英語訳
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Dharma Garden Meaning Mirror — Eliminating Obstacles Chapter
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(Continued from the previous page) ...Śāriputra fell back: when [he] was about to offer [his] eye [as an act of bodhisattva practice], the recipient disliked the smell [of the eye] and trampled and crushed it with his foot, whereupon [Śāriputra] immediately fell back and arose the mind of a śrāvaka. The details are as explained in that sūtra.
Regarding "The text: 'What is it called elimination?', up to 'also called elimination of entanglements' ": This question is raised based on the *Yogācārabhūmi* fascicle fifty-eight. That text says: Question: "When practitioners eliminate afflictions, do they abandon entanglements (*纏*, *paryavasthāna*), or do they abandon latent tendencies (*隨眠*, *anuśaya*)? Because of eliminating what is it said to be 'elimination'?" Answer: "It is merely abandoning latent tendencies, because affliction-entanglements have already been abandoned previously." And so on, extensively explained. "Entanglements and latent tendencies do not arise at all in the end." However, this chapter text says "fascicle fifty-nine," and the character "nine" is probably an error. "[Affliction-]entanglements have already been abandoned previously" means: on the preparatory path (*加行道*) the entanglements are suppressed, and on the uninterrupted path (*無間道*) the seeds are eliminated. Hence [the text] says "the entanglements have already been abandoned previously." Once the latent tendencies are eliminated, the entanglements no longer arise; hence [the text] says "they will not arise at all in the end, and this is also called eliminating entanglements."
Regarding "The text: 'This [declares that] the noble path,' up to 'is explained as elimination' ": The above [passages] are all text from the treatise (*論*); the following is the text of the chapter author (*章家*). "The noble path properly eliminates latent tendencies, etc." — speaking broadly about the meaning of "elimination," there are in all two kinds: first, eliminating seeds, etc. and leaving no remainder permanently; second, merely breaking and suppressing [them] so that the power of the seeds diminishes and present afflictions (*現惑*) do not arise. If the seeds are eliminated, only uncontaminated wisdom (*無漏智*) [can do this]. If the power [of the seeds] is diminished, both contaminated and uncontaminated wisdom can accomplish this. The present [discussion] speaks only of the meaning of eliminating seeds through uncontaminated wisdom. If [someone] objects, saying "since seeds and the path cannot co-arise, how can one call it 'eliminating seeds'?" [Note: "난" (*難*) in one edition is written as "雖" (*although*)] — [the answer is:] even though [the seeds] do not co-arise with the path, with respect to the continuous succession of before and after in a single body, through the power of cultivating the noble path, the root consciousness (*本識*), etc. is made to be free from latent tendencies at all three times [past, present, and future]. Hence it is called "eliminating seeds of the three worlds." These various meanings have
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already been explained previously. Hence [the text] says "as explained as meaning previously, this is called elimination."
Regarding "The text: 'Question: the true [seeing path of] three minds,' up to 'because of the two coarse minds' ": This is the fourth question, raised by the chapter author himself. The intent of this question also reveals the following: if the seeing path of the three minds is taken as the "true seeing path" (*真見道*), then since the observation of dharma-emptiness (*法空観*) is subtle (*細*), it must necessarily encompass the observation of personal emptiness (*生空*). If so, the second mind should also additionally eliminate the clinging to personal selfhood (*人執*). That would mean personal-self clinging (*人執*) is eliminated through three minds, while dharma-self clinging (*法執*) is eliminated only through two minds. [Or] should it be [understood as]: the subtle dharma-observation eliminates [afflictions] in three minds, while the coarse personal-emptiness observation eliminates [afflictions] in two minds?
Regarding "The text: '[Although] the dharma-observation is subtle (in answer),' up to 'otherwise it contradicts the treatise' ": The intent of this answer reveals: although the dharma-observation is subtle and necessarily encompasses personal emptiness, the second mind does not eliminate personal-self clinging (*生執*). This is like how the dharma-observation that eliminates afflictions at the ten grounds (*十地*), although it eliminates the habitual tendencies of afflictions, does not remove latent tendencies, because [personal-self clinging] is not the primary obstacle on the path of the ten grounds, and because [the practitioner] does not aspire to [its removal] at the time of the preparatory mind. The *Zuan* [i.e., *Yilin zhang zuanshi* by Huizhao (*慧沼*)] says: "At the ten grounds this is acceptable, because [the afflictions] are deliberately retained. But the deluded views (*見惑*) are not like that. Why are they not eliminated? One should answer: the second mind, while bearing the observation of personal emptiness (*生観*), follows the power of the other [dharma-emptiness observation]; even though [the personal-emptiness observation] arises, it does not eliminate personal-self clinging. If that [second mind] were to eliminate personal-self clinging, it should also be said to 'remove conceptual projections' (*遣情*). If so, there would be no difference among the three minds. Hence, each [type of clinging] is eliminated in two grades (*二品*), which does not contradict principle or teaching." This is a criticism of the chapter author's intent. Therefore, now [the chapter author] rescues [his position] by saying: "If the personal-emptiness observation carried by the second mind does not eliminate personal-self clinging because it follows the power of the other [dharma-observation], then the personal-emptiness observation carried within the third mind, likewise arising by following the other [observation's power], should also not eliminate personal-self clinging. By this reasoning, one should say, as the chapter author does, that [this] accords with the profound principle." "Both [types of clinging] are eliminated in two grades, etc." means: the two clingings of person and dharma are both eliminated in two grades. The [second mind and] first
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Dharma Garden Meaning Mirror — Eliminating Obstacles Chapter
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and third [minds] eliminate personal-self clinging, while the second and third [minds] eliminate dharma-self clinging; hence [the text] says "both are eliminated in two grades." The *Yogācārabhūmi* fascicle fifty-five says: "The first mind eliminates the inferior grade (*下品*) of personal-self clinging; the second mind eliminates the inferior grade of dharma-self clinging; within the third mind, both the superior grade (*上品*) of the two clingings are simultaneously eliminated." If one does not say "two grades," one immediately contradicts this treatise; hence [the text] says "otherwise it contradicts the treatise." Question: "The third mind is the liberation path (*解脱道*). How can one say that this is what ably removes everything?" Answer: "Elimination has three meanings. First, suppression (*伏*) is called elimination — this is the preparatory path (*加行道*). Second, properly eliminating is called elimination — this is the uninterrupted path (*無間道*). Third, blocking and cutting off (*遮断*) is called elimination — this is the liberation path. Because it blocks off the future seeds of the preceding two grades and causes them never to arise permanently, [the liberation path] is said to ably eliminate all coarse impediments (*麤重*)."
Regarding "The text: 'Question: [whether it is] the comprehensive-cognition [wisdom],' up to 'ably eliminates afflictions' ": This question is raised based on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* etc. [Note: below, this follows the text of *Shuji* (*述記*), fascicle ten, main text (folio 53, left)]. The intent of this question reveals: here, what is called "elimination" — does [one] eliminate [afflictions] through the wisdom of comprehensive cognition (*惣緣智*), or through the wisdom of particular cognition (*別緣智*)? What problem lies in either of these? If the wisdom of comprehensive cognition can eliminate [afflictions], comprehensive-cognition wisdom is not wisdom cognizing particular characteristics (*自相*). How could inference (*比量*) regarding common characteristics (*共相*) ably eliminate delusion? If the wisdom of particular characteristics (*別相智*) can ably eliminate [afflictions], it immediately contradicts the texts of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and fascicle fifty-nine, etc. Hence the *Abhidharma* treatise, fascicle seven, etc. says: Question, "What kind of mental engagement (*作意*) can eliminate [afflictions]?" Answer, "By means of the mental engagement of comprehensive cognition, observing that all dharmas are without a nature of selfhood (*我性*), one ably eliminates afflictions." Śīlabhadra (*師子覚*) says: "The mental engagement of comprehensive cognition is the mental engagement [Note: "令" in one edition is written as "合"] that cognizes all dharmas, operating through common characteristics (*共相*)." The *Zuan* says: "Fascicle fifty-nine says: 'Only through the mental engagement of comprehensive cognition can one eliminate afflictions.' If so, when one observes the true particular characteristics (*真自相*), one should not be able to
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eliminate delusion. The [question's] intent is also the same."
Regarding "The text: 'The second [position:] the *Buddhabhūmi* treatise says,' up to 'both particular and common characteristics' ": As explained in the *Buddhabhūmi* (*佛地論*) treatise, fascicle six [Note: below, this follows the text of *Shuji* (*述記*), fascicle ten, main text (folio 54, right)]: "How can the Buddha know common characteristics? Since common characteristics are established in reliance on inference (*比量*), would the Buddha's knowing of common characteristics be inferential?" That text has three positions (*三説*). This is the first position. The passage beginning "Although this master says..." is the chapter author's text. This master's intent says: "The *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (*集量論*) [i.e., Dignāga's work] explains that the two kinds of cognition — direct perception (*現量*) and inference (*比量*) — in the position of the scattered mind (*散心*) are established in reliance on particular characteristics (*自相*) and common characteristics (*共相*) [respectively]. It does not say they exist in the position of meditative concentration (*定位*). In the mind of meditative concentration (*定心*), when one cognizes all characteristics, everything is subsumed under direct perception. Because of this, even the comprehensive-cognition wisdom is subsumed under direct perception, and there is no fault in saying it eliminates delusion. This is because [the mind of] meditative concentration illuminates the very nature of common characteristics directly; hence the mind of meditative concentration is called 'direct perception'." The *Zuan* says: "According to this explanation, since the mind of meditative concentration is already admitted to cognize both particular and common [characteristics], only one who cognizes common [characteristics] can eliminate afflictions. The observation of emptiness and non-self (*空無我観*) observes common characteristics; hence the meaning is also the same. However, with respect to the observation of emptiness and non-self, there is comprehensive [cognition] and there is particular [cognition]. It is still not clear what the first master takes [as his position]. It is difficult to determine by comparison."
Regarding "The text: 'The second master says,' up to 'this is not common characteristics' ": This is all text from the treatise. "The mind of meditative concentration cognizes only particular characteristics, etc." — all minds of meditative concentration cognize only particular characteristics; they are all direct perception, and each has its own particular characteristics to know. However, when led (*引*) by the expedient means (*方便*) of common characteristics to cognize various common characteristics and reveal the principle of particular characteristics — with respect to [those] expedient means, one says [the mind] "knows common characteristics." If one does not describe the object of cognition using the expedient means in this way, [one would say the mind] knows particular characteristics. Also, since for the Tathāgata (*如來*) there is no [state of] non-meditative mind, [the Tathāgata] knows only particular characteristics, which is direct perception. Through this, by the expedient principle through which the two kinds of emptiness (*二空*) can express (*能詮*) suchness (*真如*), either by calling suchness [...]