and inference be called "cognition relating to the subject is called direct perception" etc. [meaning]? Answer: The direct perception and inference of the two teachings should not change in their characteristics. They are simply the same matter. But examining the present text there are two doctrines. A certain predecessor's transmission says: The present text clarifies the objects of the two inferences of direct perception and inference. Namely, relating to the subject becomes direct perception, relating to the predicate becomes inference. A certain doctrine says: The present text merely clarifies the objects of inference. Hetuvidyā's two characteristics of self and universal are generally their characteristics in inner teaching. The two characteristics of the dual-level objects have no difference in the two teachings. Hetuvidyā's casual two characteristics are not the same as inner teaching's two characteristics. Therefore above "relying on these two characteristics, establishing only two inferences" raises the two characteristics that are objects of the two inferences. Although the same as the two characteristics explained in sūtras, next "the substance of these two characteristics, now briefly clarifying them" immediately clarifies hetuvidyā's two characteristics of self and universal. Therefore it says not the same as explained in sūtras. [Among the present two doctrines, one should tentatively rely on the latter doctrine.] Generally, inner teaching's intention names beyond-language as self-characteristic, names speakable as universal characteristic. The mind of direct perception relates to the former; what inference obtains is the latter's scope. Within that speakable, using doctrine again establishes two characteristics. The matter is multi-layered. These two characteristics, according to reality, are all universal characteristics. Because they are all the scope of what the mind of inference obtains. Present hetuvidyā's own-nature and differentiation are the two characteristics within this speakable. The three-fold oppositions are all the scope of the speakable. Even saying "particular-universal" is within the speakable portion - being particular-attached to one's own substance, using doctrine to penetrate-through all dharmas, dividing substance and meaning. The remaining two oppositions can be understood accordingly. [Is it like this? Should be inquired.]
"There is an explanation of self-characteristics [...] this universal characteristic" - this is Bunki's explanation (his commentary 2). The meaning of this doctrine is that fire's heat characteristics etc. - naming the burning substance-characteristics of the portion that language cannot attain as self-characteristics, which the mind of direct perception obtains. That language's