英語訳
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Saying "reverence" - its meaning has not yet been revealed. Based on this, a Chinese master explained this text saying "Because the objects of reverence are numerous, 'reverence' is repeated." Is this explanation's reasoning clear? How is this?
In my view: The commentary's later text says "Following the various eloquences mentioned below, all wish and seek to obtain them. Because the Buddha is supreme, because he is the fundamental basis." The meaning is: What is perfected later refers to the possessed eloquence. When wishing and seeking to obtain this, since the Buddha is the foundation of eloquence, one reverences him. Here, the first "reverence" generally honors all Three Jewels, while the next "reverence" specifically honors the Buddha. This is honoring them as general and specific, which most certainly has intent. Regarding Master Xing's explanation, its intent does not reach this level.
Question: In the sūtra, the brahmin Kauṇḍinya, in order to obtain wonderful eloquence, requests abundant empowerment with twenty-five verses including "reverence to the non-deceptive" etc. Should he request empowerment from pratyekabuddha sages?
Proceeding to say: The sūtra appears not to request this. Regarding this: Generally examining pratyekabuddhas, they cultivate the twelve-link dependent origination contemplation and attain the fruit of emptiness of persons and freedom from defilements. Since their virtue already has power, why not request this? Moreover, even inferior śrāvakas still request this. Why not request from the middle vehicle pratyekabuddhas? Especially among the eloquences sought above, it mentions "pratyekabuddha sages' wonderful eloquence." Judging the below by the above, shouldn't the pratyekabuddha vehicle definitely not be omitted? Then Kauṇḍinya's original intent is difficult to know. How is this?
In my view: That the sūtra text's before and after differ most certainly should have its reason. Generally, pratyekabuddhas' Dharma teaching is rarer than śrāvakas'. Even when teaching, others cannot realize fruition - this is the explanation in Xuanzan Volume 4.
【Lower section】
Xuanzan does not provide the reason. The Lotus Commentary Volume 9 explains this. Because śrāvakas appear in the same age as buddhas, the sentient beings during their lifetime have merit, virtue, and sharp faculties, so hearing śrāvakas' Dharma teaching they realize fruition. Because pratyekabuddhas appear in ages without buddhas, sentient beings have meager merit and dull faculties, so hearing pratyekabuddhas' Dharma teaching they do not realize fruition. Based on this principle, pratyekabuddha sages are not requested. However, regarding the eloquence sought above, since pratyekabuddhas possess the four eloquences, they are reverenced above. The upper and lower sūtra texts each have their reasons.
Question: Regarding the sūtra text clarifying eloquence merits, when pratyekabuddha sages benefit others, should they utter Dharma-teaching words? There are problems both ways. If not appropriate, properly examining this sūtra's explanation, it says "pratyekabuddha sages' wonderful eloquence." If they possess unimpeded eloquence regarding words, how would they not utter Dharma-teaching language? If based on this they do speak, the Yogācāra treatise clarifying pratyekabuddha conduct states "only manifesting bodily signs, not teaching Dharma to them, not uttering words." How is this?
In my view: This should be resolved based on the above. Regarding the Yogācāra treatise, it discusses the majority of cases.
Question: In the present sūtra commentary, regarding clarifying precept characteristics, must bhikṣu discipline be received from others, or how is it? There are problems both ways. If not necessarily received from others, explaining bhikṣu discipline requires that reception definitely have proper procedures. Namely, the recipient stands before the teacher, regulates bodily and verbal deportment, then sequentially performs the proper ordination ceremony. Through one announcement and three ordination procedures, reaching the end of the third procedure, when chanting "this matter is thus maintained," aspirations are fulfilled and the precept essence is accomplished.
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If not received from others, how could this be accomplished? Based on this, the Yogācāra treatise explains bhikṣu discipline: "There is no spontaneous reception; originally received from others." Also, the Vijñānavāda treatise's root commentary and the Forest of Meanings chapter alike state "bhikṣus are not self-received but received from others." If based on this they must be received from others, in the present sūtra commentary it judges "not necessarily must be received."
In my view: Bhikṣu precepts are received through ritual procedures, necessarily received from others. The Forest of Meanings on Manifest and Non-manifest Actions cites Yogācāra treatise explanations: bhikṣu precepts, because of being ashamed before self and others, having shame and conscience in receiving them, are necessarily received from others. However, regarding the present commentary's explanation: in the present sūtra, when reciting divine mantras and summoning the Great Auspicious Goddess, it explains that for seven days and nights one should receive the eight purification precepts. The commentary explains this sūtra text: this is explained based on the two assemblies of lay upāsakas and upāsikās. If based on the five ordained assemblies, they need not necessarily receive them. Since the eight purification precepts are lay precepts, if there happens to be occasion to receive them, one's body becomes lay in receiving them. For the ordained portion, they do not receive them. This does not discuss bhikṣu discipline. How could this be contradictory?
The five ordained assemblies are: Śikṣamāṇā precepts (training precepts)
Bhikṣuṇī precepts (five-category precepts)
Upāsaka precepts (five precepts)
Śrāmaṇera precepts (ten precepts)
Bhikṣu precepts (five-category precepts)
【Lower section】
Question: The sūtra text clarifies the Tathāgata's realm: "all dharmas as they exist, all dharmas as they really are." Does this "all dharmas as they really are" extend to both fundamental and subsequent cognition's objects? There are problems both ways. If limited to fundamental cognition's objects, generally dharmas as they really are take the seven true suchnesses as their essence. Here examining the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra's explanation: "Combined they are named 'as they really are,' separately establishing the seven true suchnesses like transmigration etc." Yet in the Vijñānavāda treatise clarifying the seven true suchnesses: "because they are objects of both fundamental and subsequent cognition." Judging the sūtra by the treatise, they should definitely extend to subsequent cognition's realm. If following this, in the root sūtra commentary it says "respectively, namely the sphere of activity of the previous two cognitions." This makes what exists as such and what really is such respectively the spheres of subsequent and direct cognition. Clearly knowing they do not extend to subsequent cognition's objects. How is this?
In my view: "All dharmas as they exist" refers to the categorical distinctions of all dharmas, being the substantial matters of conditioned phenomena. This is the object of subsequent cognition. Beyond this, saying "all dharmas as they really are" should definitely be fundamental cognition's object. That is, the true principle that is the nature of all conditioned substantial bodies. If equally extending to subsequent cognition's objects, how could there be no distinction? Here the present commentary states: "what exists as such" is dharmas' substantial matters; "what really is such" is dharmas' principles. Also judging the former as conventional truth, they are respectively assigned as objects of subsequent and fundamental cognition. However, regarding the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra's seven true suchnesses as essence: the three of true characteristics, consciousness-only, and purity being fundamental cognition's objects speaks in terms of predominance; the four of wrong conduct etc. being subsequent cognition's objects discusses in terms of designation. If discussing the oneness of suchness as it really is,